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Abstract
The popularity and remarkable forecasting accuracy of Information Markets in the
past decade made them very attractive to companies as well as organizations. In-
formation Markets are online based market systems and utilize market mechanisms
for the aggregation of information. Market prices can be interpreted to forecast
outcomes of future events. While Information Markets were traditionally used in
political or sports events, increasing usage in industry contexts is reported in scien-
tific literature, for instance, to predict sales figures or project durations. Information
Markets show impressive prediction accuracy and often outperform other forecas-
ting methods and experts. However, Information Markets still have not become an
established part of companies’ forecasting strategies. In recent years, only a few
reports about their usage in industry environments were published. Nevertheless,
a promising application in companies is the usage of Information Markets for the
assessment of innovations since it efficiently integrates many relevant people in-
to decision making. In contrast to traditional methods like surveys, Information
Markets constantly aggregate information once it becomes available and allow im-
mediate interpretation of market results. Furthermore, performance based incentive
mechanisms can be applied and trading in Information Markets is often perceived as
entertaining by traders as well. However, there has only been little contribution to
academic literature addressing the application of Information Markets in enterprise
contexts.
In this work, experimental evidence for the assessment of innovations in compa-
nies is given. Results of a field experiment show that employees accept Enterprise
Information Markets as a valuable method for innovation management. In additi-
on, they are motivated to use them and, thus, market results show that employees
assess innovation alternatives similar to an experts’ benchmark. One of the main
challenges is the size of Information Markets in an industrial context regarding the
activity of participants due to the thread of low liquidity and, therefore, inefficient
markets. Hence, another field experiment is introduced focusing on the successful
operation of small-sized markets. In an investigation about trading behavior and
activity it can be shown that permanent liquidity is essential in order to get conti-
nuous forecasts. Participants in an artificial market yielding liquidity performed ten
times more transactions compared to a parallel market. Moreover, besides increased
market activity the results of the market are more accurate as well as less error
prone.
Summarized, this work provides results from two field experiments and shows that
Information Markets produce accurate results given an appropriate market design –
even in small-size markets. Furthermore, it demonstrates the successful application
ii
in an enterprise innovation context. The consolidated findings of both experiment
results provide a valuable reference for designing future Information Markets in
industry contexts.
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Part I
Foundations & Related Work

1 Introduction
F
orecasting has always been an essential method in decision making situations
in times of uncertainty and doubt. Organizations and companies use fore-
casting methods to overcome these situations as one of the main challenges
in the 21st century. New products and technologies, globalization, shorter prod-
uct life cycles, uncertainty, new trends as well as changes in law cause increased
pressure for innovation and competitiveness (Urban and Hauser 1993). Especially
in financial crises, where state-of-the-art methods show weaknesses and drawbacks,
the capability of predicting future developments drives companies and organizations
more than ever to develop and implement forecasting methods in order to better
manage trends, potentials, opportunities, strengths and risks. Moreover, in innova-
tion contexts making the right decisions is of utmost importance. Decision making
about innovations is directly associated with estimations and beliefs of success in
the future. Hence, strategic innovations, which will take effect in the future, can
also be understood as a sort of forecasting task in order to choose which innovation
is the most promising. Choosing a sub-optimal innovation strategy for instance may
lead to substantial losses in market shares decreasing sales figures or earnings.
Today, executives and decision makers choose their actions based on vague infor-
mation about future profitability of new products and services. They align their
decision making with the company strategy supported by innovation life cycles to
manage their innovation activities. Therefore, they need as much as information
about future developments. One of the most crucial decisions is about innovation
alternatives. Since the success of innovations can only be measured after the inno-
vation is implemented, picking out the most promising one out of several sets the
seal on companies’ success in the future. For example, a study published in 2007
about technology innovations for cars state that until 2015, 800 billion Euro will
be granted out of research funds to develop innovations. Approximately 40 % of it
will be invested in unsuccessful projects and customers are only willing to buy 17 %
of innovations offered (Dannenberg and Burgard 2007). Dannenberg and Burgard
(2007) identify a serious economical deficit. They propose that car manufacturers
as well as component suppliers should align their innovation management even more
towards the needs of their customers.
4 1 Introduction
Nowadays, executives discuss which innovation will be implemented in meetings
based on forecasts developed by experts, consultants or externals. On the one hand,
decision making solely based on forecasts from experts can be risky in case that ex-
perts or externals do not have direct contact to customers and vendors which can
be of valuable information. On the other hand, sales employees often possess de-
tailed information about expectations, requirements and needs of customers. It
is therefore advantageous to integrate employees in order to integrate their infor-
mation in innovation management (Spann and Skiera 2003; Soukhoroukova 2007;
Chen et al. 2010). Furthermore, the combination of different methods for decision
making and forecasting can be advantageous (Armstrong 2001). Armstrong (2001)
claims that the combination of forecasts is in the majority of cases increasing the
overall forecasting quality. From that point of view, adding further information
from employees is promising in order to improve a company’s innovation strategy.
This implicit knowledge needs to be extracted, which causes a serious effort if many
employees are involved. Therefore, an efficient method needs to be used, which is
convenient to evaluate as well as capable of integrating ad hoc information. For
instance, ad hoc information appears once estimations and beliefs of employees or
experts changes. These changes must be represented instantly by an appropriate
method in order to make it available for executives. Moreover, methods for the
aggregation of information need to be continuous in order to integrate new infor-
mation at any time. Traditional methods like surveys, meetings or Delphi studies
are hard to operate in a real time manner.
In this work, Information Markets are introduced as a method to aggregate and
assess estimations and beliefs about future events at once. Information Markets
promise to meet the requirements of an industry context, e.g. an intuitive user
interface, the application of incentive mechanisms for the participation as well as
continuous analysis and interpretation.
In 1984, a connection between orange juice futures and weather was identified by
Roll (1984). The futures’ prices interpreted as predictor of weather forecasts were
more accurate than the National Weather Service of the US Department of Com-
merce. In this case, the individual expectations of traders for orange juice futures
were reflected in prices. That way, the interpretation of market prices can be con-
sulted in order to derive weather forecasts. This example of the predictive power of
markets gained popularity and was picked up in several fields of application. When
Information Markets were firstly operated in 1884 for U.S. presidential elections they
performed remarkably well at a time before the era of scientific polling had begun
(Rhode and Strumpf 2004). Past 1940, no reports about the usage of Information
Markets were published for almost 50 years. In 1988, the IOWA Electronic Markets
Experiment1 (IEM) picked up the concept of Information Markets again to forecast
political elections with an online-based market system. Henceforward, results of
Information Markets have outperformed benchmarks like polls, surveys or expert
judgments regularly. In recent years, Information Markets have emerged strongly in
the field of forecasting. The number of scientific reports about the method increased
and scientists have experimented with Information Markets in different fields of ap-
plication. For example, the usage in the field of sports predictions, for instance
1http://www.biz.uiowa.edu
5STOCCER2 or TradeSports3, medicine or entertainment applications like the Hol-
lywood Stock Exchange (HSX)4, gained increased popularity. Several academics
state that in many fields of application the results show a high prediction accuracy
compared to traditional forecasting techniques (Pennock et al. 2001a; Spann 2002;
Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004; Luckner 2008).
This development draws attention to organizations and companies in the late
1990s. Siemens used the market mechanism of Information Markets to forecast
the completion of software development projects (Ortner 1997). Hewlett-Packard
forecasted sales figures of printers and Ely Lilly assessed the market success of
pharmaceutical products (Plott and Chen 2002; Polgreen et al. 2007). Other reports
describe the successful usage of Information Markets for marketing purposes or the
assessment of product innovations (Spann 2002; Soukhoroukova 2007).
Altogether, Information Markets operate similar to financial markets. Informa-
tion Markets are basically a market system where futures about uncertain events
are traded. Contracts represent events whereas market prices can be interpreted as
probabilities for the outcome of an event. Traders in Information Markets buy and
sell contracts based on their individual expectation about the likelihood of an event.
Market prices therefore comprise expectations and beliefs of individual traders and
are generated via the market mechanism. Traders perceive changes in market prices
and update their own expectation based upon their available information, if they
agree with the current market price or not. Otherwise they start to trade and put
their individual information artifact about a future event into the market. Hence,
an Information Market can be seen as a representation of the “Wisdom of Crowds”,
where aggregated information of several individuals shows more accurate results
than of single individuals (Surowiecki 2004).
Once the real outcome of the predicted event is finally known, contracts are paid
out according to payout rules. For example, the winning contract pays 1 currency
unit and all other pays 0 if an event occurs. As a consequence, rational traders buy
contracts if they belief that the likelihood of an event is undervalued in the market
and sell them in case of overvaluation respectively. In efficient information markets,
all available information is continuously reflected in market prices (Fama 1970; Fama
1991). Compared to traditional forecasting methods, Information Markets provide
considerable advantages in terms of continuous forecasting, participation, cost ef-
ficiency, incentive mechanisms and analysis. The market mechanism aggregates
information comprised in buy and sell orders automatically into the market price
once two corresponding orders are executed. In contrast to Delphi studies5, surveys
or brainstorming sessions, the effort of analyzing results and managing the infor-
mation aggregation is dramatically reduced. Due to the continuity of market prices
traders interpret changes in prices caused by other traders immediately as new in-
formation. In turn, this motivates them to directly update their own expectations
and to respond according to their own beliefs (Hanson 1999).
2http://www.stoccer.com
3http://www.tradesports.com, ceased operation in 2008
4http://www.hsx.com
5Delphi studies are structured methods to aggregate group estimations over several rounds where
feedback of each round serves as input for the next round. Refer to Section 2.2.3 for further
details.
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Therefore, markets need to be designed carefully in order to get appropriate re-
sults. Nuances in the market mechanism, user interface, market design or incentive
mechanism influence traders decisions. Hence the market design needs to be en-
gineered and an appropriate design is required (Weinhardt et al. 2003). Deficits
in vital parts of the market system may lead to market failures and thus valuable
market accuracy may get lost or results maybe distorted. Some evidence is reported
in scientific literature stating that market failure may be consequence of structural
drawbacks in market design (Schmidt et al. 2008).
In field of application with moderate public interest and especially in enterprise
contexts, markets may suffer from illiquidity and low trading activity. In particular,
in organizations where the forecasting object may be of bounded attractiveness
compared to sport or political topics or topics that are very special so that only
a small group may have relevant information, one can expect small-size markets.
Furthermore, Information Markets are used in order to assess new product ideas
and innovations. The challenge is that there is no real world event to benchmark
the market results as it would be the case for sports or political events. That is
why only a few innovations can be implemented out of several innovation proposals
due to financial and strategic restrictions. Different payout mechanisms need to be
designed or artificial benchmarks need to be created or consulted. In case of small
markets, some reports describe the usage of automated market makers as liquidity
providers in order to support low liquidity markets (Das 2005; Boer-Sorban et al.
2007). Automated market makers can be implemented as software agents following
a certain trading strategy in order to react to market circumstances at any time as
well as to keep the market liquid and, thus, attractive for human traders.
1.1 Research Questions
In this work, two main research objectives are investigated. First, an investigation
about the effect of automated market making on the market quality is conducted
as a means to an end in order to enable small-size Information Markets to produce
useful results. Second, the results of the first research objective were used in a
second field experiment for the assessment of innovation alternatives in a company,
where small-size markets were expected in all probability.
The first research objective studies the impact of automated market making in
Information Markets in the field of sport forecasting where Information Markets
often proved to produce very accurate results. During the UEFA6 European Soccer
Championship 2008 a field experiment was conducted with two identical markets.
The only difference was that one market employed an automated market maker
whereas the other one did not. Trading data of both markets were analyzed after
the experiment in order to measure the market quality improvements in forecasting
accuracy, trading activity and market efficiency. Both markets were kept artificially
illiquid in order to isolate the impact of automated market making on liquidity.
The main objective of this investigation is to provide evidence that Information
Markets produce appropriate results even if they are small-sized and trading ac-
tivity is relatively low. Moreover, the research on appropriate functionalities like
6http://www.uefa.com
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automated market makers is valuable in designing Information Markets for enter-
prise usage. Information Markets are powerful to aggregate asymmetric information
from people if the topic of the market is of public interest. But sometimes Informa-
tion Markets suffer from low liquidity, especially if Information Markets are about
topics and events of moderate public interest. Therefore, the first research question
investigates the impact of an automated market maker mechanism in Information
Markets to support small-size markets.
R1: Do Information Markets show more trading activity, increased ac-
curacy, less error and higher information efficiency utilizing automated
market makers?
In order to investigate R1, aspects like accuracy, trading activity and information
efficiency are analyzed. Two identical markets are developed to forecast the results
of the European Soccer Championship where the only difference was the employment
of an automated market maker in one market. If automated market making fosters
more accurate results, automated market making should be an integral part in
further Information Markets where illiquidity could distort market results. The
experiment design of the Information Market as well as the results are described in
Chapter 4.
The second research objective of this work is about the usage of Information
Markets for the assessment of innovation alternatives using the results from the
first field experiment. As mentioned, Information Markets may be used in industry
contexts to integrate employees or customers in innovation processes as an additional
source of information for decision makers. The challenge here is to pay out contracts
without having an outcome of an event. Therefore, an appropriate market design
and incentive mechanism need to be engineered in order to assess the quality as well
as the mode of operation of Information Markets. A field experiment was conducted
in 2009 at EnBW Baden-Wu¨rttemberg7 in order to investigate the motivation of
employees in participating as well as the result of the Information Market compared
to the assessment of decision makers. Results of the investigation about the impact
of automated market making were used in this experiment to keep the market liquid
and attractive. The second research question in this work analyses the usage, the
design as well as the operation of Information Markets in an enterprise environment.
R2: How to design and operate Information Markets for innovation as-
sessment in enterprises?
Assessing innovation alternatives and decision making about it are crucial tasks
for decision makers because decisions in innovation contexts may have substantial
financial effects for years. Furthermore, the analysis includes the identification of
lead users. This type of traders is extremely important and interesting for companies
in decision processes due to their empathy to the innovations which is reflected in
their trading activity. Therefore, lead users can be involved in ongoing activities like
7EnBW is one of the fourth largest energy suppliers in Germany.
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discussions, expert panels or consultancy. The design decisions of the market system
for innovation assessment and the results of the field experiment are introduced in
Chapter 5.
R1 and R2 amalgamate whenever an Enterprise Information Market (EIM) suffers
from low liquidity. If not enough participants in a company are actively trading in
the EIM and a trader wants to reveal his information in the market, there may be
no counterpart to complete a transaction. At this point, the consolidated findings of
the first research question (R1) provides valuable insights into the positive impact of
automated market making in illiquid markets. The findings help to design markets
for innovation assessment which motivate participants to trade while offering them
a continuous possibility to integrate their information at any time.
1.2 Overview & Structure
This work is structured into six chapters. After the introduction, Chapter 2
provides an overview about the state-of-the-art in Innovation Management and in-
troduces scientific approaches and experiments. In addition, promising new fields
of application like Business Networks in combination with Open Innovation are de-
scribed. Furthermore, commonly used techniques for the assessment of information
by groups are briefly explained followed by challenges identified for the usage of
Information Markets in innovation contexts.
Chapter 3 gives an overview on the fundamentals of markets in general and In-
formation Markets in particular. The key functionalities and design aspects of
markets are explained. Furthermore, a definition of Information Markets as well
as their operational principles and theoretical foundations are described, especially
about market liquidity and efficiency. Chapter 3 furthermore presents the current
fields of application for Information Markets as well as traditional methods and the
usage of Information Markets in organizations and companies. The chapter provides
an overview about how Information Markets can be used and which design aspects
have to be considered. Furthermore, Innovation Management in TEXO, which is a
research project about the Internet of Services, is briefly introduced. In TEXO, in-
novation management plays a central role whereas the assessment of innovations via
Information Markets is an important component in inter-organizational contexts.
Chapter 4 studies the impact of automated market making during a field experi-
ment in order to forecast the results of the European Soccer Championship in 2008.
The results show that the use of automated market making leads to higher trading
activity, increased market accuracy and decreased forecast errors compared to the
parallel run market without market making capabilities. Moreover, it can be shown
that automated market making fosters increased information efficiency of small-size
Information Markets.
Chapter 5 analyses the usage of Information Markets in an industrial innovation
context. In 2009, a field experiment was conducted at EnBW Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
in order to assess innovation alternatives considering employees’ opinions. The re-
sults show that Information Markets motivate employees to participate and reveal
their individual information and beliefs about innovation alternatives. Furthermore,
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employees’ implicit knowledge is a valuable additional information for decision mak-
ers which can be externalized via Information Markets. A lead user analysis is con-
ducted to identify the most active and successful traders in order to integrate them
into further steps.
Chapter 6 summarizes the overall contribution and discusses implications of this
work. Furthermore, it identifies promising fields of application for Information Mar-
kets and proposes further research questions related to this work. Figure 1.1 illus-
trates the structure of this work.
Figure 1.1: Structure of this Thesis
1.3 Related Publications
Parts of this work were reviewed and presented at scientific conferences and work-
shops as well as published in the respective proceedings and book chapters.
Concerning the results of Chapter 4, the results of the field experiment and the
impact of automated market making were published in Stathel et al. (2008), Stathel
et al. (2009) and Stathel (2009a). The prototype used to conduct the experiments
described in Chapter 4 is explained in Stathel, van Dinther, and Scho¨nfeld (2009)
and Stathel, Luckner, Teschner, Weinhardt, Reeson, and Whitten (2009). Fur-
thermore, the results were presented at the 3rd Workshop on Prediction Markets,
Chicago, USA (Stathel et al. 2008), the PhD Summer School of the XVIII. Interna-
tional RESER Conference, Stuttgart, Germany (Stathel 2008) and the SMI Spring
Workshop “Kollektive Intelligenz”, Stuttgart, Germany (Stathel 2009b).
The results of Chapter 5 have been accepted for publication at the ICITIE Con-
ference (Stathel et al. 2010). Furthermore, the concept and preliminary results of
using Information Markets in innovation contexts were published in Stathel et al.
(2008), Riedl, May, Finzen, Stathel, Kaufman, and Krcmar (2009), Riedl, May,
Finzen, Stathel, Leidig, Kaufman, Belecheanu, and Krcmar (2009), Stathel (2009a)
and Finzen et al. (2010). In addition, the TEXO Innovation Lifecycle for Service
Innovation as well as results for innovation assessment were discussed at PhD Sum-
mer School of the XVIII. International RESER Conference, Stuttgart, Germany
10 1 Introduction
(Stathel 2008) and the SMI Spring Workshop “Kollektive Intelligenz”, Stuttgart,
Germany (Stathel 2009b).
Beyond that, between 2007 and 2010, the research on Information Markets for
innovation assessment was contributed to and reviewed within the THESEUS pro-
gram8 initiated and funded by the Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology.
The work at hand is part of the research project TEXO9 as a part of the THESEUS
program that aims at creating a platform to foster the evolvement of a service
platform of composable service modules. A relevant part of TEXO supports the in-
novation phase of services to support the creation of value-added complex services
and enable their trade on the Internet.
8http://theseus-programm.de/en-us/home/default.aspx
9http://theseus-programm.de/en-us/theseus-application-scenarios/texo/default.aspx
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I
n this chapter, Innovation Management will be introduced in order to illustrate
use cases where Information Markets can contribute to. In Section 2.1, the
application of Innovation Management in enterprises will be outlined. Sec-
tion 2.2 presents traditional methods for decision making to show the difference
between them and Information Markets. Challenges in Innovation Management are
introduced in Section 2.3.
Companies have been pursuing innovation management for years. To manage
ideas with structured processes to support decision makers in a way that valuable
ideas will not get lost. Often, employees have good ideas how to improve processes
or organizational structures. Instead of disregarding these ideas, the ability to inno-
vate is a key success factor for growth and competitiveness (Christensen and Raynor
2003). Getting ideas cannot be“enforced”or steered by structured processes. There-
fore, many companies run idea submission platforms where for instance, employees
can submit their ideas. SAP, for example, runs its Target Idea Management1 in
mySAP2 to manage ideas from employees. Yet, companies complain that the rate
of submitted ideas decreases over time and that it takes a long time before an in-
novation manager is able to review them. Furthermore, idea submission platforms
are intransparent and lack real time feedback for submitters.
Several frameworks and approaches for idea and innovation processes exist in
scientific literature. Wahren (2003) introduced an innovation process with the three
phases: idea generation, evaluation and implementation. Wahren’s process is one of
the traditional examples of a structured process where generated ideas are screened
by an innovation manager. Promising ideas are refined in further stages and finally
implemented and used.
Hamel (2002) developed a model named “innovation wheel” in order to support
the creation of ideas, its fast implementation and the subsequent user feedback
1http://www.target-soft.com
2mySAP is an e-business software integration tool that delivers content to the user based on his
or her role in an enterprise.
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to further improve the innovation. Small steps and continuous feedback lead to
incremental improvement where promising innovations are encouraged and non-
promising innovations are dropped. Thus, innovations will not come to a “final”
state but stay in perpetual beta stages.
Soukhoroukova and Spann (2005) as well as Chen et al. (2010) successfully used
Information Markets for the assessment of product innovations. Compared to con-
joint analyses (cp. Green and Rao (1971)) and other techniques such as surveys,
Information Markets employing 8-12 participants performed well and the results
were more robust and reliable compared to a conjoint analysis with 307 partic-
ipants. Hence, Soukhoroukova and Spann (2005) find that Information Markets
seem to be suitable for the assessment of product innovations.
The assessment of new ideas and future trends is a difficult task since it is often
based on vague information and uncertainty due to long forecasting horizons. Tech-
niques exist for long term forecasting such as the Delphi method or Information
Markets. A comparison of different methods for the aggregation of group members
will be discussed in Section 2.2. The main result can be summarized as follows:
Information Markets offer some advantages which can be exploited in innovation
contexts regarding incentive schemes and information aggregation.
Information Markets only perform well if the market is liquid enough. How-
ever, sufficient liquidity can also be achieved given a quite small amount of traders
(Soukhoroukova and Spann 2005). Yet, given a small set of participants, such liq-
uidity is guaranteed if and only if the participants are motivated to trade actively
throughout the whole market period.
2.1 Innovation Management
Today, companies have to face many challenges regarding innovation. Possible
sources for innovation pressure are new products from competitors, arising trends
and technologies as well as changes in legislation (Urban and Hauser 1993). There-
fore, companies have to develop an innovation strategy which allows them to stay
competitive and successful. In innovation contexts, all these aspects arising from
the different challenges have to be considered in decision making. If decisions are
not based on a solid information background, new products may be of minor suc-
cess which may lead to substantial decrease in a company’s reputation or monetary
losses (Urban and Hauser 1993; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; Cooper 1999).
In order to assemble a comprehensive base for decision making Information Markets
are a promising method to integrate employees for the assessment of innovations,
which will be shown in the following as an additional information source.
2.1.1 State of the Art in Innovation Management
An innovation consists of three components: innovation = idea + invention +
diffusion (Corsten et al. 2006). Figure 2.1 illustrates the components. The first
component of an innovation is the idea. An idea is a creative sudden thought, a
notion. But even the very best idea is of little value without further development.
In order to develop ideas, a structured approach is necessary to bring the idea to
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the state of an invention, which leads to the successful realization of a promising
idea. This can be a prototype of a machine, a reference process or a product. The
diffusion completes the innovation process. The diffusion of an innovation is for
example the roll-out of a process or the market launch of a product.
Idea InnovationSuccessfulRealization
Invention Diffusion
Figure 2.1: From Ideas to Innovations
Adapted from Corsten et al. (2006)
The evolution from an idea to an innovation can be managed. Academia provides
several approaches for Innovation Management. Every approach proposes a different
way of how ideas shall be handled in order to optimally manage innovation processes.
In this section, several existing approaches will be described.
There are different kinds of innovations depending on their areas of application.
According to Hamel (2002), different types of innovations denote various levels of
value creation and competitive defensibility. Hamel’s innovation stack (cp. Fig-
ure 2.2) depicts different kinds of innovations according to their contribution to
success while management innovations have the biggest impact on the organization
followed by strategic innovations and so on. Later in this work, several innova-
tions about business relevant topics are introduced in an industrial context (cp.
Section 5.3). Most of them are on an operational level in that experiment.
Strategic Innovation
Operational Innovation
Product/service Innovation
Management Innovation
Figure 2.2: Innovation Stack
Adapted from Hamel (2002)
2.1.2 Scientific Approaches
Today, there are several theoretical innovation processes. The necessity for the
abundance of innovation processes today is the variety of companies which differs
in size, corporate culture and organizational form. Therefore, each process model
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highlights different aspects of the innovation process and applies different focuses.
Some of them were devised for incremental or radical innovations, others mainly de-
pend on the type of innovation (cp. Figure 2.2). The majority of process models are
tailored for product innovation. In the following, two popular scientific approaches
will be described in more detail to get an impression of innovation management.
2.1.2.1 Innovation process of Wahren
Wahren (2003) breaks down the innovation process into three stages: idea gen-
eration, idea evaluation and idea implementation. Each of these stages is complex
and consists of further phases.
The main aspect of the idea generation stage is the differentiation between three
idea pools. The first pool (I) collects all submitted ideas, the second Pool (II)
collects only mature, comprehensible and properly described ideas which reach the
second stage for evaluation. If an idea cannot be complemented and has no value,
it is forwarded into the trash which is Idea Pool III. According to the innovation
process of Wahren, the idea evaluation stage is the most important one and contains
three Phases in which ideas are further analyzed and filtered. Figure 2.3 shows the
model.
Submitted 
Ideas
Innovation 
Management
Checking and Completion of Ideas
Within an Idea Generation Phase
Idea 
Pool I
Phase A
Evaluation 
before the Start 
of the Project
Phase B
Evaluation during 
the Realization of 
the Project
Phase C
Evaluation during 
Probation in the 
Market
Ongoing Analysis of 
the Project
Innovation 
Conntrolling
Gradual 
Reduction 
of Ideas
Trash
Idea Pool III
Idea 
Pool II
Figure 2.3: Idea Evaluation and Innovation Life-Cycle
Adapted from Wahren (2003)
Phase I – idea evaluation before the start of the project: First, the com-
plemented ideas in Idea Pool II are filtered using pro and contra lists, checklists or
by organizing workshops. At this point, Information Markets can be used in order
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to filter them and use expectations and beliefs of employees from their individual
point of view. Wahren states that this rough evaluation sorts out approximately
50 % of all ideas. Afterwards, further evaluation steps are carried out. The remain-
ing ideas have to be analyzed in details. Following this analysis, only 30 % of the
original ideas remain. The last revision ends with the detailed cost-benefit analysis,
according to which a maximum of 20 % of the overall ideas (from Idea Pool II) can
be approved for implementation. As mentioned, the process of selecting promising
ideas can also be supported via Information Markets.
Phase II – evaluation during the realization of the project: In the second
stage of idea evaluation the 20 % of the residuary ideas are evaluated during their
implementation. It is an empirical fact that 50 % of these ideas will be rejected.
Phase III – Evaluation during probation in the market: Innovation con-
trolling deals with the idea evaluation either immediately after the project has
ended or within the probation period. Wahren distinguishes between evaluation on
the economic and procedural levels. The economic level monitors the achievement
of the objectives and the sufficiency of the resources used by analyzing the number
of employees involved in the project, the time invested in the project as well as the
overall project expenses.3 This information is a crucial factor for future projects
because an innovation proves itself only after a certain period of time.
The innovation process proposed by Wahren is a generic approach to innovation
management that is independent from the idea/innovation type and the application
area. It covers all stages of idea development from idea generation to receive feed-
back about realized ideas. The innovation process is transparent, well-structured
and systematic due to predefined activities and execution sequence, which are open
and visible to everyone. Nevertheless, its idea evaluation sub-process (Phases I-III)
and its criteria are not precisely specified. Because of the determined innovation life-
cycle, Wahren proposes to shorten the idea processing time. However, he does not
define any thresholds which would fix the execution duration of each phase. There
is also no role allocation that defines responsibilities for individual tasks and what
impact they have on the entire innovation process. Neither a possible collaborative
idea development nor an appropriate reward system is taken into account.
Considering the reward system, Information Markets can be used during the
evaluation phase as a collective tool for the assessment of innovations. Via the
supported incentive mechanism, the participation in the assessment of innovations
can be rewarded based on the individual performance and activity of each partic-
ipant. Furthermore, the assessment via Information Markets is transparent to all
participants and the assessment can be conducted via a community, which is advan-
tageous in decision making (Fu¨ller et al. 2004; Surowiecki 2004). Thus, Information
Markets can be a valuable tool for the assessment of ideas.
2.1.2.2 Innovation Wheel of Hamel
The innovation process provided by Hamel (2002) exhibits four fundamental com-
ponents: design rules for a radical innovation, innovation as a capability, innovation
3In this context, Siemens used Information Markets to forecast project durations (Ortner 1997).
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as a process and principles of effective activism (cp. Figure 2.4). Hamel’s innova-
tion model primarily aims at radical innovations. Radical innovations in contrast
to innovations for continuous improvement are characterized as several significant
changes in multiple aspects of a product or service. For example, running cars with
fuel cells would rather be considered a radical innovation than improvements in
fuel efficiency of conventional combustion engines. Hamel defines “Design Rules for
Radical Innovation” and describes “Activism” which are of minor importance in this
work and will not be discussed.
Design Rules for Radical Innovation
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Figure 2.4: Innovation Wheel
Adapted from Hamel (2002)
For this work, the interesting part is “Innovation as a Process” which is supported
by the capabilities a company need to have such as the capability to develop and
implement innovations (Innovation Skills), provide appropriate IT support for in-
novation tasks (IT for Innovation), develop adequate metrics to assess innovation
capabilities and value, as well as efficient management processes to support innova-
tion activities (Management Process). These capabilities support “Innovation as a
Process” as a closed loop for innovation management. The steps are similar to the
previously mentioned approach, starting with the idea creation and design phase.
The process is initiated with the idea development and design phases (Imagine,
Design). Once an idea is designed, small-scale experiments on a conceptual basis
are conducted in order to gather further insights about their value (Experiment).
The results are assessed (Assess) and finally the decision has to be made if the idea
will reach the next stage which can be further tests like large scale experiment or a
prototype. In this case, the “enveloped” process will start again with the five phases
in order to scale ideas till they reach a state where they are ready for the market or
the organization. Thus, the core idea of Hamel is to run the outer process several
times and on each cycle develop the idea further to a higher level. If an idea fails
the requirements, which increase on each level, it will be discarded.
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Hamel’s concept embraces the entire life-cycle of an idea several times, accompa-
nying it through its multiple transformations on the way to innovation. Even though
the innovation process is open and comprehensible, it is highly abstract without a
detailed view of the entire process. Especially in strategic decision situations it is
important to integrate different perspectives from employees, customers or vendors.
Hamel does not mention which single tasks are to be executed by different persons
and that all participants need to be motivated and rewarded in order to trigger a
further contribution by them. The difference to Wahren’s innovation process is that
Hamel implements a closed loop in order to provide continuous improvement and
scaling of innovations. After an innovation cycle is accomplished, it starts anew
with a new cycle to improve the achievements of the last cycle and scale ideas to a
higher level.
In Hamel’s model, Information Markets can again be used as a method of spe-
cialization during the experiment and assessment phase while providing instant
feedback. Furthermore, Information Markets incentivize participants via the per-
formance-based incentive and reward mechanism. In Section 3.4.3.1, a continu-
ous innovation management framework will be introduced developed in a research
project. The innovation management is similar to the above mentioned scientific
approaches. In every stage of an innovation life-cycle, methods and concepts are
developed including an Information Market approach to assess ideas before they
are realized in subsequent steps. In the next section, scientific experiments utilizing
Information Markets for the assessment of product ideas will be described.
2.1.3 Scientific Experiments
Scientific publications on Information Market usage in innovation contexts are
scarce – or have not been made public due to confidentiality about the usage. In
the following, two of them will be briefly explained.
In the first one, “Idea Markets” were used to generate product ideas and assess
them via a market system (Soukhoroukova 2007). It aims to assess the consistency
with traditional methods in product planning for a company. In this experiment,
participants were allowed to post their ideas directly in the market as contracts.
The market ran 36 days and was open to all employees. The 10 most successful
traders regarding their trading performance were remunerated with 3.000$ in to-
tal. Traders were endowed with virtual money. Furthermore, traders could submit
ideas for several categories: (a) new technologies for the company, (b) new product
ideas for a specific product category, (c) innovative product- and business ideas for
the company. Traders had to compose their initial portfolio of shares at market
start. Traders had to buy their portfolio items once they assessed a submitted idea
promising. After reaching a minimum investment threshold, contracts were kept
in the market and were not removed due to moderate quality or low popularity.
Altogether, the market results showed an acceptable consistency with the results of
traditional methods in product planning.
The usage of Information Markets was also reported in an enterprise innovation
context in order to demonstrate the applicability of Information Markets in inno-
vation contexts (Chen et al. 2010). In total, this market addressed about 700
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employees whereas 64 registered to the market. 61 employees were considered ac-
tive in the market, that is, traded at least once. The market was available for 2
weeks and about 3.200 trades were counted. In total, 17 contracts were traded
representing emerging technologies. As a benchmark, Chen et al. (2010) used an
expert panel assessing 6 out of the 17 contracts. After the market closed, the final
market prices were taken to compare them to the results of the expert panel. Un-
fortunately, there is no further information about why the experts only assessed six
contracts. Furthermore, the authors did not describe exactly how they closed the
market and how they come to their interpretations of the results. Overall, several
details are missing in order to understand the experiment design or repeat it.
Apparently, there is a research gap in the usage of Information Markets for in-
novation assessment – especially in business contexts. Questions like payouts for
traders, the composition of traders and how traders are supported with additional
information or communication methods need to be further investigated. In the next
section, a recently transformation process in companies will be briefly described.
Companies begin to open themselves for innovation coming from the outside, which
is important for customer integration. Innovation is no longer limited to be con-
ducted by R&D departments and therefore extents the application of Information
Markets for inter-organizational contexts.
2.1.4 Business Networks
During the last decade it could be observed that companies focused on their core
competencies and sold off business units which were out of scope. This has led to
a highly specialized economic landscape. For instance, the value creation in the
automotive industry was at only 35 % in 2002 and is estimated to decrease to 23 %
in 2015.4 The traditional value chain transforms into so-called Business Networks
(BN) in which enterprises collaboratively work together (Steiner 2005).
Traditional Value 
Chain
Specialization and inter-
organizational Value Creation
Flexible and Adaptive  
Business Network
Figure 2.5: Transformation to Business Networks
Adapted from Heuser et al. (2007)
4Mercer Consulting Study “Future Automotive Industry Structure (FAST) 2015”
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Nowadays, the transformation from hard-wired value chains into specialized parts
of a business process is intra-organizational. Therefore, other companies specialize
in certain parts of a value creation process. Together, several companies can create
value through combining or concatenating their process parts. The collaboration
of several companies offering their specialized parts leads to a flexible and adap-
tive Business Network (cp. Figure 2.5). Once a Business Network is established,
innovation processes covering certain steps of value creation need to be managed.
The communication between involved companies in innovation activities gets cum-
bersome for large-scale Business Networks. The assessment of innovations in the
value creation process can hardly be accomplished via Meetings or Delphi studies
due to their processing time. As an alternative, Information Markets can be used
offering advantages such as the ad hoc integration of assessment results from several
people continuously or an performance-based incentive mechanism. Furthermore,
Information Markets provide transparency of traders’ assessments about innovation
alternatives at any time. It is easy to integrate people from different companies via
Information Markets due to the continuous information aggregation capabilities in
an online-based web application. Thus, it can be used by executives to constantly
track the assessments of traders and to use this estimations for decision making. In-
formation Markets are therefore promising to be further used in inter-organizational
innovation contexts.
Besides the opening of companies to create value in BNs, also innovation pro-
cesses have to be conducted by involved companies. Therefore, “Open Innovation”
describes the ability of companies to open their innovation processes where Infor-
mation Markets can deliver a valuable contribution by integrating stakeholders, for
instance regular employees, executives and decision makers.
2.1.5 Open Innovation
The term open innovation was introduced and made popular by Henry Ches-
brough (Chesbrough 2003; Chesbrough 2006). Open innovation in general means
to open the innovation process of a company. Thus, the firm is given a lot more
possibilities how to deal with innovation. As shown in Figure 2.6, open innovation
can take place in both directions.
First, from inside of the company to outside, and second, the other way round.
The direction from inside the company to outside stands for the company opening
itself to sell its intellectual property to other firms. “Open innovation is character-
ized by cooperation for innovation within wide horizontal and vertical networks of
universities, start-ups, suppliers, customers and competitors. Companies can and
should use external ideas as well as those from their own Research & Development
(R&D) departments, and both internal and external paths to the market, in order
to advance their technology” (Laursen and Salter 2006). As Chesbrough (2003)
reveals, most of the intellectual property (IP) slumbers in the company and never
gets used. IP can be divided into different categories. First, IP that is currently
used and on which the innovations of the company are based. Second, IP that is
held back due to strategic reasons. Third, IP that was discovered and patented but
never used. One can divide the last type into IP that can be of use for the com-
pany and IP that has nothing to do with the company’s core business. Chesbrough
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Figure 2.6: Open Innovation
Adapted from Chesbrough (2003)
(2003) holds the opinion that the company can definitely sell IP of type three and
IP of type two in some cases. On the one hand, the company would benefit from
additional income through more openness. On the other hand, the society on the
whole would benefit. It is also possible that there are several companies that are
not able to do comprehensive R&D or cannot use specific processes due to patents
held by another company not using the IP. A lot of innovations would have never
been discovered if the company holding the IP had not sold it. In Figure 2.7, the
traditional way of innovation is shown which is called “closed innovation”.
Figure 2.7: Closed Innovation
Adapted from Chesbrough (2003)
In this concept, all three research projects, new business development and the
marketing of new products takes place within a companies’ boundaries. An im-
portant difference of the open innovation model to the closed innovation model is
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that it has no firm boundaries and, hence, allows a diffusion of intellectual prop-
erty both from outside the company to the inside and the other way round. “Open
innovation means that valuable ideas can come from inside or outside the company
and can go to market from inside or outside the company as well” (Chesbrough
2003). Companies search on the one hand outside the organization for new tech-
nologies and ideas and on the other hand cooperate with suppliers, competitors
and customers to create customer value. Thus open innovation can be described as
combining internal and external ideas and using internal and external knowledge to
create new products and services (Chesbrough 2003). An important aspect in this
case is collaboration. Innovation is almost never developed by only one individual.
This is mentioned by Berkun (2007) in his book “The Myth of Innovation” where
he describes this fact as “wise innovators [. . . ] initiate partnerships, collaboration,
and humble studies of the past, raising their odds against the timeless challenge of
innovation”. But companies do not only let this IP diffuse into the company, they
also give IP away by selling patents or the rights of usage to external companies.
The fact that companies open themselves to search and use external IP and ideas
sets the founding stone for the whole e-customer integration concept. The open
innovation model can be seen as a rethinking of the companies to more openness.
They start to use the customer to get new ideas for the development of new innova-
tive technologies and products. Piller (2008) goes further and states at an interview
that“companies that adopt an open innovative approach have to recognize that ’not
all the smart people work for my company’.” (Piller 2008). The importance of the
open innovation approach is increasing and is adopted in more and more businesses.
”This approach places external ideas and external paths to market on the same level
of importance as that reserved for internal ideas and paths to market during the
closed innovation era” (Chesbrough 2003). The concept was further developed and
described by von Hippel (2005). It stands in contrast to the traditional act of pro-
duction: “The user-centered innovation process [. . . ] is in sharp contrast to the
traditional model, in which products and services are developed by manufacturers
in a closed way, the manufacturers using patents, copyrights, and other protections
to prevent imitators from free riding on their innovation investments” (von Hippel
2005). There are a lot of examples of “traditional” companies using the new open in-
novation concept. Procter & Gamble (P&G) for example has the target of sourcing
out 50 % of its innovation from outside the company. Other examples are QinetiQ,
Shell, DSM or Tate&Lyle. The examples of these companies suggest that a lot of
non-Internet companies are using this concept successfully (Gaule 2006). Reichwald
and Piller (2005) illustrate how the open innovation concept is connected with the
concept of customer integration. As shown in Figure 2.8, the closed innovation
concept represents the “old” way of how to treat a customer.
In “mode 1: listening in” the customer/user is only passive. The companies pro-
duce and design products for their customers. There are two types reflecting the
interaction with the customer. The first type is the indirect collection of mar-
ket/customer information where the customer does not even recognize that the
company aggregates information. The second stream goes more into the direction
of the customer but also without the customer’s recognition and intention to submit
his needs. The customer is not active in this mode in contrast to the next step, an
intermediate step between the closed and the open innovation concepts, where the
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Manufacturer-Customer Interaction in the New Product Development Process 
Indirect collection of market / customer information  
• Evaluation of literature and trade journals of customers’ industries 
• Evaluation of patents 
• Evaluation of feedback based on analysis of CRM systems etc. 
Mode 1: Listening 
in: Using customer 
data from search 
portals, web-based 
advisors, or product 
catalogs to explore 
unmet customer 
needs (“design for 
customers”)
Customers as passive target of observation 
• Customer observations (during use of product) 
• Empathic design 
• Click-stream analysis, web-based content analysis etc. 
• Exploring search mechanisms, searches in product catalogs 
Manufacturer initiated dialogue with customers 
• Customer / user panels; user surveys on (future) requirements 
• Consumer idealized design 
• (Web-based) conjoint analysis 
• Quality function deployment and Kansei engineering 
• Securities trading of concepts (virtual stock markets)  
• Creativity workshops with customers 
• (Virtual) concept testing and prototyping 
• Piloting and field tests, (web-based) critical incident technique 
• Product clinics (also in form of online discussions) 
Mode 2: Asking 
about: Asking 
customers explicitly 
about new product 
features or product 
concepts, using 
surveys, web-based 
conjoint analysis, and 
other means to get 
access to customer 
preferences and 
needs (“design with 
customers”)
Customer initiated dialogue with manufacturers 
• Evaluation of complaints 
• Evaluation of customer requests / customer recommendations 
• Systematic complaint management 
• Screening of user groups and user communities 
Customers are equal partners of the organization  
• Manufacturer initiated and operated toolkits for innovation 
• Intermediary initiated and operated toolkits for innovation 
• User design: Using visual drag-and-drop, respondents trade off 
features against price or performance 
• Joint product development with customers (lead users) 
• Temporary employment of supplier’s staff at customer  
• Temporary employment of customer’s staff at supplier  
• Lead user workshops initiated by the manufacturer 
Mode 3: Taking 
part: Allowing and 
enabling customers 
to design their own 
solution (at least 
partly) by the use of 
user innovation 
platforms (“design by 
customers”) O
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n 
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Customers as independent innovators 
• Lead user activities without initial motivation of manufacturer  
• Community innovation (e.g. open source) 
• Customer initiated and operated platforms / toolkits for innovation 
Figure 2.8: Open vs. Closed Innovation
Adapted from Reichwald and Piller (2005), based on Dahan and Hauser (2002b)
customer can interact with the company but is also passive. The way companies
interact with customers is seen more from the marketing point of view where the
needs of the customer are evaluated with surveys. This approach integrates the
customer who is still passive. Companies are willing to give customers the right to
have a say in a matter, but they do not commit themselves to use or implement the
customer’s ideas into their new products or services. There exist two different types
in this mode, too. The passive customer approach is that the company initiates
the dialogue with the customer. That is the described marketing approach where
the needs are evaluated. A more active approach is the customer being active and
initiating the dialogue with the company through feedback and complaints. But
this also does not reflect the e-customer integration concept. Finally, the next step,
the mode “Taking part”, reflects this concept. In this mode products are “designed
by the customers” who have the possibility to create their own solution. This mode
is also divided into two steps. The first step is the customers being equal partners of
the organization. They are included into company processes through “Toolkits for
User Design” initiated by the company. They can compose products out of specific
components and are also deployed as temporary staff at the company.
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As one can see from these examples the customer takes over more tasks during
the product development process and can be seen as a really active customer. The
second step described is the customer as independent innovator. This type of cus-
tomer is becoming active himself and initiates the interaction. Examples are the
lead user concept, community innovation as for example the open source concept
and customer initiated and operated platforms.
In Open Innovation, there is high potential for the usage of Information Markets.
Even customers can be integrated with low effort once a web-based market system
is established. Further customers can be added to extract their implicit knowl-
edge about innovation alternatives continuously via the aggregation capabilities
of a market mechanism. Moreover, multiple companies can be addressed for inter-
organizational innovation processes in BNs. The application of Information Markets
offers notably advantages to traditional methods for decision making, which will be
described in the next section.
2.2 Traditional Methods for Decision Making
As Information Markets gained attention as a method for organizational decision
making, it can be used to complement established methods. Established methods
are Delphi Studies, Nominal Groups and Meetings. This section introduces the
state-of-the-art methods used for decision making.
2.2.1 Meetings
Meetings are the most common approach for decision making and forecasting
in organizations. People meet directly and interact with each other personally.
Meetings are organized with agendas about what will be discussed. Therefore,
participants prepare themselves in order to argue their position on a topic. Finally,
a consensus derived by group members is the result of a meeting. Meetings have
shown to be prone to many biases and drawbacks (van de Ven and Delbecq 1971;
Graefe 2009):
● Time and effort for a group to maintain itself (Dalkey and Helmer 1963)● Tendency to aim at reaching“speedy decisions”and not to consider all problem
dimensions (Maier and Hoffman 1960)● Tendency to pursue a limited train of thought, which leads to a “central ten-
dency effect” or “group think” (Janis 1972)● Less confident group members or people from lower hierarchies may stay
silent because of group pressures for conformity or implied threats of sanc-
tions (Dalkey and Helmer 1963)● Dominant personalities tend to exert excessive influence on the group (Dalkey
and Helmer 1963)● A“self-weighting”effect occurs: group members try to participate and to exert
influence to a level that they feel equally competent with others (Kelley and
Thibaut 1954)
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In scientific literature, there is only little evidence that Meetings are preferable
for decision making or forecasting (Armstrong 2006). Concerning the acceptability,
Meetings are accepted due to personal interaction which people consider as satis-
factory. People enjoy working together and Meetings have shown to achieve a high
level of satisfaction (van de Ven and Delbecq 1974; Boje and Murnighan 1982).
2.2.2 Nominal Groups
The Nominal Group Technique (NGT) is a further development of Meetings in
order to mitigate drawbacks of Meetings by adding a structured format. The NGT
was developed by van de Ven and Delbecq (1971) and van de Ven and Delbecq
(1974). The NGT follows three steps:
1. Group members work independently and generate individual estimations on
a problem
2. Group members come together and discuss in an unstructured fashion about
their solutions
3. Each member works again independently to provide an individual estimate
After these three steps, the individual estimations are aggregated and build the
final result of the group. During the second step, group members get feedback after
they build their own estimate and can discuss it with other members in order to
validate, whether they have to update their point of view or whether they are in
line with the group estimate. This step helps to come to more informed decisions.
In the third step, members do not have the chance to interact again in order to
improve their estimates again. Advantages to van de Ven and Delbecq (1971) are:
● Through incorporating direct interaction and presence of others, NGT pro-
vides evidence of activity and retains the social facilitation of the group pro-
cess● It eliminates evaluation or elaborating comments when generating the problem
dimensions● It provides participants with time for reflection and forces them to record their
thoughts● It limits the influence of dominant personalities on the group outcome by
involving the judgments of all group members
2.2.3 Delphi Study
Participants in Delphi Studies are not required to meet personally, as it is usual in
Meetings or NGT. The Delphi Study avoids some major shortcomings of Meetings
or NGT and is seen as the state-of-the-art and most developed method for forecast-
ing. Compared to NGT, Delphi Studies avoid direct interaction to eliminate every
social bias and to keep participants anonymous. The method was developed in the
late 1950s. Delphi Studies are multiple round surveys in which every participant
reveals his own individual estimates about a problem, enriched with comments from
the prior round consolidated by the operators. After each round, individuals are
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faced with the aggregated results of other individuals anonymously. Taking this in-
termediate result into account, a new estimation is provided in the following round.
In the final round, the group result is the aggregated outcome of the individual es-
timates. The strength of this method is the structured communication process that
enables discussion and helps to achieve a group result free of the major drawbacks
of Meetings of NGT (Woudenberg 1991; Rowe and Wright 1999; Rowe and Wright
2001).
Compared to Information Markets, the Delphi method shows some similarities
(Rowe and Wright 1999; Graefe 2009):
1. Both are structured approaches that use a set of predefined hypotheses
2. These hypotheses are judged anonymously
3. Both methods incorporate feedback. However, the nature of feedback differs.
Delphi feedback can also reveal comments and reasons for estimates5
4. The objective of both mechanisms is to achieve an aggregated group result
Altogether, Information Markets can be expected to have some advantages over
the Delphi method. Information Markets are highly scalable for a large group of
participants. The results do not need to be aggregated manually or semi automated.
The market mechanism works as aggregation mechanism. Furthermore, the market
mechanism is capable of integrating new information continuously, whereas the Del-
phi method is round-based and only reveals estimations once the outcome of each
round is aggregated.
Delphi uses an iterative process of distributing questionnaires to collect experts’
opinions, aggregating the data and presenting the results to the sample group along
with a new questionnaire. Information Markets, on the other hand, rely on the fact
that diverse information can be carried and aggregated in one single attribute – the
price. Green et al. (2007) compared both methods to elicit forecasts from groups.
In contrast to the Delphi method, Information Markets offer the advantage that the
results (i.e. valuations of the participants) can be interpreted immediately and con-
tinuously. Therefore, new information can be integrated immediately and trading
itself is often intuitively understood by the participants. Furthermore, Information
Markets are often considered as a method to support “Wisdom of Crowds” because
they aggregate information held by many people (Surowiecki 2004). On the other
hand, trading in Information Markets gets cumbersome for large studies with many
questions and low liquidity in small-size markets. The use of Information Markets in
the context of innovation processes and forecasting appears advantageous since the
participants do not have to exhibit their complete knowledge. Thus, participants
use their information at hand to gain profits from stock trading and report their
opinion indirectly. For a deeper discussion about the comparison of both methods
refer to Green et al. (2007).
5In Information Markets, feedback can also be supported via chats or blogs. By today, no published
research investigated the effect of feedback in Information Markets.
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2.3 Challenges & Summary
In Innovation Management, complex decisions require the involvement of nearly
all departments of a company. In order to stay competitive and innovative, it is nec-
essary to involve the top management as well as employees frequently having direct
contact with customers, suppliers and business partners. Therefore, it is important
to create a company culture allowing that all stakeholders in innovation contexts
communicate and exchange information about innovations to find the best decision
as a consensus of a all managers, executives and employees involved. Group deci-
sions are in some contexts preferable against individual decisions (Lorge et al. 1958;
van Bruggen et al. 2002; Ozer 2005). One of the main challenges for the application
of Information Markets is, therefore, the involvement of relevant stakeholders.
Successful Innovation Management depends on a healthy company culture, which
is a challenging task in itself. Therefore, the company culture must support inno-
vation activities “bottom up”, that is, employees need to be involved in decision
making. Furthermore, centrality in decision making reduces the exploratory inno-
vation capability of companies (Jansen et al. 2006). In other contexts, Information
Markets have already been used for improved decision making in software develop-
ment processes (Ortner 1997). The involvement of employees in decision making
and asking them about their estimation and beliefs about the future may be prob-
lematic due to the alignment with the company culture. But some reports find
that Information Markets are more likely to improve than detract from workplace
culture because employees perceive it as positive to be involved in decision making
processes (Abramowicz and Henderson 2007). Thus, providing a well-disposed com-
pany culture where employees are motivated to participate in innovation contexts is
one of the most essential challenges. This will not be further discussed in this work,
whereas the results in Chapter 5 show that the involved company during the field
experiment provided a business culture in order to conduct the field experiment
successfully and Information Markets were accepted by employees.
Before the experiment results are presented in Chapters 4 and 5, the basics of
market systems, Information Markets as well as their design is described in the next
section. It gives an overview about the design parameters of Information Markets
and illustrates its successful implementation in several fields of application.
3 The Power of Markets
F
or years, markets and auctions have been the methods of choice to exchange
goods, products and services (Smith 1966). With the rise of the Internet
several years ago, markets are no longer limited to traditional physical sites or
auction houses – markets are everywhere. Through eBay, in particular, mostly every
Internet user has gained some “market experience”. Therefore electronic markets
can be rated as commonly accepted by people. Furthermore, it has become common
for banks to provide online access to stock markets, thereby offering online brokering
capabilities with millions of small investors trading every day.
3.1 Evolution of Markets
The concept of trading, price setting and exchanging goods is known to be an
efficient way to determine the worth of goods for a long time (Smith 1966). During
specialization and the division of labor, goods were no longer exchanged between
individuals only. As currency established and goods could be valuated in a consistent
and comparable unit. The introduction of money changed the way of determining
the worth of a good. The valuation of a good depends on changes by each individual
based on the actual situation and context. Varian (1992) states, as an example, that
a famished man on a lonely island with no food is willing to pay 10.000for a can
of vegetables to avoid dying. On the other hand, a can of vegetables in supermarket
can be bought for a few cents. The difference is the situation on the lonely island
which drives the man to pay more money than usual.
Markets are used to determine the value of goods. By using money, the price
can be negotiated by buyers and sellers and once they found an equilibrium, the
trade can be settled. Every individual in this negotiation process has individual
preferences upon it builds its valuation. Furthermore, information plays an impor-
tant role in the negotiation process. Having superior information about a good,
the finding of the individual worth is easier than to think about a common price.
For example, buying the Mona Lisa involves the danger of falling for an imitation.
Hiring an expert who issues a certificate about the authenticity of the painting, one
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can be sure not to buy an imitation. In this case, the information has to be bought –
maybe for a lot of money – in advance in order to avoid a misinterpretation of the
valuation.
Similarly, in modern financial exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) or the Deutsche Bo¨rse/XETRA, markets are used to determine the value of
companies. The valuation of companies is very difficult and the determination via
market mechanisms is the best known estimator we know in order to determine the
true value (Plott and Sunder 1988). In other words, markets are like search engines,
in which traders search for the best price or where they should invest their money.
Therefore, market participants interact through the price mechanism of markets
which means that supply and demand is evaluated via prices in a negotiation which
may come to an equilibrium (Harris 2003). Therefore, market prices can be used in
decision processes. Based on the price, market participants can decide whether to
allocate resources or not (Hayek 1945).
Modern markets are often designed in auction formats. Popular examples are
financial stock exchanges like the NYSE or the Deutsche Bo¨rse/XETRA. In an
auction, buyers and sellers communicate via price offers to buy or sell respectively.
These orders are stored in a so-called order book. Once a sell offer is lower than a buy
offer, both offers overlap regarding the price and can be executed. The execution
can be done in different ways. The two most common procedures are continuous
execution and periodic execution (Madhavan 1992). In continuous market systems,
incoming buy and sell orders are executed once they match a corresponding offer.
This is called Continuous Double Auction (CDA). In a periodic auction, offers are
stored in an order book and are matched periodically. Periodic auctions are called
Call Auction (CA). Following the Market Engineering approach, which is described
in Section 3.1.3, the auction type needs to be designed carefully based on the ob-
jective of the market. For example, transaction prices in a CDA reflect all currently
available information once a transaction is executed. Private information1 repre-
sented in orders from other traders then becomes public information in the new
market price and is therefore no longer visible as a buy or sell order to others. In
a CA, all orders are stored until they are executed. Therefore, a CA can lead to
different market results as markets in which trading takes place sequentially (Mad-
havan 1992). On the other hand, a continuous auction can be executed faster and
traders realize the Market Outcome immediately (Forsythe et al. 1982). In most
financial exchanges, the CDA as well as the CA mechanism is used. Depending on
the market objective, different market mechanisms may be considered (Harris 2003;
Schwartz et al. 2006).
3.1.1 Efficient Markets
It is assumed that the price comprises historic, public and individual information
about the fundamental value (Fama 1970; Fama 1991; Schwartz et al. 2006). The
fundamental value of stocks is the value that all traders would agree upon if they
knew all available information and if they could properly analyze it. Informed
traders tend to know if the fundamental value is under- or overvalued whereas
1Types of information are described in Section 3.1.1.
3.1 Evolution of Markets 29
uninformed traders do not know if stocks are fundamentally over- or undervalued
(Harris 2003).
For example, historic information comprises the recent share price history which
is widely disseminated and readily available to the public, usually free of charge.
In contrast, access to real time data on market quotes and transaction prices or
historic databases must be paid for. Public information also comprises current
financial information concerning profits, current capital structures or earning fore-
casts. Furthermore, it covers economic information about a firm’s product market,
competitors and national as well as international economic conditions or structural
changes like recent innovations, acquisitions, divestitures, discoveries and regulatory
changes. Private information includes information that individuals may possess be-
cause of their own investigations and analyses.
Each trader perceives changes in market prices as an integration of new informa-
tion (historic, public, private) and compares them to his own individual expecta-
tion. Furthermore, if a trader disagrees with market prices he may change the price
according to his own expectations. Hence, the price mechanism aggregates infor-
mation comprised in market prices and thus market prices can be interpreted as a
forecast because the aggregated information reflects all expectations from traders
about the future development of stock prices (Forsythe et al. 1982; McKelvey and
Page 1990; Forsythe et al. 1992; Plott 2000; Harris 2003; Schwartz et al. 2006).
In price discovery processes, each rational market participant has reasons why he is
going to buy or sell in a market. This information is reflected in market prices: if a
market participant wants to sell, other participants recognize this as a signal that
the valuation of that participant is lower than the actual price. Otherwise he would
not put a sell order. As mentioned, orders and prices in markets comprise informa-
tion interpreted by traders. They get information in newspapers, via the Internet
or from their own experience. The “level” of information comprised in market prices
can be described. Fama (1970) introduced the efficient market hypothesis which
categorizes three levels of comprised information (Jensen 1978; Fama 1991):
● weak form of efficient market hypothesis● semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis● strong form of efficient market hypothesis
The weak form of efficient market hypothesis states that all historic information is
included in market prices. Historic information can be collected from records about
stock prices, events in the past, e.g., political elections or sports events, or news-
papers. It is assumed that all this information is reflected by market prices. The
semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis states that public information is in-
stantly included in market prices. Information in news or press releases are available
to every market participant and can be interpreted by them at once (Harris 2003;
Schwartz et al. 2006). The strong form of efficient market hypothesis states that
private information individually held by market participants is added to the weak
and semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis. To confirm the strong form of
efficient market hypothesis, every individual information has to be included in the
market prices, which cannot be assured for all individuals. Since the strong form of
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efficient market hypothesis cannot be confirmed due its strong assumptions (Jensen
1978), the semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis is widely accepted. The
semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis is confirmed in various studies in
finance and experimental markets (Smith 1982; Plott and Sunder 1988; Fama 1998;
Jung and Shiller 2005; Markovitch et al. 2005).
3.1.2 Why Traders trade
Participants may have several motives to act in markets. Based on the market
objective, one can classify between the aggregation of information to forecast future
stock developments, risk hedging or speculation (Dietl et al. 2004). Besides the
information aggregation objective, the investment of money in markets can also
be a motive in order to earn interest. Harris (2003) distinguishes between profit-
motivated traders, utilitarian traders and futile traders. Profit-motivated traders
trade because they rationally expect to profit from their trades. Speculators and
dealers are profit-motivated. Utilitarian traders trade because they expect to obtain
some benefit from trading besides trading profits such as entertainment, gambling
or fun. Investors, borrowers, asset exchangers, hedgers and gamblers are utilitarian
traders. Futile traders believe that they are profit-orientated, but their expectations
are not rational. On average, utilitarian and futile traders lose to profit-oriented
traders (Harris 2003).
Investors put their money in stocks they think will raise and otherwise sell, if
they assume that prices will decrease in the future. People with no information
are called Noise Traders because they do not posses sound information about the
fundamental value of stocks. In contrast, informed traders can exploit uninformed
traders by using their superior knowledge and therefore, uninformed traders act
as liquidity providers for informed traders (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Das 2005;
Boer-Sorban et al. 2007).
Traders normally underlie a so-called self-selection process. Since traders estimate
the value of their own private information they decide to participate in a market or
not. They have to evaluate the quality of their individual information against the
information already included in market prices and finally decide, if they can make a
profit in the market. Otherwise they should not participate in the market because
they would be noise traders and lose money to informed traders on average (Harris
2003).
3.1.3 Engineering Markets
Today, the coordination of information via market mechanisms can be conducted
using modern information technology (Malone et al. 1987; Weinhardt et al. 2003).
Due to heavily decreasing transaction costs through the usage of information tech-
nology, electronic markets can be used for nearly any type of coordination. Elec-
tronic markets provide a cost efficient and scalable method facilitating the exchange
of information, goods, services and payments (Bakos 1998). Smith (1982) argues
for a complete description of the methodology and function of experiments in mi-
croeconomics and proposed a model for microstructure. Weinhardt et al. (2003)
and Neumann (2004) proposed a framework for the coordination via markets con-
sidering the challenges and advantages of Information Technology and introducing
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a research direction named Market Engineering. The framework defines essential
characteristics in order to design a market. Figure 3.1 shows the Market Engineering
framework.
Transaction Object
Market Structure
Agent Behavior
Market Outcome
(Performance)
Micro-
structure
IT-Infra-
structure
Business-
structure
Economic and Legal Environment
Figure 3.1: Market Engineering
Adapted from Weinhardt et al. (2003), Neumann (2004)
Regulatory aspects need to be considered in order to build a market system.
Furthermore, the framework has to be embedded in the economic context of inter-
est. The basic characteristic is the transaction object, which can be goods, stocks
or services. To handle the transaction object, a Market Structure needs to be
defined consisting of three properties: Microstructure, IT-Infrastructure and Busi-
ness Structure. The Microstructure is about how the market rules are defined,
which trading mechanism is used or, for instance, if traders may revoke an order.
The IT-Infrastructure defines the information technology to be used for the Market
Structure to operate, e.g., how a database interacts with the business logic and how
market participants can put their orders into the system. The Business Structure
defines how the Market Structure can be financed. For example, transaction costs
can be charged for each transaction or market participants have to pay an entrance
fee to join the market. Once the Market Structure is defined, market participants
use the market and put their orders into the system. An agent does not need to be
a person, it can also be an automated piece of software or a broker trading on behalf
of another person. The behavior of agents is driven by the Market Structure. For
example, trading fees, transaction costs, discounts or costs of additional information
may influence agents’ behavior (Weber 2006; van Dinther 2007). The performance
of the Market Structure can be measured via the Market Outcome. Markets can, for
example, be assessed by measuring their outcome, their liquidity or their efficiency.
The latter answers questions such as: Did the agent with the highest valuation get
the transaction object?
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The overall framework provides a comprehensive guide to engineer markets be-
cause markets have to be engineered carefully due to the relation of Agent Behavior
and Market Structure (Weinhardt et al. 2003; Neumann 2004; Weinhardt et al.
2006). A similar perception is reported by Roth: “market design calls for an engi-
neering approach” (Roth 2002). Transactions in markets can be characterized by
three distinguishable phases (Schmid 1993).
1. Information Phase
Market participants inform themselves about offered products, prices or ship-
ping costs.
2. Negotiation/Agreement Phase
Market participants negotiate prices, guaranteeing, service features and finally
come to an agreement.
3. Clearing/Settlement Phase
In the Clearing Phase, goods are packed, insured for shipping, shipped by the
seller and paid by the buyer.
These phases are representative for all transactions in markets. First, one has to
inform oneself about the offers available in the market. After having all relevant
information, market participants negotiate the price and other properties of the
transaction object before the transaction can be cleared by paying the price and
exchanging the good. These phases can be very complex and interminable depending
on the type of transaction object.
Lindemann (2000) proposed a reference model for electronic markets adding dif-
ferent views to the transaction phases (Schmidt and Lindemann 1998). Figure 3.2
shows the model.
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Figure 3.2: Electronic Markets Reference Model
Adapted from Lindemann (2000)
In every transaction phase, a view is implemented for, e.g., the communication
with market participants, services to support contracting or logistics, transaction
handling or the business model in order to align all components to add value along
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the transaction phases. Moreover, the trend towards electronic markets as well
as Internet-based market research is clearly observable (Dahan and Hauser 2002b;
Sawhney et al. 2005). Furthermore, experimental markets converge towards the-
ory and confirm the expected theoretical results as well as the expected behavior
(Forsythe et al. 1982; Plott and Sunder 1988; Forsythe et al. 1992).
As described, multiple parameters have to be considered in order to develop a
market system. Each market has different requirements for its purpose and needs
to be engineered carefully. In the next section, a special market type is introduced
named “Information Market”. After the introduction, market parameters for Infor-
mation Markets will be discussed.
3.2 Information Markets
In recent years, a new way of using markets has come up by using market results
to forecast future events named Prediction Markets or Information Markets utilizing
the knowledge of many people or a community.2 Information Markets are a special
kind of markets that aggregate information held by people about uncertain events
in the future. People are trading virtual contracts representing future events based
on their individual expectation about the outcome of the events. Once an event has
occurred, stocks held by people receive a payment based on the event.
The first usage of Prediction Markets can be traced back to 1868, when U.S.
presidential elections were operated till 1940. Newspapers reported stock prices of
candidates nearly on a daily basis. The betting activity sometimes showed more
trading activity as the stock exchanges on Wall Street. Over the years, Infor-
mation Markets were rediscovered in the late 1980’s with the IOWA Electronic
Markets for political forecasting (Forsythe et al. 1992). Roll (1984) reported that
prices in orange juice futures can serve as predictor for weather changes. The us-
age of Information Markets is reported in different fields of application like sports
(Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004; Luckner 2008), medicine (Polgreen et al. 2007), new
product development (Soukhoroukova 2007), marketing research (Spann 2002) or
entertainment (Pennock et al. 2001a). Even companies like Google, HP or Siemens
use Information Markets internally to improve their decision making (Ortner 1997;
Plott and Chen 2002; Cowgill et al. 2009). Several years later, after Surowiecki’s
book “The Wisdom of Crowds”, Information Markets gained increased popularity
in the public. In essence, the aggregation of individual opinions produces accurate
and objective estimates (Lorge et al. 1958; Surowiecki 2004). In 2005, Information
Markets (Prediction Markets) were firstly mentioned in the Gartner Hype Cycle
of Emerging Technologies as technology trigger, which will reach the Plateau of
Productivity after 2015 approximately (Fenn and Linden 2005). Figure 3.3 shows
the Hype Cycle for Social Software as of August 2010. Information Markets are
considered to reach the plateau of productivity in approximately 5-10 years. Thus,
it is seen as a key technology for the future and offers a field of further investigation
and research for the next years.
2In scientific literature, many equivalent names are used for Prediction Markets like Information
Markets, Future Contracts, Fantasy Markets, Decision Markets, Idea Futures, Forecasting Mar-
kets, Artificial Markets, Electronic Markets and Virtual Stock Markets. In this work, Information
Markets is used.
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Figure 3.3: Information (Prediction) Markets in the Gartner Hype Cycle for Social
Software
As a result of these developments, scientists have begun to investigate Informa-
tion Markets (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos 2007). Snowberg et al. (2007) and Wolfers
and Zitzewitz (2009) interpret stock prices in political Information Markets as prob-
abilities for a future event and connect their changes to changes in financial stock
markets. In their results, they show a connection between political forecasts and
economic variables. For example, if a republican president candidate is in favor for
presidency, an effect in oil prices and equities is observable.
Moreover, Information Markets are highly scalable as they allow for an integra-
tion of a huge number of traders, whereas the effort to add an additional trader is
negligible (Spann 2002). Dahan and Hauser (2002a) state that Information Markets
are an efficient way of communication and interaction between traders. Traders can
be integrated in early stages of forecasting objectives which is, for instance, essential
in new product development or innovation assessment. Especially for decision mak-
ers in innovation contexts, a centrality in decision making reduces the exploratory
innovation capability of companies (Jansen et al. 2006). Therefore, Information
Markets can be utilized as decision support tool in order to decentralize decision
making and utilize the collective knowledge of employees in decision making.
3.2.1 Terms and Definitions
Academia does not provide a universal definition of Information Markets. Tzi-
ralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007) conducted a review of academic literature regarding
Information Markets. Figure 3.4 summarizes the types of publications classified.
As one can easily see, many terms are used in the academic literature for Infor-
mation Markets. This shows the diversity of names used for Information Markets.
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Figure 3.4: Academic Publications for Information Markets - Overview
Adapted from Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007)
Since there is no universal definition available, Berg and Rietz (2003) formulated a
definition of Information Markets, which is widely accepted in academic literature,
for instance Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007) or (Luckner 2008), and also used in
this work. Following their definition Information Markets are run for “the primary
purpose of using the information content in market values to make predictions about
specific future events”. In this work, an almost universal and exact definition of In-
formation Markets is of minor importance. The essential meaning reflected in every
reference to Information Markets is the aggregation of information via a market
system.
In contrast to financial stock markets, Information Markets are not mainly de-
signed to allocate resources, to trade risks or to make money. They are primarily
designed to aggregate information in stock prices corresponding to the outcomes
of future events (Tetlock and Hahn 2007). Information Markets are not substan-
tial enough in size to trade risks or make money like financial markets (Wolfers
and Zitzewitz 2004). Stocks in Information Markets rather represent an aggrega-
tion of trader’s beliefs about future events, which do not have value by themselves.
Once the future event has occurred, shares are paid out according to a payout rule,
which differentiates them further from financial stock markets. In the following, the
functionality of Information Markets will be described in more detail.
3.2.2 Functionality of Information Markets
Traders convey their information or expectation about future events through buy-
ing and selling virtual contracts in a market system. The market mechanism aggre-
gates buy and sell offers whereas a transaction may occur if a buy offer overlaps a
sell offer. The resulting transaction price determines the current market price for
certain stocks. Market prices can be interpreted based on their value about how
the likelihood of a future event is expected at the moment. Because of that, traders
can update their expectations via repeated buy and sell actions, and they can affect
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market prices continuously once their expectation differs from market prices. If an
equilibrium regarding market prices appears, it is assumed that traders have agreed
to a consensus and trading activity will decrease till they update their expectations
based on news or newly available information again (Fama 1970).
After the event in the future has occurred, the final value of stocks can be de-
termined. Shares in traders’ depots are paid out accordingly. Each trader has an
incentive to maximize his portfolio value (Spann 2002). Furthermore, traders can
be ranked based on their portfolio values and the top traders can be identified easily.
A ranking of traders based on the portfolio value also includes a competitive and
playful aspect.3 Information Markets can be interpreted as “situational securities”
and not as shares representing the value of a company because the payout value is
linked to the outcome of an uncertain future event (Elton et al. 1995). If traders
bought shares for less money than the final payout value, they realized a benefit.
On the other side, if they sold shares for more money than the final payout value,
they also made a profit. The following example will demonstrate the functionality
of Information Markets.
Imagine that the executives of a home entertainment manufacturer need reliable
information about the sales of high definition plasma TVs for the next quarter (Q3).
They need the forecast of sales figures in order to plan their procurement strategy
with respect to vendor parts. Therefore, they set up an Information Market and let
their salesmen trade the sales figures for the next quarter (Q3). In the Information
Market, shares representing the sales figures are available in intervals of 100, e.g.,
0-100, 101-200, 201-300, and so on. As soon as the sales figures are known, stocks
representing the correct interval are paid out of the share at 100. For example,
if the market price of the share “401-500 sales in Q3” at a certain point in time
is 85, the aggregated forecast of all participating salesmen is 85 % that the sales
figures will be 401-500 units. Thus, a stock price of 85can be interpreted as a
likelihood of 85 % that sales will be 401-500. If traders do not agree and think that
the probability of sales will only be 60 %, they have to sell shares from their depot.
If they think the likelihood is 90 %, they have to buy shares in the market in order
to raise the price. In that case, rational traders would buy shares up to 89.9and
sell shares down to 90.1, respectively. Figure 3.5 illustrates the functionality.
In the following, the process will be explained briefly: Each salesman has direct
contact to customers and has experience concerning their needs and preferences
about high definition plasma TVs. Salesmen integrate their information via buy
and sell offers ¶. The market mechanism immediately aggregates all expectations
reflected in buy and sell offers. Based on the market mechanism, incoming offers
are processed once they enter the market system. Already accepted orders are
executed in case of corresponding incoming buy or sell orders. As a result, a new
transaction price is calculated which reflects the aggregated information. If an
offer matches several others, all matching offers are executed if the volume of the
incoming offer exceeds the cumulative volume of overlapping offers listed in the order
book. Otherwise, offers will be partly executed. The higher a trader considers the
likelihood of the event, the higher his reluctance to sell will be. Therefore, stock
prices represent the collective estimation of participating traders about a future
3Incentive schemes will be described in Section 3.3.3.
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Figure 3.5: Functionality of Information Markets
event ·. Through buying and selling shares, traders can win or lose (virtual) money.
In the example, the salesman buys 800 shares at 60 ¸. If the final value in the
above mentioned example of TV sales is between 401 and 500, the corresponding
share will be paid out with 100 ¹. The salesman realized a profit in this case. He
bought undervalued shares which were paid out for a higher price º.
Information Markets motivate traders to reveal their beliefs and not their prefer-
ences (Forsythe et al. 1992; Spann and Skiera 2004). Shares are paid out according
to the outcome of a future event and trading according to preferences would lead
to monetary losses if the individual preferences did not relate to the outcome of
events. Even an enthusiastic salesman should not trade his preferences and maybe
boost sales forecasts because he could lose money in case of overestimating the
true numbers. The monetary incentive schema in Information Markets is therefore
very well suited to motivate traders, because it is performance-based. The better
traders act in markets by truly revealing their beliefs, the more money they can
make. While every trader reveals his beliefs, the market mechanism is a comfort-
able mechanism to aggregate all these beliefs continuously and update the forecast
of uncertain future events permanently.
3.3 Designing Information Markets
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the careful design of markets is essential for the
success of its result (Weinhardt et al. 2003; Weinhardt et al. 2006). An elaborated
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user interface is also necessary in order to guarantee a satisfying user experience
in Information Markets. Moreover, compared to financial markets, other challenges
like incentives or contract design exist and have a different impact on the market
result. If the contract design is not appropriate, traders may misinterpret the con-
tracts’s intended purpose and, thus, results may be off target. Moreover, inaccurate
incentive schemes may not foster traders to trade constantly. In financial markets,
for example, users usually trade values of companies and have precise motives why
they do so, e.g., bonuses or rate of return (Harris 2003). In Information Markets,
incentives have to be set in order to keep traders in the market. Most Information
Markets use virtual money instead of real money, because real money investment
representing future events may cause legal issues in some countries. Traders have
to be incentivized throughout the whole market duration, which may last weeks,
months or even years. Furthermore, the specification of contracts as well as the trad-
ing mechanism has to be defined (Spann and Skiera 2003). For instance, contracts
can be designed to forecast index values, which can be interpreted as likelihoods
of events. In contrast, they can be designed to forecast outcomes of events with
so-called “winner-takes-all” contracts (cp. Section 3.3.2). Another key design issue
is the selection of traders, which should be heterogeneous, and the availability of in-
formation to ensure that traders have a foundation to develop expectations to reveal
them in Information Markets (Spann and Skiera 2003; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004;
Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos 2007). The overall challenge in Information Markets, and
also in every other market system is liquidity and information efficiency. Low liq-
uidity markets may hinder traders to trade once they do not have a counterpart
to trade with. As a consequence, information cannot be integrated and therefore
a market cannot be information efficient. Market liquidity and efficiency as major
challenges in Information Markets will be further discussed in Section 3.3.4.
From the technical point of view, an appropriate Information Market Web Sys-
tem has to be implemented in order to provide the functionalities to participants
conveniently. As mentioned by Schmid (1993) and Weinhardt et al. (2003), the IT
infrastructure is of utmost importance. In the following sections, the key design
elements of Information Markets are described in more detail.
3.3.1 Traders
The number of traders in Information Markets varies depending in the objectives
of the Information Market. Different factors of influence are affecting the number
of traders: the type of contracts, incentive mechanisms, the runtime of the market
or the amount of traders (Sunder 1995). Nevertheless, markets can produce proper
results in enterprise forecasting topics with only 12 traders whereas on the HSX4
several thousand traders are active (Spann 2002). One might assume that the
traders should represent the population, however Information Markets do also show
accurate results if traders are not necessarily representative. But, there have to be
some traders with strong preferences (Forsythe et al. 1999; Spann and Skiera 2003).
Information Markets yield very good results if some traders make “mistakes” in
estimating the likelihood of future events. Informed traders exploit the mistakes of
4http://www.hsx.com
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others and do therefore improve the current forecast (Forsythe et al. 1999; Oliven
and Rietz 2004). Forsythe et al. (1999) classify informed traders as “marginal
traders”. In a laboratory experiment about forthcoming presidential elections they
identified 20 out of 192 traders as marginal traders.
In general, traders try to utilize their personal knowledge to determine the value
of stocks (Lucas Jr. 1972). This principle is well established in real world markets
as well as in experimental markets, where traders have an incentive to reveal their
true beliefs about an event (Plott and Sunder 1982; Smith 1982). These beliefs are
developed through the analysis of historic price evolutions or the interpretation of
events such as news in newspapers, TV or the Internet. Traders develop their indi-
vidual expectation about the likelihood of events. As aforementioned, market prices
in Information Markets also carry information. Traders with strong preferences can
lead the majority of traders which are going to follow. Traders continuously up-
date and reassess their beliefs (Blanchard and Watson 1982; Timmermann 1993).
Therefore, it may happen that traders show a herding behavior and cause bubbles
or crashes (Smith et al. 1988). Traders exposed to other traders’ preferences may
change their expectations and beliefs dramatically (Salganik et al. 2006). Hence, it
is important to ensure that traders get enough information about the objective of
the market so that they can build their own beliefs based on news events. If market
prices of other traders are the only information, herding behavior is likely, which
may lead to inaccurate market prices or market failure in the worst case.
During the market runtime, a trader analysis can be conducted in order to iden-
tify so-called Lead Users. Lead users are very successful traders interpreting news
precisely (von Hippel 1994; Lilien et al. 2002; Spann et al. 2005). Information
Markets have the advantage that, in contrast to financial stock markets, the trad-
ing data of individual users is available. In financial markets, individual traders are
anonymous or trade via brokering systems, whereas the information about which
trader did what kind of trade is usually not available to analysts. Lead users are
favorable as a valuable source in Information Markets (von Hippel 2005). Once
they are discovered, ongoing steps are possible such as interviews about how they
came to their expectations and beliefs. This may be valuable, for instance, in in-
novation assessment tasks where decisions are linked to very expensive and costly
follow up processes. Decision makers can use an Information Market to identify
employees interested in their main topics in order to reward them or invite them
for further assessments and forecasts. Lead users can be identified based on their
trading direction. If a trader buys an undervalued or sells an overvalued stock, the
trading direction can be analyzed if the trade was right or wrong. This analysis
can only be conducted ex post once the final value is determined. Otherwise one
cannot assess the trading direction because the final value is needed to decide which
trade was right and which one was wrong. In addition, the ranking of traders based
on the portfolio value gives an indication of trader’s performance. The ranking is
continuously updated and works even during the market runtime.
In enterprise contexts, one cannot only rely on employees in complex forecasting
topics. In those cases, the involvement of suppliers, consultants, customers and re-
searchers can be beneficial (Alam 2003; Majchrzak et al. 2004; Emden et al. 2006).
In order to get an objective assessment as well as to widen the base of valuable
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expectations and insights, the involvement of external people and partners is to be
considered in setting up an Information Market. As mentioned in Section 2.1.5,
externals are a valuable source for innovation in terms of Open Innovation. Infor-
mation Markets as a web-based application allow the easy integration of externals
via authorization procedures. Therefore, even externals from cooperating companies
can access markets for certain topics from the outside and provide their information.
3.3.2 Types of Contracts
In Information Markets, the type of contract can vary based on the forecast ob-
jectives. In order to forecast sales figures, for example, one can forecast an absolute
value of sales or an interval in which the outcome is expected to lie. It is of utmost
importance that contracts are intuitive and easily understandable so that traders
can easily understand what they are supposed to do. Contracts can be differentiated
in winner-takes-all, index or spread contracts (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004).
In case of a winner-takes-all contract, only the winning contract will be paid
out according to the payout rule. All other contracts expire and are not paid out.
This type of contract is mainly used to forecast one out of several alternatives,
e.g., the winner of a soccer tournament. All prices in winner-takes-all contracts
have to sum up to equal the sum of all payouts. For example, if a soccer team
wins a championship and only the representing contract is paid out at 100 currency
units, prices have to balance over all contracts. Once the total sum of all contracts
exceeds the total sum of the payouts, arbitrage trading is possible. Shares can
be bought from the Information Market operator and sold to the market and vice
versa. Thus, efficient markets should show an equal sum of payments and stock
prices. Summarizing, prices can be interpreted as aggregated expectations about the
probability of a future event, e.g., a soccer team winning the tournament (Wolfers
and Zitzewitz 2006).
Index contracts are used to forecast an event with a direct number. For example,
the percentage of a candidate in a political election. The payout function in this
case is linked to the final value. If a candidate receives 70 % vote share, the contract
will pay out 70 currency units. Market prices of index contracts can be interpreted
as mean values aggregated from traders.
Spread contracts pay out if the number of votes a candidate receive exceeds a
pre-defined threshold, otherwise the contract does not pay out. Hence, the spread
contract reveals the market’s median expectation if contracts are designed in a way
that winners double their money and losers do not get any payment.
In addition, one can create other contract types with very sophisticated function-
alities. Yet, the intuitiveness and simplicity for traders should be regarded in order
to keep it simple to understand. Another difficulty is the continuity of contracts.
It may be the case that in a political election one candidate revokes his application
during the election campaign. As a consequence, the outcome of the event may be
distorted as the results become non-verifiable. Such eventualities must be carefully
considered in the market design.
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3.3.3 Incentive Schemes
In Information Markets, traders are revealing their beliefs and expectations about
future events via buying and selling stocks representing future events. Their effort
is usually compensated once the market closes. Shares are paid out according to
the outcome of the event (Spann and Skiera 2004). As mentioned in Section 3.2.1,
traders have the incentive to reveal their true knowledge (Plott and Sunder 1982;
Smith 1982; Spann and Skiera 2003; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004; van Bruggen et al.
2006). In contrast, the better a trader anticipates the outcome of an event, the
better he will perform in the Information Market. In contrast to a survey, traders
are compensated based on their performance. In a survey, the performance of each
participants is usually not causal for any reward. Hence, the incentives for traders
Information Markets is different from other methods of information aggregation.
The incentive system can be designed in different ways. Scientific literature sug-
gests, that contracts in Information Markets pay real money or virtual money5 as a
very common to be used in incentive systems (Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004). Smith
and Walker (1993) investigated that increased monetary incentives bring traders’
behavior closer to predictions of economic theory. Rosenbloom and Notz (2006)
found that real-money markets are more accurate for non sports events. Servan-
Schreiber et al. (2004) found out, that there is no difference observable in sports
events regarding real money and play money markets.
In general, different motives can be utilized to serve as incentives for traders.
Motzek (2007) and Lakhani and Panetta (2007) describe three types of motivations
why people are incentivized in doing something.
1. Intrinsic Motives
People do something because it is perceived as inherently interesting and pleas-
ant. Therefore, an activity may be performed for the fun of it or because for
immediate satisfaction, the need for fun, notions of enjoyment and entertain-
ment.
2. Extrinsic Motives
Activities with extrinsic motives do not deliver satisfaction until the assign-
ment is accomplished. The objective is to complete a task because of the
compensation or sanction attached. People expecting extrinsic rewards can,
in terms of productivity, outperform those who do not receive a reward. Often,
a monetary compensation is used as extrinsic incentive.
3. Social Motives
Individual behavior is influenced by others and may complement the first two
classes of motives (intrinsic and extrinsic). This is especially true in groups or
communities in which a person’s behavior is visible to others. Social motives
include community affiliation, reputation and feedback from others for the
own achievements.
In Information Markets, components of all three types of motivation are exploited.
Firstly, it is assumed that traders in Information Markets enjoy using the market
5In this case, virtual money profits can be redeemed to in-kind prices.
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system and that trading itself is perceived as interesting and entertaining. Espe-
cially in sports markets, where the public interest is high, joy and entertainment
is a leading factor, for instance, if one’s preferred soccer team traded is included
somehow in the Information Market. This may lead to favorite long-shot biases6 as
reported by Luckner (2008). In other fields of application, fun and entertainment
are also an intrinsic factor for people to participate in Information Markets. Sec-
ondly, prizes are raﬄed as an extrinsic motivation for participants, usually based on
the individual performance of each participant. Prizes can be both monetary and
non-monetary. Motzek (2007) states that extrinsic motives can also serve as a cata-
lyst for intrinsic ones. For example, if a task assigned begins to be entertaining and
raises interest or if money is awarded as extrinsic incentive and collecting money
is an intrinsic motive. Thirdly, social motives are exploited via the competition
of traders. The performance of traders is visible in a ranking of all participants.
Thus, the success and failure in trading activity is visible to all market participants
and may serve as an incentive for traders. Participants perceive a high rank as
satisfaction at their achievements and reputation among other trader. Combined
with fun, entertainment as intrinsic motives and prizes or other types of extrinsic
incentives, Information Markets can make use of all three types of motives to attract
participants.
Besides the listing in a ranking based on the depot value, other ways of measuring
the performance of traders are imaginable. In a recent field experiment about the
forecasting of economic variables named EIX7, a scoring function was implemented
measuring traders success based on their trading direction (Teschner et al. 2011).
As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, the trading direction represents the fraction of“right”
transactions as a partition of the total number of transactions. In case of the EIX,
the number of transactions is multiplied with the percentage of “right” transactions
to get the score. Furthermore, traders can win several main prizes after the market
duration based on the portfolio value. In order to not put traders registering to
the market after other traders begun to raise their depot value at a disadvantage,
monthly prizes are raﬄed based on the monthly performance regardless of the overall
depot value. Hence, traders have an incentive to perform well every month. Traders
have to fulfill two constraints. They have to increase their portfolio value compared
to the last month and they have to conduct at least five transactions.
The field experiments described in Chapter 4 uses a ranking system with a winning
probability. The winning probability represents the fraction they have in the total
sum of traders’ portfolios. All portfolios are standardized and every traders portfolio
is described by the fraction of the total sum. The winning probability is metered
as a fraction of the total sum of all depots in %. After the market closes, the prize
is awarded under all traders based on their winning probability. A trader with a
high probability had a higher chance to win the prize. This design is chosen also to
incentivize traders who enter the market after it has started. Otherwise, traders who
have joined the market in the very beginning would have an advantage, benefiting
from former trading activities. In Section 4.1.3, the concept will be described in
more detail.
6Traders overestimate high likelihoods and underestimate low likelihoods.
7Economic Indicators Exchange, http://eix-market.de, accessed 15.04.2010
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3.3.4 Market Liquidity and Efficiency
Adequate market liquidity is essential for the information aggregation process
(Harris 2003; Schwartz et al. 2006). If a market suffers from illiquidity, efficient ag-
gregation cannot be guaranteed and, therefore, market failure is foreseeable (Glosten
and Milgrom 1985). Information Markets proved to be operational with 8-12 active
traders (Spann 2002; Soukhoroukova 2007). Thus, several more traders are neces-
sary to create minimum liquidity that 8-12 traders can efficiently trade since not
every trader is active to the same level. In a CDA mechanism, traders reveal their
beliefs about future events via buy and sell orders. As a prerequisite, each trader
needs to have a counterpart so that a transaction can occur for matching orders. If
only a few traders are in the market, trading activity may be extremely low and,
therefore, the information aggregation mechanism cannot work properly. In scien-
tific literature, several reports exist about the liquidity in (Information) Markets
investigating the effect on information efficiency.
In general, liquidity in markets is often discussed but rarely well understood
(Harris 2003). In scientific literature, liquidity has several dimensions: Immedi-
acy, Width, Depth and Resiliency (Harris 2003). Immediacy is the ability to trade
quickly at given costs. Width refers to the cost of doing a trade, which is often iden-
tified by bid/ask spreads8. Depth refers to the size of a trade at a given cost and is
measured in units of shares available. Resiliency refers to how quickly market prices
revert to former levels after a distortion of prices initiated by uninformed traders.
Therefore, liquidity can be described via different measures in each dimension. In
this work, mainly measures regarding width and immediacy are used to describe
the liquidity of markets in Sections 4.4 and 5.3.
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1, efficiency in markets is defined as the ability of
markets to integrate information. New information about companies, technologies
and trends is interpreted by traders and is represented by their trading strategies
in stock markets. In frictionless, optimal markets, stock prices follow a random
walk pattern which means, that it is indeterministic if the next trade will be a buy
or sell (Schwartz et al. 2006). This can be measured with the first order auto-
correlation. In perfect markets, the auto-correlation coefficient is 0. In typical stock
markets, a coefficient of 0.4 is often observable, which means that sell offers follow
on sell offers more often than buy offers follow on buy offers. Furthermore, efficiency
can be expressed with arbitrage opportunities. If large arbitrage opportunities are
available, markets did not integrate available information efficiently, because traders
can buy shares in one market and can sell them at a higher price in another market,
if the market rules allows that. Thereby, they realize a riskless profit. If both
markets are efficient, such transaction does not offer the opportunity to realize
profits (Schwartz et al. 2006).
Tetlock (2008) investigated three years of TradeSports9 trading records. Trade-
Sports was a real money Information Market to forecast mainly sports events.10
8Bid/Ask spreads are the difference of the lowest offer to sell (Ask) and the highest offer to buy
(Bid) shares.
9http://tradesports.com, ceased operation in 2008
10In 2003-2006, 70 % were sports events, 25 % were financial events and about 5 % were other
events like economic, political, entertainment, legal or weather and micellaneous.
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Analyzing data from 2003-2006, Tetlock reports that “liquidity does not reduce de-
viations of prices from financial and sporting event outcomes”. Tetlock argues that
excessive liquidity spending mechanisms encourage informed traders to make short
term speculation. On the other hand, liquidity offers traders a chance to reveal
their private information.
Anand et al. (2005) investigated the evolution of liquidity in NYSE stocks. They
conclude that informed traders buy early and sell shares later once they disagree
with the stock price. This kind of liquidity supports the assumption that liquidity
fosters market accuracy. In addition, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) report that
the risk of arbitrage trading is higher for smaller stocks. This effect occurs whenever
the liquidity available in markets does not suffice to exploit arbitrage opportunities.
This may also harm stock price efficiency in illiquid markets. Chordia et al. (2008)
report that, based on their investigation on market liquidity and efficiency, liquid-
ity facilitates efficiency. Moreover, they suggest that volatility induced by private
information during trading hours increases along with liquidity. This is a strong ev-
idence for the necessity to have appropriate liquidity in markets in order to support
an environment in which traders have the possibility to reveal their private infor-
mation and are not restrained from trading activity due to missing counterparts.
Bloomfield et al. (2009) analyzed informed and uninformed traders’ behavior in a
laboratory experiment and found that even taxes on transactions did not have a
severe influence on the result: taxes only caused a small decrease in trading activ-
ity. However, the appearance of uninformed traders had a positive effect on market
liquidity, whereas volume and depths were higher and spreads were lower.
All these examples show that the impact of liquidity is different depending on the
market objective, the domain of application and the type of data itself. In general,
one cannot develop a general market design that fits for every market application
(Weinhardt et al. 2003). Especially in Information Markets in innovation contexts,
the role of liquidity is of utmost importance because traders are in most cases
employees in enterprises assessing innovation alternatives. Employees do not have
plenty of time to reveal their beliefs and expectations in Enterprise Information
Markets (EIM). Once they like to reveal their information, the market must be
capable of providing them a chance to act. Otherwise, valuable information will get
lost.
In Chapter 4, a field experiment will be described which investigates the impact of
automated market making as an approach to foster liquidity and therefore forecast
accuracy in Information Markets. The effect of (automated) market making in
markets was already researched by several researchers. In the following section,
different methods of market making will be described.
3.3.4.1 Market Maker Mechanisms
In order to avoid extremely illiquid markets, researchers recognized the neces-
sity to provide a market maker mechanism in markets. Nearly every considerable
Information Market employs automated market maker mechanisms in order to pro-
vide additional liquidity. For example, the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX), the
Washington Stock Exchange (WSX), Inkling Markets and several others rely on
automated market makers.
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A commonly used method named Market Scoring Rule (MSR) was introduced
by Hanson (2003). Hanson developed the MSR as an automated mechanism to
provide liquidity in Information Markets. Market Scoring Rules are like two-sided
market11 makers providing unlimited liquidity for the sell side of the market. The
market risk of the market operator is bounded which can be seen as a subsidy for
the market. A MSR works substantially different than a CDA. A MSR maintains a
probability distribution for all events and traders can buy or sell shares if they like
to change the current probability for an event. Market scoring rules can be seen as a
sequentially used proper scoring rule where information is integrated immediately. If
traders move market prices in the right direction, they can expect a positive payoff,
otherwise they will lose money. In exchanges like Inkling Markets12 or the former
Washington Stock Exchange13, the MSR is implemented. One major challenge is
the setup for agility and reactivity. The behavior of the price setting mechanism
inside the MSR is steered by a certain factor. If the factor is defined to low, the
MSR reacts sedate and to volatile otherwise. Therefore, finding the right setup is
difficult because the behavior of the MSR needs to adapt to the current level of
liquidity in the market. Another problem is the transparency to traders. It is a
valuable information for traders if one side of the order book is filled with orders
whereas the other side is nearly empty. Hence, one can interpret that the majority
of traders expect a movement of market prices. In contrast to the CDA, where open
orders are shown in an order book, the MSR has no capability to maintain open
orders. Therefore, valuable information is not accessible by traders as it would be
in case of the CDA.
Another market making mechanism is the Dynamic Parimutuel Market (DPM)
which employs concepts from the CDA and parimutuel markets. Parimutuel mar-
kets are commonly used in horse race betting. They collect monetary bets from
bettors and keep them in a central pool. The money is divided among the winners.
Therefore, this infinite liquidity avoids the problem of illiquidity completely. On the
other side, bettors have no incentives to reveal their beliefs early. They can observe
how other bettors place their bets and react to them. Information cannot be inte-
grated immediately and the market does not consolidate the beliefs of all bettors
at once. Pennock (2004) developed the DPM mechanism to overcome this problem
by combining the infinite liquidity of parimutuel markets and market mechanisms
reflecting traders’ beliefs continuously. The mechanism offers to buy in liquidity
and acts as a one-sided market maker only offering to sell at some price in order
to move the market price according to demand. One-sided market makers do not
accept sell offers and therefore traders can sell their shares via a CDA mechanism,
allowing them to limit their losses. The market operator is not exposed to risk in the
DPM, because money is redistributed in the market and he needs not to put money
into the market to keep it liquid. Via the CDA mechanism, traders can “hedge-sell”
by buying the opposite outcome (Pennock 2004). The DPM is implemented in the
Tech Buzz Game14 operated by Yahoo (Mangold et al. 2005). A similar challenge,
as mentioned before, is the order transparency. In the DPM, traders cannot com-
11A two-sided market allows offers on the sell as well as on the buy side in parallel.
12http://inklingmarkets.com
13http://thewsx.com, now managed by Consensus Point
14http://buzz.research.yahoo.com
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Table 3.1: Trading Mechanisms Comparison
CDA MSR DPM
Guaranteed Liquidity #  G#a
Continuous information processing    
Risk for operator # G#b #
Transparency  # G# satisfied, G# partly satisfied, # not satisfied
a Guaranteed liquidity on the buy side, but not on the sell side.
b Operators’ risk is bounded.
municate that they are willing to trade at another price as quoted by the DPM
mechanism.
In Table 3.1, the introduced mechanisms for market making in Information Mar-
kets are compared.
The described mechanisms were mainly used in Information Markets. In financial
literature, several approaches and research directions exist for automated market
making, which are also relevant for Information Markets. Due to the flexibility of
the market mechanism and the order transparency to traders, the CDA was chosen
to be implemented in the field experiment which are introduced in Chapters 4
and 5. Therefore, four approaches for market making strategies in CDA market
mechanisms will be briefly introduced in the following section.
3.3.4.2 Market Maker Mechanisms for CDA
In the following, four approaches for market making in CDA markets are briefly
introduced.
● Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
The authors proposed a model to compute bid and ask orders based on order
flows from informed as well as uninformed traders. They assume that the
market maker earns zero expected profits on each purchase and each sale and
faces no transaction costs. The model computes bid and ask prices based on
the probabilities that the next order will be a buy or sell order respectively.● Shelton (2001) introduced a learning market maker model which uses a learn-
ing algorithm for software agents acting as market makers. Those agents have
a set of actions as well as a set of observations. Actions may be lowering or
widening the spread as well as adjusting the volume of orders. Observations
are the “imbalance” of buy and sell orders which will result in an appropri-
ate action. Based on the expected profit, the learning algorithm learns and
adapts these actions from past trades and chooses the action which is assumed
to maximize profit in future market situations.● Das (2005)
Das picked up Glosten and Milgrom’s model and enhanced it. The market
maker tracks a density function about the true value of stocks whereby the
market maker tries to learn that value in order to set appropriate bid and ask
orders. The model considers the appearance of informed, noisy informed as
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well as uninformed traders. Furthermore, Das’ model considers market makers
profits and provides inventory control.● Boer-Sorban et al. (2007)
Boer et al. applied a model to overcome the shortcomings (discrete time slots
per sequential trader) in Das’ model by extending it to a continuous model.
The authors ran several simulations and showed that the market maker can
learn the fundamental value of stocks passably well in different scenarios.
While all described models are promising approaches contributing to the common
understanding of the dynamics of markets, all have shortcomings with respect to
their usage in real world scenarios. For example, the models of Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), Das (2005), Boer-Sorban et al. (2007) use algorithms which are very useful
to learn the fundamental value of stocks by tracking the traders’ order flow. To
maintain a density function about the fundamental value, the market maker needs
to know about traders’ orders. Even if a trader does not want to trade, the market
maker needs to know it in order to update the density function. Furthermore, the
fundamental value must be well defined which is very difficult in service innovation
scenarios. Markets with both perfectly informed and noisily informed traders are
not considered either. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) do not consider market makers
profits whereas Das (2005) abandons a continuous market and proposes a market
organized with bidding rounds which is similar to a CA. Also, each model, except
the market scoring rule, maintains investors’ planning of only one step ahead, which
is unrealistic because traders are usually planning more than one step. The models
from Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Das (2005) and Boer-Sorban et al. (2007) assume
that the market maker knows the fraction of informed/uninformed traders in the
market, which cannot be maintained. The approach by Shelton (2001) uses a simple
model of automated market making where traders are not allowed to trade against
each other. They were only allowed to trade with the market maker. Furthermore,
all positions were liquidated at the end of the trading day in order to limit the risk
for the market maker.
As mentioned, no optimal solution for automated market making can be found in
scientific literature for the application in Information Markets operating 24 hours,
7 days a week. Moreover, each Information Market requires different customized
mechanisms related to the market objectives as well as the appropriate market
design. In Chapter 4, a field experiment will be described in which an automated
market maker agent as a piece of software was developed for that experiment using
simple strategies. In contrast to the MSR and the DPM, a CDA mechanism was
implemented for the experiment since an open order book can be provided which
carries information which are not available in the MSR or the DPM.
3.4 Fields of Application
Over the years, many Information Market experiments have been conducted to
forecast events in different fields of application. But not only experiments were
reported in scientific literature, also theoretical and descriptive work has been pub-
lished. Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007) conducted an extended literature review
and classified existing Information Market literature. They classified 152 research
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papers and counted 72 articles as application reports. Descriptive and theoretical
work sum up to 60 articles whereas reports about law and policy sum up to 20
articles. The majority is, therefore, about applications in the field.
3.4.1 Politics
As mentioned in Section 3.2, early introductory articles by Hanson (1990a), Han-
son (1990b), Hanson (1992) were followed by the majority of articles about political
stock markets. The IOWA Electronic Markets (IEM)15 started forecasting political
elections and was operated by the University of Iowa. The first scientific report
about the IEM was published in 1992 (Forsythe et al. 1992). The IEM focused on
US presidential and state elections. The platform was also used to forecast pres-
idential elections in Austria, Korea, France as well as Germany. Stock Prices in
Information Markets react very quickly to new information because traders reveal
their information at an early stage of the market, especially in markets of high pub-
lic interest (Berg and Rietz 2006). In recent years, the IEM has not only focused
on political events, but also allows the trading of economic indicators.
Further political stock markets were conducted in Canada (Antweiler and Ross
1998), Sweden (Bohm and Sonnegard 1999), Germany (Beckmann and Werding
1996) and Austria (Ortner et al. 1995), where they regularly outperform traditional
polls (Berg et al. 2000). Due to this outstanding success, political stock markets
have gained a lot of attention in the media. Agencies and publishing houses even
started to operate their own political stock markets (Filzmaier et al. 2003).
3.4.2 Sports
The prediction of sport events is very popular in markets like Betfair.com16, World
Sports Exchange17 or NewsFutures18. Popular sports events cover Baseball, Bas-
ketball, Hockey, Football, Golf, Tennis, Boxing, Soccer, Horse and Auto Racing.
NewsFutures runs a general approach not limited to sports events. They provide
even political betting, financial markets or movie stocks. Like political markets,
sports markets are often at least as accurate as experts’ forecasts (Servan-Schreiber
et al. 2004; Chen et al. 2005; Tetlock 2006). The first Information Market about
soccer matches was introduced by Schmidt and Werwatz (2002). Luckner (2008)
operated another Information Market during the FIFA Soccer World Championship
in 2006 forecasting the world soccer champion. Moreover, Information Markets for
sports events react very quickly according to the efficient market hypothesis. It is
reported that horse race betting markets in the UK fulfill the weak as well as the
strong form of market efficiency (Smith et al. 2006; Luckner 2008).
In order to seize the full potential of Information Markets, appropriate incentives
have to be designed for participation and information revelation (cp. Section 3.3.3).
Therefore, Information Markets like Betfair.com or the IEM require real money
investments from traders. As further stated in Section 3.3.3, several reports in-
vestigated the effect of real money vs. play money in sport Information Markets.
15http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem
16http://www.betfair.com
17http://www.wsex.com
18http://www.newsfutures.com
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The results show that there is no significant difference between real money and
play money markets (Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004). In general, these results are
contrary to those from Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) whose work indicates that no
final answer can be made to the question of accuracy between play money and real
money markets.
3.4.3 Enterprise Information Markets
Information Markets in enterprises were firstly introduced to forecast software de-
velopment projects (Ortner 1997; Ortner 1998). Based thereupon, many enterprises
used Information Markets for different kinds of forecasting applications internally
(Surowiecki 2004). One of the main objectives of using Information Markets is the
exploitation of performance-based incentive system as an effective way to motivate
employees (Griffiths-Hemans and Grover 2006). The remuneration of employees
based on their individual performance in Information Markets is dominant in con-
trast to the incentives in traditional surveys, which are not performance-based.
Surveys do not have motivational aspects like competition with colleagues, play-
ful aspects, performance-based incentive mechanisms or a continuity of information
aggregation. Therefore, companies have been experimenting with Information Mar-
kets in order to enrich their decision making by involving employees.
Siemens tried to forecast software development projects with Information Mar-
kets. Ortner (1997) and Ortner (1998) set up several markets investigating how
accurate the forecasts were. The results show that participants anticipated new
information, rumors and personal feelings long before official statements were pub-
lished. In an enterprise-wide experiment, Google also used Information Markets
to forecast whether a project would be completed on time or whether a particular
office would be opened (Cowgill et al. 2009). A very traditional decision making
forecast was conducted at Hewlett-Packard, aiming at the forecast of sales figures of
printers (Plott and Chen 2002). Their results show that the market beat the official
HP forecasts regularly. An internal Information Market at Eli Lilly aimed at finding
out which drugs are the most successful ones (Kiviat 2004). 50 employees at Ely
Lilly involved in drug development – chemists, biologists, project managers – traded
six mock drug candidates through an internal market and predicted the three most
successful drugs. British Petroleum (BP) also experimented with Information Mar-
kets to forecast different sales scenarios.19 At BP, the market mechanism generated
a prediction that was significantly closer to the actual sales than the traditional
sales forecast.
Recently, the usage of Information Markets has been extended to the assessment
of new product alternatives (Soukhoroukova 2007; Chen et al. 2010). Such an in-
novation context yields a special challenge since the final value of the shares traded
cannot be used for the payout of stocks. In order to determine which innovation
alternative is the most promising one, all alternatives have to be evaluated. Due
to unreasonable costs, enterprises cannot implement all alternatives and thus, must
decide which one to implement. Up to now, several methods and tools were intro-
duced to support decision making in innovation contexts, but there is no general
19http://www.accenture.com/NR/rdonlyres/0DEC6700-DAB1-41BF-942E-FC8C2F61EDFF/0/
know markets.pdf, accessed 23.04.2010
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rule to guarantee success. Information Markets are considered as an additional
decision support tool to involve employees into the assessment of innovation alter-
natives. Information Markets provide some advantages over traditional methods
in order to integrate employees such as the convenient analysis of results or the
usage of incentive mechanisms, Thus, Information Markets are a powerful method
to assess innovation alternatives continuously. For the market operator, it is also
convenient. The results are not to be evaluated or aggregated because the mar-
ket mechanism provides a continuous indication and aggregation mechanism, with
which intermediate results can be assessed continuously.
Due to the fact that no final value of the innovation alternatives can be observed,
the objective of an Enterprise Information Market (EIM) for innovation assessment
is to aggregate information from employees rather than forecasting an event. There-
fore, the market design has to be engineered more carefully in order to allocate the
right incentives for participants. Nevertheless, Information Markets for new prod-
uct development have been successfully used (Gruca et al. 2003; Dahan et al. 2007;
Soukhoroukova 2007). Gruca et al. (2003) used Information Markets in order to
forecast the success of new products. Their results show that market prices sum-
marize the information contained in survey forecasts and improve those forecasts
by reducing the variability of the forecast. In addition, Soukhoroukova (2007) used
Information Markets for the assessment of new product concepts for MP3 players
in order to evaluate how participants assess different characteristics before products
are pushed into the market. Furthermore, Soukhoroukova (2007) compared the re-
sults of 8-12 traders to a conjoint analysis of 307 participants and found out that
results of the Information Market were more robust for different price measures.
Altogether, the usage of Information Markets increases the likelihood of finding the
right decision and obtaining a more comprehensive information pool by involving a
large sample of participants (Ozer 2005; Surowiecki 2004).
In the next section, Innovation Management in a project context focussing inter-
organizational service innovation assessment will be described briefly. The project
combines aspects of the innovation management approaches mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.1 and develops tools and methods to support innovation management in
inter-organizational contexts.
3.4.3.1 Research Project Use Case: TEXO
While the service sector is one of the biggest employers in Germany, a large-
scale German research project was launched in 2007 in order to develop a holistic
approach for the management of dynamic Business Networks (BN). The project
named TEXO20 consists of a platform, models, methods and components to real-
ize a supportive system to bring together service providers and service consumers.
Therefore, an open standard infrastructure to offer and deliver services is an essen-
tial prerequisite. Allowing the composition to build services based on several sub
services is of central relevance to offer value added services. Offering and trading
these services via a web-based service platform allows the easy access of service
providers as well as service consumers. Moreover, service providers may adapt their
20The TEXO project is funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (support code
01MQ07012), duration of 4 years (03/2007-02/2011).
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services to offer them to a specific group of consumers with different business mod-
els. A comprehensive description of the TEXO concept can be found in Janiesch
et al. (2008).
3.4.3.2 TEXO Innovation Life-Cycle and Methods
As mentioned in Section 2.1.4, innovation assessment plays also an important
role in inter-organizational contexts. Academia offers several approaches for the
management of innovations. The described approaches in Section 2.1.2 provide
descriptions how innovation management can be implemented, but lack concrete
tools and methods for the fulfillment of single steps. The innovation management
in TEXO was designed to utilize the advantages of a continuous innovation model
similar to the innovation wheel of Hamel (2002) and developed tools and concepts
for the conduction of tasks in innovation management. One of the first activities
during the creation of new services is the innovation phase. This phase supports
the development of new services through the provision of methods and tools for the
innovation life-cycle. The TEXO innovation process is depicted in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: TEXO Service Innovation Model
In early product and service stages respectively, an innovation idea usually is
developed either by inspiration or clever combination of fragments.21 Therefore,
the innovation life-cycle starts with two phases (Phase 1 and 2) of how ideas may
enter the life-cycle. Typically, such an idea generation is done in group workshops
or think tanks where the result is stored in the idea/innovation repository (A).
After the idea generation, the developed ideas and innovation alternatives can be
evaluated through communities (B) in phase 3. Once idea alternatives have been
21Methods to support the creation of ideas and further information can be found in: Diehl and
Stroebe (1987), Potter and Balthazard (2004), Simonton (1999), Toubia (2006), Goldenberg
et al. (1999), Troy et al. (2001), Hender et al. (2002), Pinsonneault et al. (1999), Piller and
Walcher (2006).
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evaluated by the community, the idea can be (prototypically) implemented (Phase
4). To evaluate if the community accepts services or products, an evaluation phase
collects opinions as well as usage information from the community (Phase 5) based
on information derived from the service repository (C). The result obtained at the
end of the five phases may be reused as feedback for the prior phases in order to
initiate new ideas or refine already implemented services.
The advantage of the innovation life-cycle is that loosely organized participants
in Business Value Networks can be integrated in every stage of the process. For
example, the assessment of innovations via an Information Market allows market
operators to invite people to register to the web-based market system easily. Fur-
thermore, a relevant fraction of the TEXO community may take part in brainstorm-
ing sessions whereas another fraction is evaluating the most promising ideas via an
Information Market. While participants in the community are customers as well,
they can actively influence and steer innovation of their own interest. Furthermore,
they can track the impact of their trading activity as well as the aggregation of all
traders’ estimations in the market directly after trading in real time. The TEXO
innovation life-cycle overcomes therefore the drawbacks of state-of-the-art models.
For instance, feedback loops in every phase allow the continuous improvement in
any phase. If results of the feedback analysis indicate that early innovations needs
to be improved, a new innovation cycle can be triggered beginning in Phase 1.
Thus, the community can again assess improved innovation proposals via an Infor-
mation Market in a second step. By monitoring service usage continuously (Phase
5), feedback about the usage is collected in order to derive, if a service needs to be
reinvented or if new services seem necessary based on community feedbacks. Alto-
gether, Information Markets are used as a method to assess information from prior
phases in an ad hoc and flexible manner as an integral part of the TEXO innovation
life-cycle.
3.4.4 Other Fields of Application
In scientific literature, the usage of Information Markets is also reported for vari-
ous objectives. Nearly all kinds of future events can be represented as contracts and
evaluated in fields of public interest ranging from technical to socio-political issues
(Pennock et al. 2001b). Therefore, scientists experimented in different domains.
Due to the logic of the payout mechanism, Information Markets are apparently
suitable for short-term and medium-term forecasting of events in order to observe
their outcomes. These outcomes form the base for the payout and, thus, determine
the success of participating traders. Transferring this to long term forecasting, one
would have to wait for the outcome of the event in order to determine the payments.
Yet, traders are not willing to invest time in an Information Market and wait several
years for their payment. In order to tackle this issue, Hanson introduced Idea Fu-
tures for long term forecasting and argues that “[. . . ] future markets in ideas could
help the evolution of ideas by creating a visible consensus of relevant experts, and
better incentives for honesty and care when making contributions.” (Hanson 1992).
Thus, traders obviously do accept Information Markets for long term forecasting.
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In Yahoo’s Tech Buzz Game22 users predict technologies that Internet users will be
searching for in the future (Mangold et al. 2005). Users are paid out according to the
number of search requests as a benchmark. Once the topic becomes uninteresting,
the markets will be closed. In parallel, Yahoo’s Tech Buzz Game tries to predict the
popularity of smart phone operating systems, e.g., Apple’s iOS or Google’s Android.
In parallel, the search frequency of these technologies is ranked based on their search
frequency in internet search engines. Depending on this ranking, traders can be paid
out. Once the search frequency drops, it can be assumed that the overall interest
in these technologies is decreasing and the markets close.
In the field of economic indicators, Information Markets are used to aggregate
expectations of people about the development of important economic variables like
inflation rates, gross domestic product or unemployment rates (Berlemann 2001;
Gu¨rkaynak and Wolfers 2005). From November 2009 till October 2010, a large
field experiment with nearly 1.000 registered users23 is operating named EIX –
Economic Indicators Exchange24. Beginning in November 2010, it is extended to
another year of run-time till October 2011. In the EIX, play money is given to
registered traders. Based on their individual forecasting performance, they can
win monthly prices worth ranging from 175e to 500e. In November 2010, four
major prizes are raﬄed for the traders with the best overall performance in the first
year. Contracts about export, inflation, unemployment, the gross domestic product
and industry investments for Germany can be traded three periods in advance and
in parallel along the publication of terminal values through the Federal Statistical
Office25. Once the terminal values are available, shares are paid out according to
these values.
Other markets try to forecast political risks (Hulse 2003). Even in the medical do-
main, Information Markets are used to forecast infectious disease activity (Polgreen
et al. 2007). A very popular application of Information Markets is the Hollywood
Stock Exchange26 (HSX). The HSX was introduced in 1996 and is an example of a
very successful application of Information Markets for years. The HSX forecasts box
office numbers for cinema movies as well as contracts representing the popularity
of actors and movies. The HSX shows very accurate forecasts regularly (Pennock
et al. 2001a; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004; Lamare 2007). Information Markets are
also used to predict market capitalization of companies like Google. The prediction
markets forecasted Google’s post-IPO market capitalization accurately (Berg et al.
2009).
3.5 Challenges & Summary
In the previous sections the fundamentals of markets were described in order
to show how complex the design of markets is concerning the decisions a market
engineer has to consider. In Information Markets, the market design has a strong
effect on the overall success of the market. Many Information Markets rely on
22http://buzz.research.yahoo.com
231.000 registered users as of September 2010.
24http://eix-market.de
25http://www.destatis.de
26http://www.hsx.com
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virtual money. One of the main challenges is to retain the participants activity in
the market. In financial markets, in which traders are incentivized via their own
real money investments, it is difficult for traders to quit trading once their portfolio
dropped below the initial value. In play money Information Markets, traders can
quit trading at every time. If their portfolio value drops below the initial value
and they feel that it is too tedious to stick to the market, it is likely that they
drop out – with no disadvantage. Therefore, incentives have to be designed that
even traders who are likely to quit the market have an incentive to actually stay
in. On the one hand, one can argue that “unsuccessful” traders are not necessarily
needed in markets because they do not contribute information to bring prices in
the right direction. But they provide further liquidity to informed traders and are a
valuable in Information Markets. On the other hand, every trader brings a piece of
information visible to other traders. Other traders update their beliefs and therefore
the overall performance of the Information Market may improve.
In this context, it is of utmost importance that several aspects of an Information
Market are factored in and carefully designed in order to implement a successful
market. As mentioned before, the selection of traders is an important issue. The
right target group needs to be identified containing people carrying relevant informa-
tion and having beliefs about the forecasting objective of the Information Market.
This is highly relevant for enterprises, where it has to be decided which group should
be invited to the market. It can be decided to use an open, a closed or even a mixed
group of employees, customers, suppliers or consultants.
Furthermore, the contract design needs to be simple and intuitive. Contracts
which are hard to understand may restrain Information Market novices from using
the market regularly. In order to provide traders in Information Markets useful in-
formation about the contracts, several methods of information provisioning are to be
considered. Newsletters or news feeds are helpful as information source for traders.
Thus, as mentioned in Section 3.1, the engineering of successful market design is
a challenging task. Especially in field experiments, as explained in Section 3.4, it
is crucial to design an Information Market carefully. An inappropriate market de-
sign conceals the latent risk of getting lost or being not encouraged to reveal their
true beliefs and expectations. For example, during the 2002 FIFA Soccer World
Championship, Schmidt et al. (2008) operated an Information Market to predict
the outcome of 64 matches and compared the forecasts to Bookmakers quotes and
a random predictor. The results of the Information Market were contradictory to
what one would expect. The Information Market produced weak results which were
extremely inaccurate. In other Information Markets predicting soccer results, the
accuracy was at least as good as the benchmarks.27 Schmidt et al. (2008) state that
after their analysis the results seemed to be distorted due to a structural problem of
the markets’ design. They suspect that biases of traders lead them to poor predic-
tions and caused therefore a low overall prediction accuracy. If the market design
would have been designed to avoid biases, the results would maybe have shown
better predictive accuracy. Therefore, especially in field experiments, the market
design is of utmost importance to avoid market failures.
27European Championship 2000 (Schmidt and Werwatz 2002), FIFA World Soccer Championship
2006 (Luckner 2008)
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On the other hand, some markets’ designs obviously do not offer reasons for
failures. Sometimes traders themselves bear a potential for inaccurate market results
of which a market engineer should be aware of. Several reports describe the favorite
long shot bias as a reason for market inefficiencies (Ali 1977; Hausch et al. 1981;
Thaler and Ziemba 1988). Traders tend to overestimate their own favorites and
undervalue common favorites. Therefore, bettors’ misperceptions of probability
drive the favorite long shot bias (Snowberg and Wolfers 2007). The favorite long
shot bias may thus be considered as the result of inefficient markets (Woodland and
Woodland 1994). In Information Markets field experiments, long shot bias effects
are often observable and are to be considered (Berg and Rietz 2002; Wolfers and
Zitzewitz 2004; Leigh et al. 2007; Luckner 2008). In order to avoid biases, the
market engineer has to identify situations in which biases may occur and design an
appropriate part of the incentive scheme in order to bring traders not to follow their
biases. If the market design is appropriate, Information Markets may outperform
natural benchmarks28 like polls or experts regularly, even if traders in Information
Markets are biased (Bru¨ggelambert 1999; Forsythe et al. 1999; Berg et al. 2000;
Berlemann and Schmidt 2001; Spann 2002; Berg et al. 2008; Graefe 2008b; Stix
2008).
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the outcome of Information Markets for innovation
assessment cannot be exactly determined in order to payout traders. Therefore, the
design of an appropriate substitute is one of the substantial challenges of market
engineering. Moreover, employees in EIM may trade following their estimation,
based on which innovation they prefer instead of which innovation is the most
beneficial one for the company. In order to bring employees to trade in line with
the objective of the Information Market, the challenge lies in the appropriate and
intuitive design of contracts and the incentive system.
Another serious issue in Information Markets is manipulation. In former political
stock markets a group of traders tried to distort prices of their favorite candidate.
But the market quickly detected the inappropriate prices and within 24 hours, prices
rebounded to the previous level again (Hanson et al. 2006). Hanson and Oprea
(2004) investigated that Information Markets cannot be manipulated in terms of
price manipulations because traders are keen on identifying inappropriate prices
in order to exploit them. The prerequisite in liquid markets is, therefore, that
there are enough traders constantly observing price movements and that enough
liquidity is available. Another type of manipulation is the usage of automated
trading mechanisms (bots) or multiple accounts. Since most Information Markets
operate with play money and do not charge fees for participation, traders may
register multiple times in order to move virtual money from one account to another.
In the STOCCER field experiment during the FIFA29 World Cup in 2006, several
traders registered multiple accounts and tried to exploit them. This challenge can
be faced with a fraud detection tool. Blume et al. (2008) developed a monitoring
tool capable of identifying suspicious price movements and trading activities to some
extend. It can mark the relevant accounts autonomously following certain strategies
28Possible benchmarks are explained in Section 2.2.
29Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association
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and tags accounts for manual inspection. It is a helpful tool in order to face the
threat of possible manipulative activities in Information Markets.
Summarizing, this section provided insights of important aspects a market en-
gineer has to consider while setting up an Information Market. Several of the
described challenges are picked up again in the following Part II, where two field
experiments are introduced. Both of them were individually designed to be oper-
ated in different contexts whereas the design of the mentioned challenges played a
vital role and took most of the time during the market system development.
Part II
Methodology & Evaluation

4 The Impact of Market Making
on Information Markets
I
n this chapter, the impact of automated market making on the forecasting accu-
racy, market liquidity as well as information efficiency of Information Markets
is described. As mentioned in Section 3.3.4, market making is an important
concept to keep markets liquid as well as to improve market quality. Market makers
are usually used to support trading activity by providing bid and ask orders in stock
markets. Mostly, market makers are human entities in real money markets like the
New York Stock Exchange1 (NYSE) or the Frankfurter Bo¨rse2. In general, mar-
ket makers pursue several objectives besides making money through their trading
activity (Schwartz et al. 2006).
The classic role of market making is the provision of immediacy through the provi-
sion of continuous trading. The market maker is continuously present, buying when
a public seller arrives and selling when a public buyer arrives. It is the medium
through which public buyers and sellers effectively meet each other. Another ob-
jective is the provisioning of liquidity. A market maker will commonly trade for
larger order sizes that it is quoting. The ultimate source of liquidity are still public
buyers and sellers. The market maker simply helps them to come together and
cannot be the ultimate source of liquidity. Furthermore, market makers animate
markets while bringing liquidity to less liquid stocks as a facilitator. Moreover, they
support price discovery processes while offering buy and sell shares continuously.
Summarizing, market makers have several important roles to play. These are the
provisioning of capital, animating the market, participating in price discovery and
fostering price improvements. Generally, illiquidity is a serious problem in markets
(Schwartz et al. 2006). Markets are like networks in which traders are nodes de-
pending on each other. Once a trader demands liquidity there has to be a liquidity
providing counterpart. The more traders join the network, the more frequent the
overall trading activity will be (Schwartz et al. 2006).
1http://www.nyse.com
2http://www.boerse-frankfurt.de
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When Information Markets were used in the late 1980’s (cp. Section 3.2), they
were mainly about forecasting of political and sports events. The liquidity in such
topics does not very often lead to a problem, because sports and politics are topics of
common interest in the public. Almost anybody has some knowledge or expectations
about who will win the football match or which candidate has a chance to win
the election. Hence, almost anybody can act as a trader in Information Markets.
Information and news, which may change the mind of traders, are ubiquitously
available in newspapers, television or radio-broadcastings. During the 90’s, the field
of application expanded to other topics than politics or sports. Companies began to
use Information Markets to forecast sales figures, technology impact in the future
or project durations. Furthermore, public available markets like Inkling3 came up
and started offering markets to the public to forecast almost everything somebody
is interested in like weather or technology breakthroughs. Moreover, Information
Markets have begun to be available as web-based systems and were operated 24
hours a day, 7 days a week. Thus, human market makers are not applicable in
online-based Information Markets. Therefore, this chapter investigates the impact
of automated market making on market accuracy, liquidity and efficiency in a field
experiment during the European Soccer Championship 2008.
As mentioned, forecasting in domains of low interest public interest may suffer
from illiquidity in web-based Information Markets and, therefore, the concept of
automated market making suggests itself. Many Information Markets make use
of automated market makers to support trading activity. For example, popular
Information Markets like Inkling4 and the HSX5 rely on market making. But the
impact of automated market making compared to non-market maker markets has
not been comprehensively analyzed in a field experiment, yet. What exactly is the
impact of having a market maker in an Information Market on the forecast accuracy,
the trading activity as well as the market efficiency? What effect has an automated
market maker on the trading activity of traders? And, can a market maker lead to
more accurate results in small-size Information Markets?
The following sections describe the field experiment conducted in 2008 which in-
vestigated the impact of market making during the European Soccer Championship.
In Section 4.1, the field experiment design will be described in detail. Section 4.2
presents descriptive statistics in order to provide an indication about the overall
market. Afterwards, Section 4.3 shows the hypotheses investigated during the field
experiment whereas Section 4.4 introduces the results. Section 4.5 concludes the
chapter.
4.1 The European Soccer Championship 2008 Ex-
periment
The European Soccer Championship 2008 was carried out in Austria and Switzer-
land. The tournament started with the first matches on the 7th of June 2008 and
ended with the final match on the 29th of June 2008. In total, 16 teams qualified
for the tournament and were sorted into four groups as shown in Figure 4.1.
3http://inklingmarkets.com
4http://inklingmarkets.com
5http://www.hsx.com
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Figure 4.1: European Soccer Championship 2008 - Group Phase
The teams had to play against each of the other teams in their group and were
ranked in a group ranking based on their success. In the experiment, teams were
represented via contracts. Traders were supposed to trade contracts based on their
expectations and beliefs following two objectives: in the first step, they were sup-
posed to forecast the teams reaching the final round. In the second step, they were
supposed to forecast the winner of the tournament.
The group phase was carried out until the 18th of June 2008 and eight teams –
the first and the second team of each group – qualified for the final round while the
other teams dropped out of the tournament. The tournament was then organized in
four quarter finals, two semi finals and the final match. That is, the eight remaining
teams in the knockout stage had to qualify in each ongoing match to reach the next
round. Otherwise they dropped out of the tournament. The finals took place from
19th of June – 29th of June 2008.
4.1.1 Experiment Design
To investigate the impact of market making, two identical markets were imple-
mented. One was equipped with an automated market making mechanism whereby
the other was not. Details about the functionalities of the automated market maker
will be described in Section 4.1.2. For the experiment, it was intended to invite
only a few participants to keep the two markets small in order to learn if the market
without a market maker mechanism would be very illiquid and no reasonable results
would occur.
Approximately 250 people were invited to participate in the market via email
invitations, whereby people were allowed to forward the invitation. Altogether, only
a few mailing lists were addressed in order to get small markets with approximately
40-50 participants. In total, 88 people registered as participants. Each participant
was endowed with 100.000 virtual currency units (EMe) and 100 shares of each
stock, in order to trade instantly. Each stock represented one corresponding team
out of the 16 teams taking part in the tournament. From the 7th through the 18th
of June participants were supposed to trade the eight teams that they expected to
reach the final round of the tournament. After the group stage, the depot of every
trader was paid out. Stocks in the depot of participants representing teams reaching
the finals were paid out with 100 EMe, otherwise 0 EMe. After the payout, shares
were taken from the market and could not be traded anymore.
From the 19th till the 29th of June, traders were again equipped with 100 shares
of each team participating in the finals and were supposed to forecast the champion.
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After the final match, only the shares of the winner were paid out with 100 EMe,
all others with 0 EMe.
Both markets started on the 7th of June 2008. Stocks were issued at an equal
price of 50 currency units. The sum of all payouts was 800 (= 8x100) currency units
and, therefore, the sum of all stock prices should be 800 on average at any time.
Thus, each contract was initially issued at a price of 50 (= 80016 ) currency units.
Until the 18th of June 2008, the group phase was traded and was paid out after the
last match of each group. On the 19th of June 2008, the market was reset and the
eight teams in the final round were traded. Only the shares of the champion were
paid out with 100 currency units. Therefore, the sum of all stock prices should be
100 currency units. Thus, contracts were issued at a price of 12,5 (= 1008 ) currency
units. The final round was open until the final match on the 29th of June 2008.
Figure 4.2 shows tournament overview in relation to both market phases.
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Figure 4.2: Tournament Overview (Market Phases)
Traders could see the order book with all outstanding buy and sell offers con-
tinuously in the trading screen. Furthermore, they could track the evolution of
transaction prices via charts representing the stock price history. Via a trading
screen, they could submit limit orders by quoting the volume and price they were
willing to buy/sell. In the depot screen, they could see their already executed orders
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and actual depot details. All traders were ranked according to their depot value
in a ranking, which was accessible to all traders.6 The depot value included the
trader’s available money as well as contracts in the depot. The prices of contracts
in the depot were valuated according to the current stock price. Changing stock
prices could therefore affect the depot value. A selection of screen shots illustrates
the market system in Appendix A, Figures A.7 - A.12.
As incentives, prizes were raﬄed among participants. All depot values were sum-
marized and the fraction for each trader’ depot value was calculated in percent (%).
This indicated the winning probability of each trader according to the depot value.
The winning probability was displayed in the ranking as well. After the tournament,
an iPod worth 125e was raﬄed in each market. A trader with a higher winning
probability had higher chances to win the prize. Traders could realize profits once
they started trading. Hence, early traders had an advantage compared to traders
entering the market several days later. With the winning probability, even late
traders had a chance to improve their winning chances. This was intended to moti-
vate traders who had entered the market late. In contrast to traditional strategies
where traders with the highest depot value are allowed to win prizes, it is advanta-
geous to motivate late traders before they quit trading if they feel that they cannot
catch up to other traders. For the draw of winners, random numbers were assigned
to traders according to their winning probability and a random number was drawn
in order to allot the winner.
The experiment used an continuous double auction mechanism (CDA) in order to
allow the immediate execution of orders. Once a trader submitted an order, it was
executed with a counter order. Therefore, traders could provide their information at
any time. In contrast, a call auction does not provide a continuous order matching
mechanism. As mentioned in Section 3.1.3, orders are stored whereas the matching
is done at a pre-defined point in time. Since information in the context experiment
appears continuously, the CDA mechanism was used to allow traders the immediate
provision of their information.
4.1.2 Market Maker Mechanism
As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, one of the two markets employed a market maker
mechanism in order to avoid situations of illiquidity. The functionality of the imple-
mented market maker mechanism focused on two aspects: The provision of liquidity
and arbitrage trading at any time.
The liquidity providing functionality intends to offer immediate trading capabili-
ties for traders. The market maker is implemented as an automated piece of software
equipped with a trading strategy. As mentioned in Section 3.3.4.1, a CDA mech-
anism reveals open orders in an order book. Other mechanisms do not offer that
kind of information revelation. For the experiment, thus, a market maker mecha-
nism was implemented in a CDA mechanism which functions will be described in
the following.
Once a trader initiates a trade via a corresponding bid or ask offer, a new transac-
tion price occurs. This new transaction price triggers the automated market maker
6It was ensured, that traders from the MM market could not see the NMM market and vice versa.
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to react. Once it observes a new transaction price, it put an ask offer in the market
at +1 % above the new transaction price and a bid offer at -1 % below the new
transaction price analoguously. In each offer, it put 50 shares. Once another trans-
action happens, it deletes its old offers and the remaining shares in case of a partly
executed offer and sets two new offers at +/-1 % around the new transaction price.
Hence, traders may trade at any time with a counterpart in the market and the
market maker reacts only if a human trader causes a new transaction. This strat-
egy was developed in order to investigate, if a simple strategy works well and has
a positive effect on trading activity, market efficiency and accuracy. If this strategy
fulfills these objectives, it can be assumed that even more sophisticated strategies
will also show positive effects. Figure 4.3 illustrates the market maker strategy.
Transaction Price 1
Transaction Price 2
40.0
40.4
39.6 39.6
39.9
39.2
+ 1%
- 1% + 1%
- 1%
Figure 4.3: Market Maker Strategy
On the left hand side, the current situation of the transaction price is given by
40 currency units. The market maker puts a sell order at 40.4 and a corresponding
buy order at 36.6 currency units. After a transaction happened at 36.6, the new
transaction price is 36.6. The market maker deletes his old orders and submits two
new orders at 36.96 (sell) and 36.23 (buy).
Moreover, the market supported portfolio trading in order to buy or sell shares to
the operator for a given price. Portfolio trading is intended to keep market prices
efficient. Traders could buy or sell 1 share of each stock for 800 currency units
during the group market from the market operator. Analogously, the portfolio in
the final round cost 100 currency units – the sum of the payouts in the final round.
Traders can use the portfolio trading in two ways:
1. The sum of all stock prices is higher than the sum of the total payout
2. The sum of all stock prices is lower than the sum of the total payout
In the first case it is reasonable to buy portfolios and sell them to the market.
While the sum of all stock prices is higher than the price of a portfolio, the trader
makes riskless profits by selling shares to the market. In the second case, traders
should buy stocks in the market and sell them with profit to the market operator.
This is also called arbitrage trading. Traders were allowed to do arbitrage trading
at any time during the market runtime.
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Figure 4.4: Arbitrage Trading
Figure 4.4 shows the function of the market maker arbitrage trading strategy.
The market maker checked after each trading activity, if in case of the group phase
the sum of all stocks was 800 currency units, during the final round 100 currency
units respectively. The areas above the horizontal line indicate an overvaluation7 of
the market whereas areas below the horizontal line indicate an undervaluation8. If
the sum differed more than +/-5 % currency units, the market maker began to trade
in every stock following a trading strategy which will be described in the following.
Assuming that the sum of all stocks is 850 instead of 800, the market maker tries
to bring the sum down by 50 currency units between 760 and 840. First, it assigns
the 50 currency units to each stock regarding the current stock price of each stock.
Hence, stocks with high prices will be more affected than stocks with lower prices.
This is to ensure that the relation between stocks is retained. If the market maker
tries to trade all stocks down linearly, the relation of high priced stocks and low
priced stocks is changed. Imagine, if a stock is traded at 1 currency unit and the
market maker tries to bring all 16 stocks down by 5016 = 3.125, the linear strategy
would lead to a negative stock price in that case. Therefore, the market maker used
the following strategy to avoid the described distortion of stock price relation.
Remembering the 50 currency units to bring the sum of all stocks down, the
strategy normalizes all stock prices to 1 and calculates the weight of each stock
based on the stocks’ fraction related to all stocks. For example, if three stocks are
in the market priced 100;30;20 and the total payout is 100, the weights of stocks
calculates to 100150 = 0.666; 30150 = 0.200; 20150 = 0.133. Thus, the strategy of the market
maker is to trade the first stock down by 50 ∗ 0.666 = 33.33 currency units, the
second stock by 50∗0.2 = 10 currency units and the third stock by 50∗0.133 = 6.65.
The higher a stock price is, the more it will be affected by the market maker. The
strategy follows a distribution of 1x . Figure 4.5 shows the functioning of the described
strategy. The black panels represent the original overvalued stocks whereas the dark-
gray panels represent the resulting stock prices reduced by the automated market
maker (light-gray panels).
With these two functionalities of raising stock values up and down and to keep
them on a certain level, two major objectives of liquidity provisioning and arbitrage
trading essential for thinly traded Information Markets are achieved. First, traders
were able to find a trading partner permanently. The liquidity spending market
7The sum of all stock prices is higher than the sum of the total payout.
8The sum of all stock prices is lower than the sum of the total payout.
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Figure 4.5: Arbitrage Example
maker is triggered by transactions of human traders. Hence, it reacts on informa-
tion brought by traders. Secondly, the arbitrage functionality of the market maker
ensured that stock prices always summed up to the total sum of the payouts. This
functionality ensured that unexperienced traders could not set prices to an absurd
level. To avoid them from dropping the market due to implausible perception, the
arbitrage functionality helps to keep stock prices in a sensible range without losing
the information content of stock prices.
4.1.3 Technical Design
The market in the field experiment was developed to create a market system which
is easy to maintain and which can be extended by services and functionalities with
manageable effort. The system was developed with Groovy&Grails9. The market
system is then compiled to be deployed into an application server, e.g., Apache
Tomcat10, to get it online. An underlying database system keeps all relevant data
required for the market system. Figure 4.6 shows the basic system architecture.
Traders could connect to the market via http://www.em-stoxx.de at any time. On
the start page, they had to login with their personalized user name and password.
The necessary data for authentication and trading activities were accessed in the
MySQL database11 via the Application logic. This was necessary to recognize and
authenticate each trader at any time to assign depots and money to the trader. New
users could get a user name and a password through a registration process free of
charge. During registration, a unique email address and a user name was necessary
to join the market. Traders had to agree to the Standard Business Terms12. In order
to avoid automated bidding, the usage of bots and automated trading mechanisms
was strictly forbidden by the SBT. Each clue of automated functionality during
market runtime was investigated and would have led to the disqualification of traders
9http://www.grails.org
10http://tomcat.apache.org
11http://www.mysql.com
12engl: Standard Business Terms (SBT), Allgemeine Gescha¨ftsbedingungen (AGB), cp. Ap-
pendix A, Figure A.9
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Figure 4.6: System Architecture
violating the SBT. During market runtime, the trading activity was monitored with
an automated analysis tool, which monitored each trade. Indicators for automated
trading were, e.g., very short time between several trades or the observation of
several trades in one stock with unrealistic prices between two traders or a group
of traders.13 The used automated market monitoring tool introduced by Blume
et al. (2008) allowed real time and ex post market monitoring. One could adjust
several parameters on which issue the tool should focus. During market runtime, no
conspicious trading activity was monitored. It may have happened that some smart
traders anyhow tricked the market which was not detectable by the monitoring
tool nor by manual inspection. On the other hand, Hanson and Oprea (2004)
showed that a proportion of “manipulative” trading activity may be advantageous
in Information Markets.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
For an initial overview, Table 4.1 illustrates the complete tournament results.
The columns MM and NMM show the last trading price in both markets before the
match started for each team. The winner as well as the second best team at the
end of the group phase qualified for the quarter finals.
Each price was taken before the match began. It was assumed, that these prices
reflected the collective estimation of all traders, and that the team with the higher
stock price would win the match. For example, the final match prices on the 29th
of June 2008 were 55.7 for Germany and 40.0 for Spain in the market maker mar-
ket. Thus, traders supposed Germany would win in this case. In Section 4.4.2,
several measures and benchmarks will be introduced to describe the accuracy of
both markets in detail.
Table 4.2 shows basic statistics of both markets. Registrations were equally dis-
tributed with 44 participants, although the number of active participants was 33 in
13This indicates that one trader or a group of traders established several accounts and transferred
money from one account to another via fake trades.
68 4 The Impact of Market Making on Information Markets
Table 4.1: Tournament Overview
Match Last Price
MM NMM
Date (Team 1 - Team 2) Team 1 Team 2 Team 1 Team 2 Result
Group A
07 June 2008 Switzerland - Czech Republic 40.40 53.00 70.00 55.00 0:1 (4,6)
07 June 2008 Portugal - Turkey 70.00 40.40 60.00 55.00 2:0 (4,4)
11 June 2008 Czech Republic - Portugal 55.30 91.30 50.00 60.00 1:3 (4,4)
11 June 2008 Switzerland - Turkey 21.00 1.40 12.00 20.00 1:2 (6,4)
15 June 2008 Switzerland - Portugal 0.80 85.00 5.00 101.00 2:0 (6,6)
15 June 2008 Turkey - Czech Republic 25.90 58.70 80.00 95.00 3:2 (6,6)
Group B
08 June 2008 Austria - Croatia 22.40 60.00 20.00 75.00 0:1 (4,4)
08 June 2008 Germany - Poland 80.00 35.80 95.00 40.00 2:0 (4,4)
12 June 2008 Croatia - Germany 40.10 82.00 80.00 125.00 2:1 (6,6)
12 June 2008 Austria - Poland 50.60 27.20 11.00 5.00 1:1 (6,6)
16 June 2008 Austria - Germany 50.00 90.00 5.00 100.00 0:1 (4,4)
16 June 2008 Poland - Croatia 8.00 99.60 5.00 99.00 0:1 (4,4)
Group C
09 June 2008 Romania - France 21.60 90.00 70.00 90.00 0:0 (6,6)
09 June 2008 Netherlands - Italy 29.40 100.00 35.00 100.00 3:0 (6,6)
13 June 2008 Italy - Romania 80.00 20.00 75.00 35.00 1:1 (6,6)
13 June 2008 Netherlands - France 75.40 67.20 101.00 95.00 4:1 (4,4)
17 June 2008 France - Italy 25.80 29.50 100.00 70.00 0:2 (4,6)
17 June 2008 Netherlands - Romania 100.00 43.20 119.00 35.00 2:0 (4,4)
Group D
10 June 2008 Spain - Russia 80.00 33.00 92.00 52.00 4:1 (4,4)
10 June 2008 Greece - Sweden 23.90 50.00 20.00 90.00 0:2 (4,4)
14 June 2008 Sweden - Spain 36.90 82.90 95.00 102.00 1:2 (4,4)
14 June 2008 Greece - Russia 20.00 28.40 95.00 5.00 0:1 (4,6)
18 June 2008 Greece - Spain 0.05 100.00 95.00 90.00 1:2 (4,6)
18 June 2008 Russia - Sweden 64.70 26.90 90.00 95.00 2:0 (4,6)
Quarter Finals
19 June 2008 Portugal - Germany 35.00 2.70 60.00 35.00 2:3 (6,6)
20 June 2008 Croatia - Turkey 6.20 2.00 55.00 40.00 1:3 PSO (6,6)
21 June 2008 Netherlands - Russia 42.20 3.50 95.00 34.00 1:3 E.T. (6,6)
22 June 2008 Spain - Italy 13.00 7.00 70.00 40.00 4:2 PSO (4,4)
Semi Finals
25 June 2008 Germany - Turkey 70.00 5.60 95.00 34.00 3:2 (4,4)
26 June 2008 Russia - Spain 7.10 10.00 35.00 70.00 0:3 (4,4)
Final Match
29 June 2008 Germany - Spain 55.70 40.00 95.00 90.00 0:1 (6,6)
the market maker market and 35 in the non-market maker market. A participant
is denoted as “active” if he conducted at least one transaction. In total, 11.265
transactions were monitored in the market maker market compared to 346 in the
non-market maker market. The total number of transactions includes every trans-
action incl. those from the market maker. The number of transactions caused by
either human traders or the market maker are differentiated in the next three rows.
In the following, the nomenclature M-M, M-H, H-M and H-H is explained.
● M-M: Transaction occurred between the market maker. The market maker
traded with itself.
● M-H: Transaction occurred from the market maker on the buy side and a
human trader on the sell side
● H-M: Transaction occurred from a human trader on the buy side and the
market maker on the sell side
● H-H: Transaction occurred between two human traders
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Table 4.2: Market Liquidity
MM Market NMM Market
# Participants 44 44
# active Participants 33 35
Transactions total 11.265 346
Transactions M-M 6981 ./.
Transactions M-H/H-M 3.877 (1.473/2.404) ./.
Transactions H-H 407 346
Transactions per trader () 152** 24
Transactions per trader per day () 6,5* 1
# Orders/day () 1.423 15
# shares/day () 33.246 1.631
# of marketable limit orders (, human active) 17,12* 2,15
# of marketable limit orders (, human passive) 4,81* 1,92
# trades in 24h () 179* 18
# of shares per trade in 24h () 195 99
Trade size in e Vol. () 2307 6281**
Trade size (# Shares per Trade, ) 97 108
Quoted Spread (bps, ) 1616** 2515
Quoted Spread (bps, σ) 2580 2274
Quoted Spread Trade (bps, ) 602* 2120
Quoted Spread Trade (bps, σ) 1279 2226
Effective Spread (bps, ) 651** 2582
Effective Spread (bps, σ) 1401 6976
Significance: (*) 1 % level, (**) 5 % level, t-test
A further analysis about the composition of transactions was conducted and will
be described in Section 4.4.1. An indication for the liquidity of markets is the
analysis of spreads. Liquidity represents the transaction cost market participants
face to trade. A measure for the liquidity is an asset’s ability to be sold rapidly,
with minimal loss of value at any time (Harris 2003). Quoted spreads are a simple,
commonly used measure of trading costs and can easily be calculated using trade
and order data. All calculations presented in Table 4.2 are spreads relative to stock
prices and are reported in basis points (bps). Let Aski,t be the ask price for a stock
i at time t and Bidi,t the respective bid price. Midi,t denotes the mid quote then
the quoted spread is calculated as follows:
Quoted Spreadi,t = (Aski,t −Bidi,t)2 ∗Midi,t (4.1)
Additionally, one can separate quoted spread and quoted spread at trade. Quoted
spreads include all order book changes whereas quoted spreads at trade are limited
to quotes just before a trade is executed. The effective spread is the spread when
an incoming market order is directly executed with a counter order. Let Pricei,t be
the execution price then the effective spread is defined as
Effective Spreadi,t = (Pricei,t −Midi,t)Midi,t (4.2)
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The effective spread indicates how deep an order matches in the order book. The
measure must therefore be higher or equal than the quoted spread at trade at any
time. The lower the spread measures are, the less transaction costs traders have to
face.
Traders in the MM market did 152 transactions on average whereas traders in the
NMM market did only 24. The number of marketable limit orders, which means
that an order caused a transaction directly with a matching counter order was more
than eight times higher in the MM market. The average number of marketable
limit orders where a human trader was passive is 4.81 and, thus, lower than the
number where human traders were active. This indicated that traders actively hit
more existing orders directly than being executed by counter trades. Concerning
the spread sizes, the MM market showed narrower spread sizes on average in quoted
spread, quoted spreads at trade time as well as the effective spread. The fact that
quoted spreads at trade are on average lower than quoted spreads indicate that
traders mainly traded when spreads were narrow and, thus, transaction costs are
low. The effective spread is slightly higher than the quoted spread at trade because
it considers the level of how deep an order matches orders in the order book. If an
order hits only the first level (ask or bid) in the order book, the quoted spread at
trade and the effective spread are equal.
In order to visualize the changes in stock prices over time, Figure 4.7 shows the
stock price history exemplary for two teams. All charts for all teams are shown in
Appendix A, Figures A.1 - A.6. Figure 4.7 shows the evolution of stock prices for
Switzerland and Portugal.
(a) Switzerland (b) Portugal
Figure 4.7: Evolution of Transaction Prices
In Figure 4.7(a), the evolution of daily transaction prices is shown for the contract
representing Switzerland exemplary. The lines represent the median as well as
average data for both markets. The course of the transaction prices starts between
40 and 60 currency units. The negative trend indicates that traders assessed the
likelihood of Switzerland reaching the finals lower than in the beginning. The red
vertical line indicates the day once it was clear that a team reached the finals or
not. On the 11th of June, Switzerland lost the second match and dropped out of the
tournament before their third match. Regarding the results from the other teams in
Group A, they did not have a theoretical chance to reach the finals. Interestingly,
trade prices reacted hesitantly and reflected the collapse of Switzerland two days
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later with a trading price close to 0. On the 15th of June, the last group matches
were carried out and after that, contracts of that group were paid out. Accordingly,
contracts of group B were paid out at the 16th of June and so on.
In case of Portugal, which is shown in Figure 4.7(b), traders in both markets
moved transaction prices till the 14th of June although Portugal definitely reached
the final round after their second match on the 11th of June. Therefore, the pre-
diction in case of Portugal ended at that day and trading prices were disregarded
for further investigations in this work. Trading after a team definitely reached the
final round distorts market accuracy and does not add further information. The
payout of group A was on the 15th of June because on that day the final matches
of that group took place. Therefore the whole group was paid out after the last
match once the final results were available. For the design of further markets, it
should be investigated if some contracts should be paid out early once their forecast
is needless due to premature events to avoid price distortions, manipulation and
effects on market accuracy.
Market accuracy seems to have a relation to the sizes of spreads in the introduced
market. In order to further investigate spread measures in more detail, an analysis of
spreads for each team was conducted and is shown in Table 4.314 for both markets on
average per team during the group phase. The average quoted spread, the quoted
spread at trade as well as the effective spread in the MM are significantly lower
than the average quoted spread in the NMM. With lower spreads, it seems that
the accuracy as well as the trading activity increase because traders are more likely
to trade if spreads are narrow and therefore transaction costs are lower. Effects
of market making on trading activity will be further analyzed in Section 4.4.1.
The effect on accuracy and error measures will then be described in Sections 4.4.2
and 4.4.3.
Table 4.3: Spread Analysis
Quoted Spread Quoted Spread Trade Effective Spread
Team Sample MM NMM MM NMM MM NMM
Austria Complete 501 5397 373 4396 385 17968
Group 501 5397 373 4396 385 17968
Finals - - - - - -
Switzerland Complete 2274 7413 496 6956 579 6956
Group 2274 7413 496 6956 579 6956
Finals - - - - - -
Germany Complete 1451 2767 697 2242 833 2242
Group 711 1214 504 795 571 795
Finals 1593 7273 728 6903 876 6903
Greece Complete 1845 351 574 263 575 263
Group 1845 351 574 263 575 263
Finals - - - - - -
Czech Republic Complete 535 1468 407 809 415 809
Group 535 1468 407 809 415 809
Continued on next page
14The analysis of quoted spreads, quoted spreads at trade time and effective spreads was conducted
for each contract/team in basis points. A basis point is 1
10000
of a currency unit. The analysis
differentiates the complete sample per contract, the group phase as well as the finals.
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Table 4.3 – continued from previous page
Quoted Spread Quoted Spread Trade Effective Spread
Team Sample MM NMM MM NMM MM NMM
Finals - - - - - -
Romania Complete 1082 2579 370 447 393 447
Group 1082 393 370 447 393 447
Finals - - - - - -
Italy Complete 2369 1361 949 1310 1028 1363
Group 1841 1361 681 1310 838 1363
Finals 2747 n/a 1147 n/a 1167 n/a
France Complete 1597 1743 465 1710 476 1715
Group 1597 1743 465 1710 476 1715
Finals - - - - - -
Croatia Complete 1489 2332 438 1780 507 1780
Group 1767 2332 382 1780 393 1780
Finals 1163 n/a 490 n/a 612 n/a
Poland Complete 435 824 288 824 289 824
Group 435 824 288 824 289 824
Finals - - - - - -
Netherlands Complete 1408 3177 430 2996 457 3049
Group 1538 3156 532 2996 563 3049
Finals 1240 5714 327 n/a 349 n/a
Spain Complete 1417 774 561 708 586 708
Group 1584 666 443 444 454 444
Finals 1259 2423 639 2423 673 2423
Sweden Complete 1382 2881 371 2348 379 2348
Group 1382 2881 371 2348 379 2348
Finals - - - - - -
Turkey Complete 1262 2066 351 1522 370 1522
Group 1392 2154 363 1611 380 1611
Finals 1206 625 346 625 366 625
Portugal Complete 1207 2375 373 2267 385 2267
Group 1741 1489 400 723 414 723
Finals 342 6901 342 6901 351 6901
Russia Complete 2186 2129 1078 1948 1199 1960
Group 1094 1941 368 1774 375 1790
Finals 3003 3636 1609 2727 1816 2727
Average 1403 2477 514 2033 554 2889
p-value <0.05 <0.05 <0.05
The results show that spread sizes were significantly smaller in the MM market.
This can be expected because the sizes of the spreads quoted by the market maker
in the MM market were a part of the designed market maker strategy. But traders
accepted these spreads and the market maker quoted new spreads only in case a
human trader caused a transaction. Nevertheless, with an equal number of traders
in the MM and NMM market, it fostered trading activity.
Table 4.4 shows further basic statistics. The daily number of traded shares was
significantly higher in the MM market.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Analysis: The number of transactions per day as well as the
average volume traded per day and the average trade size were calculated
on a daily basis for the MM and the NMM market.
# Trades per Day  Volume per Day
MM NMM MM NMM
06 June 2008 6 50
07 June 2008 107 28 49 81
08 June 2008 34 29 48 80
09 June 2008 159 90 76 83
10 June 2008 169 41 46 108
11 June 2008 119 39 89 84
12 June 2008 861 13 26 168
13 June 2008 36 25 51 86
14 June 2008 301 30
15 June 2008 251 14 47 59
16 June 2008 51 8 30 38
17 June 2008 336 3 48 230
18 June 2008 574 6 50 103
19 June 2008 206 27 72 356
20 June 2008 211 2 40 15
21 June 2008 170 12 84 87
22 June 2008 195 2 80 26
23 June 2008 76 2 205 53
24 June 2008 62 66
25 June 2008 36 2 52 15
26 June 2008 230 1 326 200
27 June 2008 23 587
28 June 2008 82 1473
29 June 2008 3 2 1067 10
Average 179* 18 195 99
Significance: (*) 1 % level, t-test
4.3 Hypotheses
The research question R1: “Do Information Markets show more trading activity,
increased accurate, less error and higher information efficiency utilizing automated
market makers?” introduced in Section 1.1 will be evaluated with the following
research hypotheses.
1. Trading activity is higher in market maker markets than in
non-market maker markets (c.p.)
It can be assumed that automated market making has a positive effect
on trading activity and liquidity. The trading activity is measured as
number of trades or number of orders per trader as well as the number
of transaction per trader per day on average. In order to test the first
research hypothesis, the following hypotheses are stated:
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H0-1: Trading activity is equal in MM and NMM
H1-1: Trading activity is different in MM and NMM
The results of the investigation of hypothesis 1 are shown in Section 4.4.1.
2. The results in automated market maker markets are more
accurate as in non-market maker markets
In the second hypothesis it is investigated if a market maker in Informa-
tion Markets fosters trading accuracy. To evaluate the second research
hypothesis, the following hypotheses are stated:
H0-2: Information Market accuracy is equal in MM and NMM
H1-2: Information Market accuracy is different in MM and NMM
Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 describe the results of hypothesis 2 about the accuracy
of both markets.
3. The MM is more information-efficient than the NMM mar-
ket
The third hypothesis states that the MM is more efficient in informa-
tion aggregation than the NMM market. This will be evaluated by
the comparison of the auto-correlation coefficients for both markets. In
general, the auto-correlation coefficient is measured for the efficiency of
information aggregation in markets (Schwartz et al. 2006). Moreover,
arbitrage trading opportunities indicate if markets are information ef-
ficient. Hence, an analysis for arbitrage trading opportunities is also
conducted. Therefore, the following hypotheses are stated:
H0-3: Information Market efficiency is equal in MM and NMM
H1-3: Information Market efficiency is different in MM and NMM
The results of hypothesis 3 will be described in Section 4.4.4.
4.4 Experiment Results
In the next sections, the results of the field experiment will be described. Sec-
tion 4.4.1 introduces an analysis about the market and trading activity. In addition,
Section 4.4.2 analyses the forecasting accuracy of both markets compared to several
benchmarks whereas Section 4.4.3 describes error measures and price distortions
during market runtime. Section 4.4.4 provides results of an information efficiency
analysis of the MM and the NMM market.
4.4.1 Market and Trading Activity
Figure 4.8 shows the amount of trades in both markets over time. The number
of transactions in the market maker market (MM) was significantly higher at any
time.15 Furthermore, the number of transactions correlates very well to the matches
of high interest with alleged top team involvement. Even in the final round, where
the trading activity in the non-market maker market (NMM) was extremely low,
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Figure 4.8: Market Activity
several hundreds of trades occurred in the MM market. The green line indicates
how the number of traders developed over time.
Another interesting indication for the activity in the MM market is the number
of transactions per trader. Figure 4.9 shows the number of transactions per trader
in a descending order and a logarithmic scale. The most active trader caused re-
markable 1984 transactions in the MM. The second most active trader caused 1267
transactions. In the NMM market, the most active trader caused 155 transactions
during 23 trading days followed by the second most active trader who caused 63
transactions.
In order to investigate how the trading activity is distributed over time, Table 4.5
illustrates the trading activity of the 10 most active traders in the MM market. As
one can easily see, five16 of the 10 traders were active till the end of the market. In
the final round, the trading activity decreased slightly whereas 62 transactions were
observed on the day before the final match (28th of June).
Table 4.6 shows the same data for the NMM market. The results show that many
traders traded mostly at the beginning of the market duration. The trading activity
decreased constantly towards the end of the group round. A small rise in trading
activity was observable at the beginning of the final round, but in the further course,
this trading activity also constantly decreased and on 4 out of 11 trading days in the
final round no transaction was registered at all. This result is a strong indication
for the illiquidity of the NMM market compared to the MM market. In the MM
market, not even one day without any trading activity was observed. Moreover,
the least active trading day was the day of the final match with two transactions
whereas the second least active trading day was two days before the final match
with 17 transactions.
15t-test, p-value < 0.01
16Traders 1, 2, 5, 6 and 8
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Figure 4.9: Transactions per Trader
In summary, the results presented in this section indicate a dramatic gain in
liquidity and trading activity in the MM market compared to the NMM market
(cp. Tables 4.8 and 4.9). All results were focused on human involvement which
means that only orders and transactions with human involvement either on the buy
side or on the sell side were considered. Recapitulating Table 4.2 and Figure 4.8,
the results show a strong indication for the higher liquidity in the MM market. The
number of transactions with human involvement as well as the market activity were
at all times higher in the MM market. Even the number of transactions per trader
presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 of the ten most active traders shows explicit evidence
for the higher trading activity. The indication based on the presented results shows
that the MM had significant impact on market liquidity and the MM market was
more liquid than the NMM market. The hypothesis H0-1, stated in Section 4.3 can
therefore be rejected, that the presence of a MM leads to equal trading activity and
equal liquidity (c.p.). In that case, H1-1 can be accepted for this experiment because
the MM market showed higher liquidity and therefore more trading activity on a
significant level compared to the NMM market. In the next section, the accuracy
of both markets is investigated.
4.4.2 Accuracy Comparison
In order to assess the overall accuracy of the two Information Markets, a com-
parison with two external benchmarks was conducted. For each match during the
tournament, betting odds from wetten.de, the last transaction prices in both mar-
kets just before a match started and the FIFA world ranking were selected and built
the basis for comparison.
Betting odds are perceived as very efficient. In order to avoid monetary losses
betting companies having large sums of real money at stake are required to generate
accurate forecasts. The incentive to predict accurately is presumably much stronger
since in Information Markets there is no real money at stake and only little money
at stake in real money Information Markets. Therefore, betting odds were selected
to serve as a competitive benchmark.
4.4 Experiment Results 77
Table 4.5: Market Statistics per Trader MM: The activity of traders in the MM
market is described in detail in this table. For each day during the
market duration, the number of trades is calculated for the top 10 of the
most active traders (cp. Figure 4.9.)
Traders
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
07 June 2008 38 62 16 5 121
08 June 2008 17 14 2 33
09 June 2008 31 38 37 17 21 1 15 4 3 167
10 June 2008 20 18 67 22 23 5 4 159
11 June 2008 14 57 29 3 2 15 3 123
12 June 2008 688 72 16 37 22 7 21 13 5 881
13 June 2008 8 17 13 5 1 44
14 June 2008 251 29 22 5 307
15 June 2008 46 135 26 7 46 8 268
16 June 2008 14 19 2 1 36
17 June 2008 195 61 24 14 5 299
18 June 2008 127 376 10 26 2 16 1 15 573
Group Sum 1449 898 77 173 108 103 74 77 32 20 3011
19 June 2008 34 59 31 14 19 3 160
20 June 2008 111 63 16 1 10 201
21 June 2008 48 80 2 1 1 132
22 June 2008 41 78 52 1 7 179
23 June 2008 42 13 4 2 5 66
24 June 2008 3 28 5 16 3 55
25 June 2008 34 1 35
26 June 2008 162 14 3 2 3 184
27 June 2008 7 8 2 17
28 June 2008 61 1 62
29 June 2008 2 2
Finals Sum 509 369 106 0 28 25 32 24 0 0 1093
Total Sum 1958 1267 183 173 136 128 106 101 32 20 4104
The FIFA world ranking is a ranking of all national soccer teams and provides
scores for each team based on their success in international matches. The FIFA
ranking is updated every month and comprises the outcome of past matches, the
importance of past matches, the strength of opponents, regional strength, results in
home and away matches as well as the number of goals scored.17
During the group phase, draws were possible in each match. Betting odds for
draws were always higher at any time than the betting odds for one team to win.18
In the Information Markets, the last transaction price in case of a draw had to be
exactly equal, which is very unlikely and was not the case at any time during the
17http://www.fifa.com/worldfootball/ranking/lastranking/gender=m/fullranking.html
18The probability for a team to win was therefore always higher than a draw.
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Table 4.6: Market Statistics per Trader NMM: The activity of traders in the NMM
market is described in detail in this table. For each day during the market
duration, the number of trades is calculated for the top 10 of the most
active traders (cp. Table 4.9.)
Traders
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
07 June 2008 9 3 22 8 5 7 54
08 June 2008 3 16 14 4 5 6 48
09 June 2008 72 1 16 16 36 15 4 15 17 192
10 June 2008 13 12 4 13 14 2 8 3 9 78
11 June 2008 17 30 4 3 4 1 4 63
12 June 2008 1 1 2 5 4 2 15
13 June 2008 1 18 11 2 4 2 38
14 June 2008
15 June 2008 7 1 3 11
16 June 2008 5 1 6
17 June 2008 2 1 1 4
18 June 2008 4 6 10
Group Sum 129 53 48 56 46 53 41 26 36 31 519
19 June 2008 16 8 5 5 13 1 48
20 June 2008 2 3 1 1 7
21 June 2008 7 4 2 13
22 June 2008 1 1 1 3
23 June 2008 2 3 5
24 June 2008
25 June 2008
26 June 2008 4 4
27 June 2008
28 June 2008
29 June 2008 4 4
Finals Sum 26 10 13 5 11 0 4 13 1 1 84
Total Sum 155 63 61 61 57 53 45 39 37 32 603
experiment. Therefore, matches which ended in a draw were neglected for further
investigation.
In the FIFA ranking, teams are listed in a ranking ordered by a score based on
success over time. The rank of two teams cannot be equal, thus, a draw could also
not be predicted by the FIFA ranking and was neglected for further investigation,
too. During the final round, draws were possible after the regular match time.
Then, an extra time was played followed by a penalty shootout in case the extra
time ended with a draw. For the comparison, the final results were taken including
extra times and penalty shoot-outs. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show exemplary screen
shots of betting odds from wetten.de and the FIFA World Ranking.
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Figure 4.10: Betting Odds: wetten.de
Figure 4.11: FIFA World Ranking
To compile the results of the FIFA World Ranking, the ranking as of June 200819
was taken to “replay” the tournament where teams with a higher ranking position
were supposed to win the match. In order to compute the hit rate, benchmarks
got 1 point if a match was forecasted correctly. Correct in case of betting odds was
if the bet for the winning team was lower than for the other team which indicates
in turn a higher likelihood. In case of the FIFA ranking, a match was correctly
forecasted if one team had a higher ranking position. For both markets, 1 point was
assigned if the winning team showed a higher transaction price before the match
began. Points of all benchmarks were summarized and a fraction of correct forecasts
was computed.20 Table 4.7 shows the results of the comparison.
Table 4.7: Benchmarks
Method # of Observations Hit rate
MM 28 67,86 %
wetten.de 28 67,86 %
FIFA World Ranking 28 60,71 %
NMM 28 53,57 %
19http://www.fifa.com/worldfootball/ranking/lastranking/gender=m/fullranking.html#
confederation=0&rank=170
20This method is adapted from Luckner (2008), where a similar comparison was conducted during
the FIFA World Cup 2006.
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The comparison of the MM market, the NMM market, the FIFA World Ranking
as well a betting odds from wetten.de shows that the MM market performed equally
appropriate to betting odds from wetten.de21 with an accuracy of 67,9 % followed
by the results of the FIFA Ranking with 60,7 % and the NMM market with 53,6 %.
The results of the comparison with external benchmarks show that the MM market
was as accurate as the betting odds from wetten.de. Luckner (2008) conducted an
experiment for the FIFA Soccer World Championship in 2006 and showed that the
results of the Information Market were slightly less accurate than the benchmark
of the betting odds from wetten.de, which were the more accurate predictor during
that tournament.
The MM as well as the NMM market were supposed to forecast the teams reaching
the final round in a first step as well as the winner of the tournament in a second step.
A perfect forecast would have been if at the first trading day exactly eight teams
showed transaction prices of about 100 currency units whereas the others would
have been traded at about 0 currency units. Transaction prices in a “winner-takes-
all” contract represent the likelihood about the outcome of the underlying event.
Therefore, the comparison to benchmarks for single matches, e.g., betting odds, is
not exactly about the same forecasting objective. The markets were supposed to
forecast a total outcome of parts of a tournament whereas betting odds and the FIFA
world ranking were supposed to forecast single matches. Hence, the comparison
described above gives only a weak indication of the overall accuracy of the MM and
NMM market against the two benchmarks. In order to provide stronger evidence,
another approach was conducted. In the following, draws were regarded in betting
odds. The overall objective was to generate a group ranking based on the quotes
from bookmakers where the consideration of draws is necessary for the quality of the
results of betting odds. First, the betting odds were transformed into probabilities
for win, draw and lose for each team in each match. As seen in Figure 4.10, quotes
were available for both teams. The quotes can be transformed as follows.
Probability = 1
Quote
∗ 100 (4.3)
In case of the first row in Figure 4.10 which was Austria vs. Croatia, the quotes
were 4.45, 3.25, 1.88. Thus, the probabilities for that match were:
1. Austria wins: 14.45 ∗ 100 = 22.47 %
2. Draw: 13.25 ∗ 100 = 30.77 %
3. Austria loses: 11.88 ∗ 100 = 53.19 %
Summarizing all probabilities, one may notice that they sum up to 106.43 % which
is more than 100 %. This is because the bookmaker sets his quotes in order to make
a profit. Usually, bookmakers set the quotes of higher quotes/lower probabilities22 a
21wetten.de moved to digibet.com for internationalization https://www.digibet.com/?lang=01
22In this case Austria wins (Quote: 4.45, Probability: 22.47 %) and draw (Quote: 3.25, Probability:
30.77 %).
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little bit lower to attract traders to buy lower quotes and bet on less likely outcomes.
Therefore, the profit of bookmakers cannot be differentiated in quotes because it
is the bookmakers secret how to set quotes. For the comparison in this work the
profits of bookmakers can be neglected because they do not change the overall
outcome based on the quotes. For the computation of the accuracy in this work, it
is important to get the probabilites to process the next step which ist the generation
of group rankings based on the probabilities computed via Equation (4.3) for all
matches. The profit of bookmakers is unknown to the public. Therefore, it is not
possible to separate them in order to compute probabilities without these profits.
As a test, the probabilities without these profits were computed whereby the 6.43 %
were equally assigned in order to have the sum of probabilities of all three outcomes
summing up to 100 %. The results concerning the outcome of the quotes do not
differ and therefore, the probabilities are further computed with the available quotes
incl. the profit of bookmakers.
Based on the computed probabilities, a ranking for each group can be compiled.
Therefore, probabilities were weighted with the reward a team gets for winning or
a draw. For example, if a team wins a match, it gets three points in the group
ranking. For a draw, teams receive one point and zero points for losing a match.
The winning probability for Austria vs. Croatia was 22.47 % and the probability
for a draw was 30.77 %. Altogether, the weighted results for that match summarize
to 3 ∗ 0.2247 + 1 ∗ 0.3077 + 0 = 0.9818. For that match, 0.98 points can be expected
for Austria according to betting odds. If this is conducted for all matches and
summarized for one group, a ranking ordered by the sum of weighted probabilities for
the expected points E(p) during the group phase can be compiled. Afterwards, the
linear distance can be measured to the real outcome of the team ranks in each group.
The linear distance is also calculated for the MM and the NMM market according
to transaction prices before the matches were kicked-off. The group ranking was
also conducted for the FIFA ranking according to the rank of teams in the FIFA
ranking. Teams with a higher rank were supposed to win the matches against lower
ranked teams. The sum of all distances per benchmark indicates the accuracy for
the forecast of team rankings after the group phase. The lower the sum of the
distance is, the better the accuracy of the method. The distance was calculated
for the two group winners, which was the forecast objective for the MM and NMM
market, as well as the overall group ranking. Table 4.8 shows the results. The linear
distance is denoted as di, wheras a lower di indicates more accuracy.
The results show that the MM market forecasted the group results more accurate
compared to wetten.de. The sum of the linear distances is lower than every other
benchmark.
During the final round, a ranking of the eight teams cannot be conducted because
if one team is predicted to move to the next stage and loses the match, it drops out
of the tournament. Otherwise, in case the team is predicted to lose the next match
and it wins, the ranking would be not representative. Table 4.9 therefore shows the
evolution of transaction prices on each trading day during the final round before
a match was kicked-off. The highest transaction price indicates the aggregated
estimation which team will win the tournament, which is highlighted in bold letters.
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Table 4.8: Accuracy of Benchmarks: For each group, the group ranking was calculated based on quotes from wetten.de, last transaction
prices from the MM and NMM market and the FIFA ranking. The differences to the outcomes are measured with a linear
distance. For example, a distance of 1 indicates that the accuracy for that team differs by one rank. E(p) denotes the
expected group point per team derived from betting odds. di denotes the difference to the observed group per team.
Group Official Result E(p) wetten.de di MM di NMM di FIFA di
A
Portugal 5,61 Portugal 0 Portugal 0 Portugal 0 Czech Republic 2
Turkey 4,41 Switzerland 2 Czech Republic 1 Switzerland 2 Portugal 1
Czech Republic 3,95 Czech Republic 0 Turkey 1 Czech Republic 0 Turkey 1
Switzerland 3,31 Turkey 2 Switzerland 0 Turkey 2 Switzerland 0
B
Croatia 6,69 Germany 1 Croatia 0 Germany 1 Germany 1
Germany 4,08 Croatia 1 Germany 0 Croatia 1 Croatia 1
Austria 3,53 Poland 1 Austria 0 Austria 0 Poland 1
Poland 2,73 Austria 1 Poland 0 Poland 0 Austria 1
C
Netherlands 5,11 Italy 1 Netherlands 0 Netherlands 0 Italy 1
Italy 4,74 Netherlands 1 Romania 1 France 2 France 2
Romania 4,74 France 1 Italy 1 Italy 1 Netherlands 2
France 2,74 Romania 1 France 0 Romania 1 Romania 1
D
Spain 6,11 Spain 0 Spain 0 Sweden 2 Spain 0
Russia 4,07 Russia 0 Russia 0 Greece 2 Greece 2
Sweden 3,69 Sweden 0 Sweden 0 Spain 2 Russia 1
Greece 3,44 Greece 0 Greece 0 Russia 2 Sweden 1
Group Winners Rank (∑di) 6 2 10 10
Total Group Rank (∑di) 12 4 18 18
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Table 4.9: Final Round Trading Prices MM
19 June 20 June 21 June 22 June 25 June 26 June 29 June
Germany 2,7 30,0 33 64,8 70 85 55
Spain 12,4 10,3 10,3 13 16,7 10 40
Russia 1,8 1,5 3,5 6,75 6 7
Turkey 2,5 2,0 4 2,4 5,6
Italy 4,8 5,2 11,2 10
Netherlands 37,6 31,0 44,8
Croatia 7,75 6,2
Portugal 35
From the 19th to the 21st of June the Netherlands were supposed to win the
tournament in the MM market. After the Netherlands dropped out of the tourna-
ment, Germany was supposed to win. Germany lost the final match against Spain
0:1. The results from the NMM market cannot be computed because during the
final round, there were too few transactions observable in order to compute sensible
results. Luckner (2008) investigated the home bias of traders in order to explain
that traders mainly trade shares of their national teams. Furthermore, they tend to
overestimate the likelihood of success for their national teams. In the MM market,
mainly German traders were active and therefore it seems that they were subject
to the home bias effect and overestimated the likelihood that Germany would win
the tournament.
According to Table 4.7, the MM market outperformed the NMM by 12,9 %. In
addition, the results in Table 4.8 show that the MM market forecasted the group
results more accurate than the NMM market. The linear distance was 2 vs. 10
for the forecast of group winners and 4 vs. 18 for the forecast of the total group
ranking. The hypothesis H0-2, that the MM and NMM markets show equal accu-
racy can, therefore, be rejected.23 Furthermore, the FIFA world ranking was also
outperformed by both measures, the hitrate and the group ranking forecast.
The accuracy of the MM market compared to the betting odds from wetten.de
was equal with the first measure (cp. Table 4.7). In the second measure, the MM
market outperformed the betting odds in the group winners’ rank as well as the
total group ranking at a significance level of 1 %.
4.4.3 Error Measures
In order to measure the forecasting error for the MM and the NMM market,
the average transaction price for each stock was computed for each trading day
according to the following equation.
1
Ni
Ni∑
j=1pij (x) ,∀i ∈ I = (1, ..,32),N ∈ N+0 (4.4)
Equation (4.4) computes the average price for each stock where p is the price of
each transaction in each stock i. I denotes the number of all stocks, N denotes the
number of transactions in each stock i whereas j denotes the trading day.
23Significant to the 1 % level.
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The mean absolute error (MAE) indicates how accurate both markets were dur-
ing the first 12 days of trading, which was the group phase of the tournament.24
Equation (4.5) illustrated the formula for the computation of the MAE, where p̂j
denotes the payout value and p the market price.
MAE = 1
N
N∑
j=1 ∣p̂j − pj ∣ = 1N N∑j=1 ∣ej ∣ (4.5)
The MAE was ex post calculated based on the final outcome of the group phase
for each team. For each day, the rank of each team was calculated ordered by
average transaction prices per day and then compared to the real outcome. It could
be expected, that the MAE would decrease in the course of the tournament as more
information was available. Figure 4.12 shows the market error over time.25
Interestingly, on the 5th and 6th trading day a distortion of transaction prices was
observed in the MM market (Figure 4.12(a)). A distortion of transaction prices
was detected on the 5th trading day in the MM market because one trader tried
to buy shares of Germany contracts for 5.000 currency units and sold it to himself
several minutes later. This caused a reaction by the market maker trying to adjust
other prices to lower levels. Therefore, prices showed a higher error rate. Several
hours later, transaction prices came back to a normal level by transactions of other
traders. If the price distortion is neglected and transaction prices are also neglected
after it could be determined that a team has reached the finals or dropped out of the
tournament, the error rate is significantly lower in the MM market. Figure 4.12(b)
shows the adjusted transaction prices without the distortion of transaction prices.
In Figure 4.12(a), transaction prices were taken as they were during the market
duration. Sometimes a team could already have reached the final round before they
had played their third match during the group phase because they won the first
two matches. From that point in time, the price of the contract representing that
team should be 100 because the information that this team reached the final round
was publicly available. But traders did not integrate this information in prices
appropriate. Moreover, this can be considered as an information inefficiency in the
market. In Figure 4.12(b), these errors were adjusted and as soon as a team was
identified to reach the final round or drop the market, a transaction price of 0 in case
of a drop or 100 in case of reaching the final round was available as public information
and therefore reducing the error. Since traders did not integrated stock prices of
successful teams correctly, the distortions can be eliminated because it makes no
sense to trade events which are already public information. This experience will
help to design further markets which design is capable of instantly avoiding such
situations and pay out shares if necessary. The results from the MM market in
Figure 4.12(a) are not significant, whereas the results in Figure 4.12(b), where the
prices were adjusted based on public information are significant to the 10 % level.
This indicates that the MM market shows significantly less forecasting error than
24The error calculation was based on the group phase of the tournament because in the final round
the trading activity in the NMM was too low to compare it to the MM.
25The evolution of undistorted market errors for the MM and the NMM market are shown in
detail in Appendix A, Table A.1.
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(a) Error Measures - distorted
(b) Error Measures - undistorted, adjusted
Figure 4.12: Error Measurement
the NMM market. The overall results presented in this section support the rejection
of hypothesis H0-2 which was previously rejected during the investigation of forecast
accuracy in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.4 Information Efficiency
The information efficiency of markets describes how efficiently a market integrates
public as well as private information (cp. also Section 3.1.1). In general, efficiency
cannot be measured with one parameter, it depends on a set of data and the market
characteristics as shown in Table 4.2. In scientific literature, one of the character-
istics of efficient markets is the correlation of trade prices (Harris 2003; Schwartz
et al. 2006). It is assumed that the sequence of trade prices should follow a ran-
dom walk. This means that it is not predictable if the next transaction will be
buy or sell (Schwartz et al. 2006). If at any time the current trade price reflects
the full information, then the price should not change. If so, the stock’s price is
no appropriate reflection of the current information. Regarding the efficient market
hypothesis, the stock price should only change once new information is available to
traders and they provide their interpretation of it in the market. Information has
to be “new” otherwise it would have been already integrated in the current stock
price as public information. Therefore, the effect of new information cannot be pre-
dicted since one cannot assume which information will occur and, thus, the stock
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price cannot change. The stock price evolution must, therefore, follow a random
walk and consecutive stock prices should not correlate to prior ones (Schwartz et al.
2006).
In order to measure the efficiency of markets, correlation patterns in stock prices
indicate if stock prices are related (cp. also Section 3.3.4). There are two forms of
correlation patterns, inter-temporal correlation patterns and serial cross correlation
patterns. Inter-temporal correlations are also referred to auto-correlation or serial-
correlation and can be positive or negative. In the first case, a sequence of buy trades
raises the price, hence, the trading sequence is positively auto-correlated. In the
second case, prices tend to decrease sequentially via sell trades.26 The more random
this sequence is, the less auto-correlation will be observable. For example, if several
buy trades follow buy trades, a high auto-correlation is observable. Auto-correlation
measures the dependency of the sequence of trades. If a sequence of trades is
correlated, several traders relate their transaction decision based on the observation
of what happened in the trade before. In contrast, serial cross-correlations are
related to the returns of two or more different stocks and indicate if the advent of
new information has an asynchronous effect on different stocks. In financial stock
markets, the theoretical optimum of a random walk in stock prices cannot be reached
because stock prices are always slightly correlated due to imperfections in the price
discovery process (Schwartz et al. 2006).
For the analysis of the information efficiency of the MM and NMM markets,
the first order auto-correlation indicates the information efficiency which can be
compared to the MM and the NMM market. The analysis of the final round has to
be discarded because there was insufficient trading activity in the NMM. Therefore,
only the group phase can be used for the following analysis.
In order to measure the first order auto-correlation of the field experiment data,
the sequence of buy and sell transactions was analyzed for each contract in the
MM and NMM. Buy transactions were tagged with (1) and sell transactions were
tagged with (-1). Then the auto-correlation was computed on that sequence for
both markets. Afterwards, the difference between the MM and the NMM market
was calculated following Equation (4.6) to show the improvement (Diff ) of the MM
to the NMM market. Table 4.10 shows the results.
Diff = ∣NMM∣ − ∣MM∣ (4.6)
The auto-correlation coefficient ranges between (-1) and (1). Therefore, negative
values can appear if a sequence of sell transactions (-1) is dominant. In theory,
the optimal value should be 0. Thus, values close to 0 indicate a higher level of
market efficiency (Schwartz et al. 2006). Summing up each squares27 (∑x2) the
MM market shows a lower auto-correlation coefficient by 1.03. Therefore, the MM
market integrated information more efficiently than the NMM market during the
group phase. Some values show an auto-correlation coefficient of slightly more than
26For a discussion about possible reasons for positive/negative auto-correlation refer to Schwartz
et al. (2006).
27An average value is not applicable in this case because the auto-correlation coefficient ranges
between (-1) and (1).
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Table 4.10: Auto-Correlation: The auto-correlation coefficient is calculated based
on the sequence of buy/sell transactions. Buy trades were assigned
(+1) and sell trades were assigned (-1). For each contract, the sequence
of transactions (buy/sell) is analyzed for first order auto-correlation.
The difference (Diff ) indicates the improvement against the other mar-
ket. Positive values indicate the lower auto-correlation coefficient in the
MM market whereas negative values indicate a lower auto-correlation
coefficient in the NMM market.
Contracts MM NMM Diff
Austria -0.23 0.47 0.23
Switzerland 0.46 0.84 0.37
Germany 0.04 -0.09 0.05
Greece 0.50 -0.15 -0.34
Czech Republic 0.25 -0.25 0.00
Romania 0.29 -0.08 -0.21
Italy 0.28 0.33 0.05
France 0.20 0.20 0.00
Croatia 0.24 0.03 -0.21
Poland 0.44 1.00 0.56
Netherlands 0.09 0.15 0.07
Spain 0.16 0.03 -0.13
Sweden 0.41 -0.18 -0.23
Turkey 0.17 0.19 0.01
Portugal 0.11 0.36 0.25
Russia 0.31 0.10 -0.21∑x2 1.37 2.40
0.4 at maximum, which is similar to those of financial markets. Most of them
are between 0 and 0.4 which indicates that the MM market integrated information
efficiently.28 Column Diff indicates which market was more efficient. For example,
the MM market “beats” the NMM market in contract 1 by 0.23 and was therefore
more information efficient. If the Diff shows a positive sign, the MM market was
more efficient and vice versa.
Another characteristic of efficient markets are arbitrage trading opportunities. If
arbitrage opportunities are exploitable, markets lack information efficiency. Shares
are over- or undervalued and can therefore be bought in the market and sold in
another market riskless and vice versa. In order to investigate the arbitrage op-
portunities in the MM and the NMM market, Figure 4.13 shows the aggregated
transaction prices per day over time. The better the lines adapt to 50 currency
units, the less arbitrage opportunities are available in general.
On the 5th trading day the MM market showed an unforeseen behavior. The
arbitrage opportunities were extremely high. This is because one trader tried to
buy shares at a price of 5.000 currency units and sold them to himself for 5.001
28It can be assumed that the mentioned imperfections and auto-correlation theory, which are
known in financial markets, are transferable to Information Markets.
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(a) MM Group Phase Arbitrage Opportunity (b) NMM Group Phase Arbitrage Opportunity
(c) MM Finals Arbitrage Opportunity (d) NMM Finals Arbitrage Opportunity
Figure 4.13: Arbitrage Opportunities during Group and Final Round
currency units. This caused a reaction by the market maker trying to adjust prices
to the new situation. Therefore, the accuracy dropped on that day as arbitrage
opportunities were available. It took only several hours until prices came back to
a normal level. Nevertheless, this issue was causal for the MM market not to show
significantly less arbitrage opportunities during the group phase compared to the
NMM market. In the final round, the results are significant to the 1 % level.
In order to report the results without the price distortion, the irrational trans-
action price of 5.000 was neglected and a new analysis was conducted. Overall,
without the price distortions on the 5th trading day, the results show significance to
the 1 % level. This indicates that the MM market would have shown less arbitrage
trading opportunities than the NMM market. Figure 4.14 shows the adjusted chart
in contrast to Figure 4.13(a).
Figure 4.14: Arbitrage Opportunities - undistorted
In order to show the difference of both markets, Table 4.11 summarizes the results.
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Table 4.11: Arbitrage Opportunities Comparison: The average arbitrage opportu-
nity was calculated for the group phase as well as the final round. The
calculations are conducted with the median as well as the average trans-
action prices and represent the sum of all prices divided by the sum of
all payouts. In the group phase, the optimal value should have been
50, during the finals, the optimal value should have been 12.5. Only
the adjusted MM market results without the price distortions shows
significantly lower arbitrage opportunities to the 1 % level.
Group Phase Finals
Median Average Median Average
MM 47,60 45,22 13,15 11,20
MM (undistorted) 50,16 49,18 ./. ./.
NMM 56,34 59,12 54,45 57,65
The results in Table 4.11 are not significantly better for the MM market during the
group phase due to the price distortions and the consequent arbitrage opportunities.
Nevertheless, the results show significance to the 1 % level in the final round. If the
effect of the price distortion is neglected, the results show significance at the 1 %
level during the group phase. This is a strong indication that the MM market
showed less arbitrage opportunities and was therefore more efficient in information
aggregation than the NMM market. Altogether, hypothesis H0-3 can be rejected.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the effect of automated market making on trading activity, accu-
racy and market efficiency was investigated with a field experiment. Two identical
markets were set up for the European Soccer Championship in 2008 where one mar-
ket employed an automated market maker mechanism and the other one did not.
Both markets showed an equal number of active participants and were functionally
identical.
The results show that the trading activity was significantly higher in the MM
market which can be explained by the continuous trading opportunity provided by
the automated market maker, it animated human traders to update their beliefs
about the soccer matches more often so they could provide their expectations to
the market immediately. Besides, the analysis of the trading activity showed that
every trader did significantly more transactions in the MM market.
Furthermore, the presence of an automated market maker mechanism seemed
to cause significant benefits in market liquidity through the attraction of human
traders which caused a gain in market accuracy as well as a decrease in forecasting
error as shown in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. Compared to the NMM market, the MM
market was equally accurate as betting odds from wetten.de and more accurate
than a benchmark based on the FIFA World Ranking. In addition, the accuracy
in forecasting the outcome of the group ranks after the group phase was extremely
accurate in the MM market and outperformed the forecasts derived from betting
odds as well as those of the NMM market and the FIFA ranking.
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The forecasting error in both markets was on an equal level at the beginning of
the group phase. A price distortion on the 5th trading day caused by a human trader
raised the forecasting error in the MM market so that the error measures for both
markets were nearly the same. After adjusting the data and neglecting the price
distortion, which can be seen as an obvious manipulation attempt or misunderstood
trading rules, the error measures decreased in the MM market to a significant level.
The error in the MM market would have been definitely lower than the error in the
NMM market which gives further evidence about the overall accuracy of the MM
market compared to the NMM market.
Regarding the information efficiency described in Section 4.4.4, the MM market
integrated information more efficient than the NMM market. The results from an
analysis of the sequence of trading prices show that trading prices in the MM mar-
ket were less auto-correlated than transaction prices in the NMM market. This
indicates that the MM market was more efficient. Furthermore, an investigation
of arbitrage opportunities in both markets provides evidence that the MM market
offered significantly less arbitrage opportunities. This is a strong indication that the
MM market shows increased information efficiency. Altogether, Table 4.12 summa-
rizes the results of this chapter and highlights the characteristics of both markets
during the conducted field experiments.
Table 4.12: Summary of Results
Investigation Measure MM market NMM market Significance
Trading Activity
Total # of trades  G#  
Activity of traders  G#  
Accuracy
Hit rate  G# #
Group phase forecast  G#  
Error
MAE   #
MAE w/o distortions G#   
Information Efficiency
Auto-Correlation G#  #
Arbitrage opportunities G#    fulfilled/satisfied, G# partly fulfilled/satisfied, # not fulfilled/not satisfied
Altogether, the main experience from this field experiment is that traders dis-
torted trading prices in some contracts which can be avoided by regulative arrange-
ments in the market system. For example, the maximum trade price should be
bounded by 100 currency units that traders have no possibility to overprice con-
tracts. Even if they would find a counterpart, this can be denoted as irrational
behavior since the maximum payout was 100 currency units.
Furthermore, it has to be investigated if a situation can occur in which an early
close of contracts and payout should be conducted. During the group phase, a few
teams reached the final round or dropped out of the tournament prior to the regular
payout date. During that time, transaction prices do not add further information
to the market which opens opportunities for gambling and manipulation. These
situations should be identified carefully and appropriate mechanisms have to be
developed in order to avoid these situations.
Nevertheless, with adjusted or neglected distortions mentioned above, the MM
market significantly showed an increased accuracy, more trading activity as well as
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increased information efficiency compared to the NMM market. Since the num-
ber of traders was equal in both markets, the results in nearly all measures were
superior in the MM market which can be traced back to the employment of an
automated market maker mechanism, which was the only difference between both
markets. Therefore, the usage of automated market maker mechanisms is favorably
in small markets. Interestingly, the MM market was able to motivate about 6-8
traders to constantly update their expectations and beliefs during the course of the
tournament for about three weeks. The relative low incentive of winning a price
worth 125e raﬄed in each market worked surprisingly well. This shows that people
participated not only to win the price (which was bound to a winning probability)
but rather from other motives which are briefly explained in Section 3.1.2. The
time they were willing to invest to update their expectations nearly every day for a
duration of three weeks is astonishing for the relative low incentive. Besides, some
of them may have perceived trading in the markets as fun and entertaining.
In summary, the main objective of this field experiment was to investigate the
effect of automated market making on the trading activity, forecasting accuracy and
information efficiency in a well understood field of application where Information
Markets constantly deliver very accurate results. As means to an end, the promising
results presented in this chapter provide valuable experience for the development of
small-sized Information Markets, for instance, innovation assessment. In innovation
contexts, low trading activity and small markets are more likely as in Information
Markets in contexts of public interest. Thus, a field experiment for innovation
assessment in a company, which is described in the next chapter, was implemented
using the valuable experience shown in this chapter.

5 Enterprise Information Markets
for Innovation Assessment
W
hen companies noticed the predictive power of Information Markets, they
began to launch first prototypes and experiments for internal usage. Once
they realized the advantages, they adapted them for internal market anal-
ysis, forecasting of sales figures, operations planning as well as project management
(Ortner 1998; Eliashberg et al. 2000; Gruca 2000; Plott 2000; Spann 2002; Spann
and Skiera 2004; Dahan et al. 2007; Tetlock 2008; Cowgill et al. 2009). For exam-
ple, companies like Google, Intel or HP are using internal Information Markets. Yet,
Information Markets have not become an established part of companies forecasting
strategy.
Despite the sporadic usage of Information Markets for the management of pro-
jects, they often experience trouble due to several reasons. Jørgensen et al. (2008)
provide facts and challenges based on a comprehensive survey among 1.500 practi-
tioners worldwide in order to investigate the reasons of project failures.1 An inter-
esting figure is the high number of troubled projects, which did not reach their goals
or were stopped. Figure 5.1 shows the results of the survey regarding the project
success rate in companies. In total, 41 % of the projects fully met their objectives.
In contrast, 59 % were troubled whereas 15 % out of these 59 % missed their goals
or were stopped.
Jørgensen et al. (2008) introduce several challenges, which have to be tackled
in order to avoid project failures. In Figure 5.2, the three major challenges are
the “changing mindset and attitudes” followed by the “cooperate culture” and the
“complexity of projects” with 58 %, 49 % and 35 % respectively. Interestingly, three
other challenges are mentioned, which can be addressed with the contribution of
this work:● Lack of commitment of higher management (32 %)
1The survey covered 1.532 organizations of all sizes, balances around the globe and across indus-
tries. In total, 21 industries, whereby 14 % companies employed more than 100.000 employees
and 22 % had less than 1.000 employees.
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Project that fully 
met their 
objectives
44%
Projects that either 
missed all goals or 
were stopped
Projects that fully 
met their objectives
Projects that did 
not meet either 
time, budget or 
quality goals15%
41%
Figure 5.1: Success Rate in Change Projects
Adapted from Jørgensen et al. (2008)
● Lack of transparency because of missing or wrong information (18 %)● Lack of motivation of involved employees (16 %)
58%
49%
35%
33%
32%
20%
18%
16%
15%
12%
8%
Changing Mindsets and Attitudes
Corporate Culture
Complexity underestimated
Shortage of Resources
Lack of Commitment of higher Management
Lack of Change Know How
Lack of Transparency because of missing or wrong Information
Lack of Motivation of involved Employees
Change of Process
Change of IT Systems
Technology Barriers
Soft Factors
Hard Factors
Figure 5.2: Challenges in Change Projects
Adapted from Jørgensen et al. (2008)
Enterprise Information Markets are intended to be used by a representative frac-
tion of a relevant group. In case of innovation contexts, employees, for instance of
the sales department, or customers are valuable sources of information. Information
Markets can be a method to mitigate some of the challenges like the commitment
of management or information transparency. In an Information Market, available
information becomes consolidated and therefore, information becomes transparent.
Even if the higher management takes part in Information Markets, it shows its
commitment through the usage of the market system just like regular employees.
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These are two examples of how several problems in change management can be
addressed with Information Markets. Information Markets cannot surely solve any
challenges mentioned in Figure 5.2 – but they may provide a contribution in order to
tackle some of them. In the following, a field experiment in an enterprise innovation
context is described where challenges, mentioned above, are addressed.
5.1 The EnBW Information Market
Service Innovation is a crucial activity for companies in order to maintain busi-
ness success over time. Section 2.3 outlined challenges as well as requirements to
be innovative in intra- as well as inter-organizational contexts. Strategic decisions
about innovations are important tasks and innovation strategies are directly linked
to the business strategy as mentioned in Section 2.1. Depending on the type of
innovation, an appropriate and comprehensive decision making process should be
applied to avoid trouble during the implementation of innovations as well as to re-
duce avoidable costs (Dannenberg and Burgard 2007). As mentioned in Sections 2
and 3.3.1, employees, customers, consultants or independent experts can be con-
sidered as participants in Information Markets. A difficulty in decision making in
innovations contexts is that decisions have to be made even under high risk, high
investment costs or uncertainty. Therefore, to avoid overlooking crucial aspects in
decision making about innovations, employees are a valuable source to be consid-
ered (cp. Section 3.4.3). In order to analyze the application of Information Markets
with employees, a field experiment was conducted at EnBW, which is one of the
biggest electricity suppliers in Germany. In the experiment, an Information Market
was used to aggregate estimations about innovation proposals.
5.1.1 Experiment Design
In the remainder of the experiment, the objective of the innovation workshop as
well as the field experiment design was discussed with decision makers prior to the
workshop. The innovation workshop in March 2009 was held the 3rd time and the
experience of the executives is that employees are interested and contribute their
expectation and knowledge. The workshop’s objective was to provide a mixture
of presentations about new technologies concerning internal processes in order to
foster attendants’ creativity. In a second step, they developed innovation proposals
aiming to improve internal processes.
After the 1st day, attendees had a comprehensive overview about the introduced
topics and technologies. These topics and technologies ranging from interactive
social technologies to devices for power management were identified by company
representatives prior to the workshop. An initial collection of technologies was
gathered by an agency and the 12 most interesting ones were selected to be presented
in the presentation slots.
On the 2nd day, attendees had the opportunity to discuss their ideas with each
other in groups in order to further develop and improve them. After 30 minutes,
groups were mixed up so that everybody could discuss with different people to get
feedback. Once promising ideas were ready, attendees submitted them. On the 2nd
day, about 80 ideas were submitted.
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The company noticed during the two days workshop, that attendants were very
interested in further developing their ideas and therefore, they supported discussions
and further developments with a company internal wiki software in their intranet.
Attendees had the possibility to review and discuss their innovations in an online
discussion forum. After a few weeks of improvement and discussion, 12 ideas were
ready to be assessed via an Information Market for employees, an Information Mar-
ket for experts as well as a questionnaire for decision makers. After the experiment,
the results of the three methods were compared. Table 5.1 gives an overview of the
12 innovation alternatives.2
Table 5.1: Products in the EIM
ID Name (Original) Name (Translated in English)
1 Twitterinfo Twitterinfo
2 MEREGIO-Plattform MEREGIO Platform
3 Heim-Automation Home Automation
4 Parallele Dokumentenbearbeitung Parallel Document Processing
5 Intelligente Terminplanung Intelligent Calendar Management
6 Web 2.0 Plakate Web 2.0 Poster
7 Digitalisieren von Visitenkarten Digitizing Business Cards
8 xing@enbw.com xing@enbw.com
9 New Contact Networking New Contact Networking
10 All in One All in One
11 Gera¨teinventar Hardware Inventory
12 mobile Za¨hlererfassung Mobile Metering
As described in Section 3.4.3, these alternatives can be assessed by employees via
an internal Information Market. So far, the experience of earlier workshops was
that participants were very cooperative and interested during the workshop, but
there was no adequate method to keep them involved in the innovation context
after the workshop. Therefore, it should be evaluated, if workshop participants can
be kept in the innovation process via the employment of an Information Market.
Participants of the innovation workshop were invited to join the Innovation Market
and to keep on the innovation topics several weeks after the workshop.
The market was online available from the 4th of May 2009 till the 12th of June 2009.
Furthermore, compared to a regular financial exchange, the market was available 24
hours, 7 days a week. In total, ca. 110 people joined the innovation workshop and
everybody received an anonymous account as well as a password to join the market.
The participants were supposed to trade stocks representing innovation alternatives
(Table 5.1) in order to rank them according to their personal expectation about
the overall benefit for the company. The representing stocks were initially issued
for each user account as well as an initial amount of money. Each account was
endowed with 100 shares of each stock and 100.000 virtual currency units. The
market endowed users initially, that participants were able to trade immediately
2In the following, the English names of innovation alternatives are used. In the field experiment, the
original names were in German language. In Appendix B, Figures B.13 - B.19 show screenshots
of the market system where the original names are used. Refer to Table 5.1 for translation.
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in each stock and did not have to arrange their initial depot themselves. Traders
were supposed to interpret available information related to the benefits and the
feasibility of innovation alternatives and to provide it in the market. Information
may get available via internal news channels, company wide information systems or
discussions with colleagues.
In addition, an automated market maker mechanism was used in the market
based on the results showed in Chapter 4. Since it was expected that only a few
traders would register to the market system, the automated market maker mech-
anism should provide continuous trading capabilities and, thus, improve market
activity, accuracy and efficiency. The trading strategy of it slightly differed to the
strategy described in Section 4.1.2. The difference was the determination of how
many shares it offers. In contrast to the strategy used in Section 4.1.2, it draws a
random number out of an interval3 and did not used a fixed number of shares. Alto-
gether, the application of the automated market maker mechanism was intended to
improve the market quality in this field experiment as well, as already demonstrated
in Chapter 4.
As described in Section 3.2, the strategy of selling and buying shares depends
on the participant’s individual expectation of the attractiveness of the underlying
innovation. If traders think that an innovation is overvalued compared to another
innovation alternative, which in their mind is of minor attractiveness, they were
supposed to sell shares. Vice versa, if an innovation alternative is undervalued in
their opinion, they are supposed to buy it in order to raise the price so that it
represents their expectations.
After closing the market on the 12th of June 2009, it was expected that the stock
prices represent the aggregated valuation of all participants. While every active
participant provided individual information in the market via buying/selling orders,
the mechanism aggregated them. Once the market was closed, the innovations were
ordered by their market price and then the ranking can be interpreted. The results
are shown in Section 5.3. As a benchmark, opinions from decision makers and
an identical, parallel market for experts were evaluated. From decision makers, a
ranking was collected without them having traded in the market to compare it to
the market results. Unfortunately, the experts traded very little that the results
were not usable for further interpretation. The comparison is described later in
Section 5.3.
5.1.2 User Interface
For the experiment, a user interface was designed in order to provide a convenient
way to access all market functionalities whereas the market functionalities were
similar to those described in Section 4.1.1. Once a trader logged in to the market
system, the start screen with a short introduction is shown. On the left hand side,
a navigation bar provides easy access to the trading screen, the despot view as
well as the ranking screen, where all traders are listed, sorted based on their depot
value. A selection of screenshots of the user interface are described in Appendix B,
Figures B.13 - B.19.
3The automated market maker’s strategy was to choose a random number out of the interval
[30;70] in steps of five shares.
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5.2 Design Objectives
The design objectives of Information Markets are manifold. The first objective
is a high motivation of participants. It can be assumed, that the more participants
are motivated, the trading activity of Information Markets increases. The same
holds for the acceptance of Information Markets by participants. If a method is not
accepted by participants, it will not produce accurate results. Therefore, the field
experiment was conducted in order to provide an indication for the fulfillment of
the design objectives.
Three major objectives motivated the conduction of the field experiment. The
first objective was to investigate the motivation of participants in using the market
system via their trading activity and a paper-based survey during the workshop.
The motivation of people in using an Information Market is a very important step
towards the successful application of it. Besides, harnessing implicit knowledge from
participants is also important. The aggregation of information in markets can only
work properly, if implicit information can be extracted from traders. The second
objective was to investigate employees’ acceptance of Information Markets. For the
successful application of Information Markets it is necessary that employees accept
a method, otherwise they may not use it. In the third design objective, the results of
an expert panel and the Information Market were supposed not to differ. Therefore,
several design objectives focusing on the aspects mentioned above were developed,
which are described in the following and investigated in Section 5.3:
1. Traders use the Enterprise Information Markets
a) Trading activity is equally spread over time
b) Traders are active during the whole market duration
c) Employees are motivated to use the Information Market
2. Information Markets are accepted by employees
a) Employees assess the method of using Information Markets in an enter-
prise context positively
b) The Information Market is accepted by employees
c) Employees perceive that the EnBW is able to better assess innovation
3. Results of the Information Market and an expert panel do not differ in inno-
vation contexts
Design objective 1 and the relevant subordinated objectives are intended to indi-
cate how traders are motivated to actively participate during the market period. In
innovation contexts, innovation cycles may last several months or even years (Doc-
ter et al. 1989). Thus, it is important to keep traders motivated. In innovation
contexts, new information about the feasibility of an innovation is likely to occur.
For example, a major breakthrough in technology may support an innovation to be
realized. In long lasting Innovation Markets, news about changes in technology may
be a motive for traders to change their expectations about the innovations in the
market and let them change their depot structure and, therefore, market prices. In
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turn, other traders respond to such activity. The investigation of design objectives
1 a)-c) is introduced in Section 5.3.1.
Design objective 2 is also subdivided into several design objectives. These ob-
jectives are intended to get an indication of how employees estimate the value of
Information Markets for a company. The investigation about design objective 2c,
which states that employees perceive that the EnBW is able to better assess inno-
vations, provides valuable evidence of trust and acceptance for EIM by employees
as well. This is a major prerequisite for the employment of EIM in companies. The
results are described in Section 5.3.2.
Design objective 3 refers to the results of the Information Market and investigates
if the Information Market’s results are similar to the results of an expert panel. The
Information Market as well as the expert panel provides a ranking of innovations
and can therefore be compared. The results of the Information Markets are expected
to be similar to the result of the expert panel in the best case. The results will be
discussed in Section 5.3.3.
5.3 Experiment Results
This chapter is divided in two subsections. The first Section 5.3.1 addresses the
investigation of the activity, the activity level as well as the motivation of employees
during the field experiment according to design objective 1. Descriptive results like
trading activity as well as survey results are introduced to provide evidence for
the motivation of traders. Second Section 5.3.2 investigates the acceptance of EIM
by employees which is derived from the trading activity and results from a survey
according to design objective 2. In Section 5.3.3, the results from decision makers
are analyzed compared to the result of the Information Market whereas Section 5.3.4
provides the development of a confidence score in order to further discuss the results
of Section 5.3.3 according to design objective 3.
5.3.1 Motivating Employees
One of the challenges of innovation management is the involvement as well as
the motivation of employees (cp. Figure 5.2). In the next section, the market
activity of the EnBW Information Market is analyzed regarding the overall activity
of participants. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, the self-selection process in markets
encourages interested and motivated participants who think they can make a profit
by providing their information.
5.3.1.1 Market Activity
Figure 5.3 shows the stock price changes for each stock over time. The stock
prices for several products vary heavily, which is an indication that trading activity
must have been high during the market period and information was processed.
In order to further analyze the trading activity, Figure 5.4 shows the trading
activity on a daily average basis of all transactions where human traders were in-
volved. Similar to the experiment described in Chapter 4, an automated market
maker mechanism was actively trading in the market. It’s presence showed that it
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Figure 5.3: Stock Prices Overview
is capable of increase trading activity, market liquidity and, thus, market efficiency
whereby it only reacts once a human trader did a transaction. The following figures
focus on those transactions at least one human trader was involved.
Figure 5.4: Trading Activity
One can see that between the 21st and 26th of June no transaction occurred.
During this period, there was a nationwide holiday on the 21st of June and many
employees took one day off on the 22nd of June. Besides this, an overall trading
activity was observable almost every day. In total, trading activity occurred on
30 out of 40 trading days, even on weekends. In Figure 5.4, the weekends are
marked with blue boxes. The daily trading average was 110 transactions with human
involvement with a minimum of two and a maximum number of 366 transactions.
5.3 Experiment Results 101
In total, participants caused more than 2.000 transactions and submitted more than
4.000 orders.
Figure 5.5 shows the number of transactions per trader in an descending order.
In total, the most active trader did slightly more than 1.000 transactions and the
least active trader did only one transaction.
Figure 5.5: Transactions per Trader
The results in figures 5.4 and 5.5 indicate that design objectives 1 a), 1 b) and
1 c) are met. Concerning 1 a), the trading activity is spread over the whole mar-
ket period. The trading activity decreased at weekends and only a few days were
observable with no trading activity. That is in line with what one might expect.
The worst expectation, that the trading activity would only be observable at the
beginning of the market period, can be denied.
Design objective 1 b) is also achieved. In total, 110 workshop participants were
invited to join the market after the innovation workshop. About one third followed
the invitation and traded in the market. Approximately ten traders triggered at
minimum 100 transactions. About ten traders caused between 100 and ten trades
whereas further ten traders did less than ten transactions. That is also what one
can expect and is a typical distribution of trading behavior according to other
Information Markets (cp. Section 4.4.1).
Table 5.2 shows the final prices of the innovation market. As described in Sec-
tion 5.1.1, the Information Market will be compared to an expert market as well as
results from a questionnaire for decision makers. Unfortunately, the expert market
only generated seven transactions, which are too few to serve as a benchmark. The
experts were mainly employees from companies/agencies affiliated to EnBW and
held the presentations at the first day of the innovation workshop. Therefore, they
did not have a major interest in evaluating innovations for a company they are not
working for. Ex ante, this result was not expected. It was planned to combine the
payout function of the Information Market with those of the expert market. This
was also announced on the start screen of the Information Market (cp. Figure B.13).
The prices in the expert market did not change that much that after the final payout
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the ranking of the Information Market was influenced after the combination. The
payout function of the Information Market for employees was weighted one third to
the expert market weighted with two thirds. The intention of this weighting was
to avoid that participants of the Information Market get the impression, that their
result at the end of the market period would be taken as a final decision and the
top rated innovation would be implemented. With a weighting of one third, partici-
pants of the Information Market had the only incentive to imagine what the expert
market’s result would be. It was ensured, that no participant was able to see the
intermediate result of the other market. Therefore, the maximum expected payout
of one participant could only be realized revealing the true valuation about the in-
novations. The weighting of 1/3 and 2/3 was chosen because if the proportion have
been 1/2 and 1/2, participants in the Information Market could get the impression
that they have as much weight as experts once the results would be combined. In
the worst case, participants could have had the incentive to distort prices and affect
the results of the expert market. Therefore, the weight of the Information Market
had to be slightly lower than the expert market’s weight that employees had no
incentive to trade strategically. Hence, the decision was to weight the Information
Market with one third and the expert market with two thirds.
As one can easily see, the results of the expert market did not change the overall
ranking of the total payout prices after the combination. Therefore, the payout was
done with the weighting, although the expert market was illiquid.
Table 5.2: Combined Prices from the Expert Market and Information Market: The
combined price for each contract consists of the combination of prices
from the Information Market and the results of the Expert Market. The
Expert Market was weighted 2/3 whereas the Information Market was
weighted 1/3.
Name Combined Price Expert Market Information Market
All in One 17,13 7,50 36,40
MEREGIO Platform 12,58 7,90 21,94
Web 2.0 Poster 11,64 8,34 18,24
xing@enbw.com 10,92 8,34 16,07
Parallel Document Processing 9,25 8,34 11,08
Hardware Inventory 7,56 8,34 6,00
Mobile Metering 7,54 8,34 5,93
Home Automation 6,32 8,34 2,28
New Contact Networking 6,10 8,34 1,62
Intelligent Calendar Management 5,85 8,34 0,86
Digitizing Business Cards 5,83 8,34 0,81
Twitterinfo 5,72 8,34 0,49
Table 5.3 shows statistics for the whole market duration of the trading days. In the
columns, the min, max, median (med) and diameter () are shown for transactions
with at least one human trader on the buy or sell side.
The values in the columns per share have different min and max values, which
indicates that prices differed and information was processed. The diameter shows
the average for each stock. Detailed results of Table 5.3 per week are illustrated in
Appendix B, Tables B.1 and B.2.
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Table 5.3: Market Statistics: Minimum, maximum, median and average trading
prices are calculated for each stock.
ID min max med  Name
1 0.74 8.40 8.34 3.84 Twitterinfo
2 0.10 50.0 6.60 16.47 MEREGIO Platform
3 0.10 14.45 8.80 7.32 Home Automation
4 0.10 40.0 13.79 18.14 Parallel Document Processing
5 0.50 20.0 20.0 4.19 Intelligent Calendar Management
6 2.01 40.0 8.34 16.74 Web 2.0 Poster
7 1.00 8.71 7.05 4.66 Digitizing Business Cards
8 4.13 100.0 9.50 21.93 xing@EnBW.com
9 0.50 8.34 8.34 4.48 New Contact Networking
10 0.10 77.0 9.00 25.72 All in one
11 0.30 48.5 9.00 6.71 Hardware Inventory
12 0.10 12.0 6.21 5.78 Mobile Metering
In Information Markets, one may expect that traders trade intensively in the
early days of the market. They have an initial expectation about the innovations
alternatives and therefore they set up their depots according to these expectations.
They may favor one or two innovations and trade them at higher prices compared
to the innovations which will not be that beneficial for their company. After they
set up their depots according to their initial expectation, it can be assumed that
most traders are satisfied with their depot and wait until stocks will be paid out.
In case that the market is open for six weeks, one should observe the most trading
activity in the first one or two weeks. Typically, information is needed to prompt
traders to update their expectations. But if a company does not provide or sup-
port information about future innovations and make it available to their employees,
they will not update their expectations. In the field experiment, new information
was available to traders via an internal wiki where all tradable innovations were
described and traders had the chance to discuss them with each other and build
new information in a forum. Other employees could see these discussions and sen-
timents of traders and use it to update their own expectation about the success
or failure of the innovation alternatives. Therefore, it is beneficial, if a continuous
high number of transactions can be observed in the market for two reasons: Firstly,
traders have to update their portfolios constantly because transaction prices change
often. Thus, their depot value changes based on the transaction prices and may
prompt them to update it. Secondly, traders are encouraged to inform themselves
about the innovations because only if they gain knowledge about what they trade
they are able to bring the price in the direction they think the innovation should be
based on their assessment.
In Table 5.4, the number of trades of the ten most active traders at each trading
day is illustrated. It is remarkable that 1182 of 2145 orders occurred in the last
ten trading days. During the whole market duration of 40 days, only 10 days were
without any trading activity. On the 05th of June 2009, the most active day was
observed with 328 orders. 264 of them caused from only one trader. In total, it is
impressive that the trading activity was constantly high and did not decrease over
the market duration.
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Table 5.4: Top 10 active Traders: The trading activity (number of trades) of the
top ten traders (most active) was analyzed for each trading day.
Traders
Date 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Sum
04 May 2009 5 13 47 5 1 71
05 May 2009 3 2 34 92 4 4 139
06 May 2009 3 38 4 45
07 May 2009 4 2 5 11
08 May 2009 18 8 19 6 26 3 80
09 May 2009 19 27 46
10 May 2009
11 May 2009 3 1 4
12 May 2009 11 19 2 32
13 May 2009 2 8 2 2 10 24
14 May 2009 2 3 6 2 4 17
15 May 2009 1 1
16 May 2009
17 May 2009 2 2
18 May 2009 2 2 3 7
19 May 2009 1 1
20 May 2009 7 7
21 May 2009
22 May 2009
23 May 2009
24 May 2009
25 May 2009
26 May 2009
27 May 2009 82 15 1 32 130
28 May 2009 68 14 14 96
29 May 2009
30 May 2009
31 May 2009
01 June 2009 32 32
02 June 2009 40 12 21 1 74
03 June 2009 123 1 3 17 144
04 June 2009 2 2
05 June 2009 264 13 18 33 328
06 June 2009 37 27 7 71
07 June 2009 2 2
08 June 2009 73 25 43 15 1 3 160
09 June 2009 23 41 1 17 5 87
10 June 2009 3 27 30 3 3 6 72
11 June 2009 8 79 10 97
12 June 2009 153 73 5 29 260
13 June 2009 4 13 13 73 103
Sum 842 458 200 195 128 95 60 41 35 91 2145
In Table 5.5, the number of “correct” transactions is shown. This analysis was
conducted ex post, after the final price was determined. Hence, orders of each trader
are analyzed, if the direction of a trade moved the price towards the final value. For
example, a buy order is tagged as “correct”, if the limit price of that order was lower
than the final value and the order was executed. Otherwise, if the limit price of a sell
order is lower than the final value, the order is tagged as “incorrect”. 164 out of 280
total observations indicate that the market processed positive trading directions. If
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Table 5.5: Trade Direction: The success per trader can be measured with an indi-
cator about the “correctness” of trades. Ex post, it can be analyzed how
often a trader did a buy/sell trade depending on the current stock price.
A buy/sell trade was correct in case of under/overvaluation compared
to the final value. The relation of correct trades to the total number of
trades leads to the trade direction coefficient per trader and per stock.
Trader Stocks
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2 0.03 0.42 0.45 0.66 0.10 0.44 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.69 0.23 0.23
3 1.00
8 0.10 0.34 0.58 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.10 0.33
13 0.00
15 0.83 0.22 0.29 0.84 0.56 0.00 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.10 0.21 0.42
19 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.22 0.00
21 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
25 0.20 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.20 0.50
27 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
32 1.00 0.52 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.67
38 0.00 1.00 1.00
41 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 1.00
42 1.00
54 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
55 0.00 0.00 1.00
65 0.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.09 1.00
66 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
69 1.00 0.00
72 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
79 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
81 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
85 0.00 0.40 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
98 0.17 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.00
100 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
102 0.55 0.15 0.89 0.74 0.33 0.77 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.07 0.56
103 0.00 0.14 0.89 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.50 0.33
106 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
109 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
121 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
128 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
129 0.84 0.21 0.53 0.77 0.34 0.37 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.20 0.38 0.03
141 1.00 0.00 1.00
143 0.43 0.50 1.00 0.86 0.00 0.50 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.63 1.00 0.35
149 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
154 1.00 0.00
155 0.00 0.00 1.00
203 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.02
a cell is not allocated, the trader did no transactions in that stock. If the cell is
tagged “0.00”, the trader did transactions in that stock, but all transactions moved
the price away from the final value.
Altogether, the analysis of the trade direction indicates which traders provided
a positive contribution to the market result. Traders with top performances can
be consulted for further interviews about their estimations or to take part in on-
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going innovation activities since they showed an accurate understanding about the
tradable contracts.
5.3.1.2 Survey Results for Motivational Aspects
During the workshop, participants were asked about their job profile in order to
learn about their background with a survey4. The result is illustrated in Figure 5.65.
Most participants were regular employees without executive or innovation tasks.
The second group can be tagged as employees with at least 50 % innovation tasks and
personnel responsibility. Only ten employees had executive functions whereas six
people were something else like external employees or working students. Altogether,
workshop participants were invited from all nine EnBW sub-divisions.
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Figure 5.6: EIM Survey: Participants
In the following, the trading activity of the ten most active traders is analyzed
in order to identify which kind of employees were most active. A common analysis
in Information Markets is the identification of lead users. Lead users are important
traders who are most active and react very quickly in order to adjust their infor-
mation in the market. Furthermore, they are highly interested in improving, e.g.,
new products, and face the need for future products or try to find solutions for their
needs months or even years before (von Hippel 1986; Urban and Von Hippel 1988;
4The survey was conducted in German language and is translated in English language in this
work. For the investigation in this chapter, several questions are highlighted. The original
questionnaire in full length is illustrated in Appendix B, Figures B.20 - B.25. In total, 100
questionnaires were handed out whereas 69 questionnaires returned. Question 1 was about the
affiliation participants, e.g., if they are executives, regular employees or a regular employees
with innovation tasks or other responsibilities. Questions 2-7 were about the approach of using
Information Markets for innovation assessment whereas questions 8-16 were about the business
culture concerning innovation within the company. Questions 2-7 were further intended to learn
about the motivation of employees in participating Information Markets and their expectation
about how the approach is suited to assess innovations in companies.
5This question refers to question 1 in Figure B.20.
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von Hippel 1988). That makes them a potential source for innovative ideas. The
participation in Information Markets shows that they have a higher involvement
in contracts than other traders. According to von Hippel (1978) and von Hippel
(1986), companies should integrate lead users in their development processes, once
they identified them. Table 5.5 shows the ratio of each active trader in every prod-
uct. One may easily see that some traders traded every product and have mainly a
positive score in each product. This means that they bought undervalued share and
sold overvalued shares correctly. One cannot expect the score to be 1, because then
every trade would have been in the “right” direction. Some traders did hundreds
of trades and, therefore, it is unlikely that every trade was right. The analysis in
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 allows the identification of traders which played an impor-
tant role in the price discovery process. Traders were analyzed concerning their
domain of work, e.g., if they are a regular employee, or an executive etc. in order
to see, if the market was dominated by a certain type of employees or if traders are
representative for the company. The following list reveals the domain of work for
the top ten most active traders:
1. business responsibility
2. regular employee
3. regular employee
4. personnel responsibility
5. other (external)
6. regular employee
7. regular employee
8. personnel responsibility
9. regular employee
10. regular employee
Altogether, this is a result very similar to the result presented in Figure 5.6.
The group of people mainly responsible for market prices consist of an appropriate
representation of employees. As mentioned in Section 5.3, one can conclude that
the market did not motivate only the regular employees in participating the market
but also executive employees with personnel and business responsibility. The higher
management is appropriately represented by three very active participants. Hence,
this result indicates that the higher management showed their commitment since
they traded actively. Furthermore, even the motivation of regular employees, which
is another challenge in innovation management, can be confirmed, because their
trading activity within the top ten traders is also observable.
Another challenge mentioned in Figure 5.2 is the lack of transparency due to
missing or wrong information. One can argue that the existence of the Information
Market is a source of information itself. Participants can see which innovations are
actually traded in the market and, thus, may be implemented. In addition, a wiki
system was provided to host textual descriptions where participants could review
the innovations and share their expectations in a discussion forum as well.
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On the one side, information is essential for traders to interpret it and to provide it
to the market. On the other side, they provide their estimations via an user interface
in a virtual market system which denotes an effort for traders. In the following, the
individual perceived effort was questioned in the survey. Figure 5.76 shows the
results for the question about the effort of participants in using EIM. Participants
answered with an average of 3.54 and a median of 4.00, where 5 denotes “very high”
and 1 denotes “very low”. The variance of 0.72 (standard error 0.85) indicates that
the participants assess the effort of using EIM is relatively high. This is reasonable,
because using an EIM is definitely more complex than filling out a questionnaire.
In an EIM, participants have to monitor stock price changes frequently. In a survey,
participants have to fill out a questionnaire whereby this represents only a snapshot –
but associated with less effort, based on the length of the questionnaire.
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Figure 5.7: EIM Survey: Effort
Interestingly, the motivation of using an EIM for a longer time is well-balanced.
The results are shown in Figure 5.87. The average was 2.85 and the median was
3.00, where 5 denotes “very high”and 1 denotes“very low”. In that case, the median
as well as the average indicates that the motivation is perceived as neutral. This
is also comprehensible, because if a method is perceived as more intensive in their
usage, the motivation should be lower compared to a questionnaire. On the other
side, in an EIM a performance-based payout mechanism can foster the motivation
in using an EIM, which is not applicable in questionnaires.
Regarding design objective 1 c), the motivation of employees is limited. The
average on the 5 point Likert scale where 5 denotes – very high – and 1 denotes –
very low – is at 2.85, slightly below the middle (3). The median was 3.00, the
variance was 0.92 which indicates that the overall motivation for the participation
in EIM is moderate. A correlation analysis shows that the effort and the motivation
6This question refers to question 4 in Figure B.21.
7This question refers to question 5 in Figure B.21.
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Figure 5.8: EIM Survey: Motivation
is low correlated8 with a negative correlation coefficient of -0.322. This is reasonable
since the usage of a tool takes more effort, it should not increase traders’ motivation.
Thus, the development of the system should focus on usability in order to decrease
traders’ effort and in turn, increase the motivation of users.
The analysis of results supporting design objective 1 c) shows that it is partly
achieved. This indicates that the incentives have to be further developed in order to
foster the motivation of employees. Nevertheless, some employees were extremely
motivated as can be derived from the results presented in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. Some
traders were very active and caused several hundreds of transactions which indicates
a non negligible level of motivation.
In another question, employees were asked which problems they perceive for the
usability of EIM. The results are shown in Figure 5.99. The main answer was that
people think they have no time to use the information market tool. Interestingly,
the second answer was that they think they cannot estimate the value of stocks
correctly. That answer opens two directions of interpretation. The first one is that
they are not able to transform their expectations into stock prices. The second one
is that they are not able to assess the benefits of innovation alternatives for the
company correctly.
5.3.2 Acceptance of Information Markets by Employees
A very common way to measure the accuracy of Information Markets is to com-
pare their results to an observable benchmark. In case of sport or political events,
the Information Markets’ results can be compared to the final values of the sport
event outcome or the final values of an election (Berg and Rietz 2006; Graefe et al.
8According to Weise (1975), (-0.322) is medium correlated. Other values: (0-0.2] – weak correla-
tion, (0.2-0.5] – low correlation, (0.5-0.7] – medium correlation, (0.7-0.9] – high correlation.
9This question refers to question 7 in Figure B.21.
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Figure 5.9: EIM Survey: Problems
2009). In case of Enterprise Information Markets (EIM), a similar final value may
exist, if sales figures or project run times are to be predicted. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2, EIM are applicable even if no final value is observable (Soukhoroukova and
Spann 2005; Chen et al. 2010). In case that no observable real world benchmark
or event can be used to determine the accuracy of an EIM, other benchmarks need
to be used. One option introduced by Spann (2002) is to run two markets in paral-
lel. Traders are only allowed to participate in one market. Once both markets are
closed, the final values of stocks of the first market can be taken as payout function
for the second market and vice versa. Other approaches are reported by Slamka
(2009) or Chen et al. (2010) by using the final stock price as payout function. It is
doubtful to use the last transaction price as benchmark because the payout function
has to be transparent to traders in EIM and therefore strategic behavior may be
supported. Traders may tend to trade their favored stocks as they want the mar-
ket result to be and that should not be possible. The payout function should lead
traders to reveal their real expectation based on the objective the market should
fulfill. The payout function must be the dominant guideline that strategic behavior
is neither rewarded nor incentivized.
For the field experiment introduced in Section 5.1, two benchmarks were intended
to be compared to the results of the Information Market employees had used. The
first one was an identical market running in parallel. Dedicated experts chosen
from EnbW and also presenters of the presentation slots mentioned in Section 5.1
were supposed as participants for the expert market. These experts were employ-
ees mostly from external companies affiliated with EnBW. In total, eight experts
were supposed to be in the expert market. Unfortunately, only seven transactions
were observed and, thus, the result cannot be consulted to serve as a benchmark.
The reason might have been that the experts were not originally employees of the
EnBW and therefore had no interest or information to trade in the expert market.
Therefore, the result of the expert market was discarded.
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The second benchmark was the comparison to decision makers at EnBW. In the
past, the innovation workshop was conducted twice and every time the decision
makers came to their decision which innovation should be implemented by them-
selves. In 2009, the Information Market was an additional method to get further
information from employees which was a rather new situation. In the next section,
the results of both the Information Market and decision makers will be illustrated.
5.3.2.1 Expert Expectations and Information Markets
A common benchmark is the usage of expert opinions to measure the accuracy of
Information Markets. In scientific literature, it is reported that Information Markets
consequently outperform experts in various fields of application (Spann and Skiera
2004; Soukhoroukova 2007; Graefe 2008a; Graefe 2008c). But it is only sensible to
compare expert opinions to the market result if it is assured, that the experts are
the best available benchmark for the given problem. In an innovation context, even
experts may not have superior information which innovation is most profitable. In
this work, a combination of several information sources is considered most promising
for a company trying to identify the most profitable innovation by involving their
employees in decision processes. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, traders participate
in markets only if they have superior information. Otherwise, they will not be able
to realize positive outcomes in the market. Thus, the market may be open for a
sensible partition of relevant employees and only those will participate who think
they can bring information in the market and make profit. A common challenge
in selecting experts for expert opinions is to find them. A research direction in
Information Science focuses on that problem (Campbell et al. 2003; Yimam-Seid
and Kobsa 2003; Hawking 2004; Balog et al. 2006). But somehow companies
manage to form an expert group – as they have to do in order to get a decision
which innovation they should realize. Either way, the expert group or a project
team will be formed. The field experiment competes with the expert group as a
parallel method to rank innovations mentioned in Table 5.1. The company has two
major benefits of having a market parallel to the expert opinion:
1. Additional ranking of innovations
2. Information from another group of employees
Alltogether, there are four imaginable outcomes of the two benchmarks which are
described in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Possible Outcomes
Market
positive negative
Experts
positive good (1) action required (2)
negative action required (3) good (4)
In the best case (1), the market as well as the experts come to the same or similar
ranking which is aligned with the expectation of decision makers. This indicates
that the majority of people involved in innovation processes think the same way
about the most promising innovation. In the second (2) and the third (3) case,
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either the experts or the market point in different directions. For the company,
this is an indication that at least one group assess the innovations differently. In
innovation contexts, one cannot evaluate that the one innovation is beneficial and
the other is not. Therefore, the indication in case (1) is mostly desirable, because
the decision makers in the company may have a suggestion, which innovation they
should support by themselves. Once both, market participants and the experts,
assess the same innovation as beneficial, the decision to make is easier to justify by
decision makers.
In case (2) and (3), it is of high importance that before the final decision is made
the decision makers check the innovation again, eventually through another control
group like external consultants or internal counselors. The different direction of the
market and the experts’ opinions alerts decision makers to reconsider if they should
go for an innovation or not. In the worst case (4), the market as well as the ex-
perts point to the same direction, but both groups may have a different perception
about the innovations compared to decision makers. If decision makers have no
such markets, they must decide which innovation they should go for. Either way,
the combination of experts and Information Markets is a way to have the possibility
to get various opinions from groups with different perceptions. Via the self-selection
process, only employees with relevant knowledge are expected to join the market.
Traders working in the sales division may possess information about the needs of
customers or business partners they know and makes their decisions about an inno-
vation based on that information. Other employees maybe have different business
networks and therefore, they can provide that information to the market – even
about the same innovation (Plott and Sunder 1988). Moreover, for the company it
does not have to be of any disadvantage having an additional information source
which innovation employees favorize. In contrast, they have an additional control
group to the experts or consultants they always have in order to identify the most
beneficial innovation.
In case that the market and the experts have the same expectation about the
innovations, it may happen that the decision makers have a different one. That is
meant by (negative/negative). But it cannot be determined ex ante, in which sector
in Table 5.6 the results of the three entities (decision makers, experts, innovation
market) are, because sector (1) and (4), as well as (2) and (3) are possible, depending
if the results from decision makers can be assumed as right or false, which is not
possible ex ante. Even ex post, it is not feasible to check if the results of a “wrong”
result turn out to be right, because not all innovations can be implemented. Even
if the best innovation is lower ranked as others, it may never be noticed. But this
cannot be proved until all innovations are implemented and evaluated against each
other. As already said, it does not have to be of any disadvantage having additional
information about the expectation of employees via markets and experts on the
other side. It may help to avoid implementing a barely advantageous innovation.
5.3.2.2 Survey Results for the Acceptance of Information Markets
After the first day of the innovation workshop, a survey with several questions
was conducted in order to get valuable information from the participants about
innovation management via Information Markets. The survey was paper-based
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and was handed out after the slot about innovation management with Information
Markets. In Appendix B, the complete survey is illustrated. The objective of the
survey, which was conducted before the field experiment started, was to learn about
the employees’ perception about the Innovation Market approach.
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Figure 5.10: EIM Survey: Innovation Assessment for EnBW
Figure 5.1010 shows the results of the question: “Will the EnBW be able to better
assess innovations with the EIM?” In total, 65 participants answered that question.
The 5 point Likert scaled question, where 5 denotes “strong agree” and 1 denotes
“strong disagree”, was answered with an average of 3.19 and a median of 3.00. The
variance was 0.86 and the standard deviation was 0.93. One can see that the overall
opinion of employees with an average of 3.19 is positive, that most of them believe
that the approach of using EIM is beneficial for the company. The variance as well
as the standard error and especially the median indicates that the majority of the
respondents agree, that the company can assess innovations better with EIM. For
employees, it is a simple participative way to make their information available to
executives. One challenge in companies with strict, top down hierarchies, is that
employees may think they do not have impact on decisions and the executives make
their decisions independent of the employees’ opinions. It is not feasible asking
each employee about his opinion, but with EIM, interested employees can join the
market and offer their information whereas the market mechanism aggregates each
individual information effectively. Moreover, this is also a benefit for decision makers
and executives, as already mentioned in Section 2.1.
The interpretation from Figure 5.1011 continues in Figure 5.11. In this question,
the workshop participants were asked, what their opinion is about the approach of
using EIM to assess innovations. The results are shown in Figure 5.11.
10This question refers to question 6 in Figure B.21.
11This question refers to question 3 in Figure B.21.
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Figure 5.11: EIM Survey: EIM Approach
In total, 67 participants answered the question with an average of 3.54 and a
median of 4.00, where 5 denotes“very good”and 1 denotes“not good”. The variance
is 0.86 and the standard error is 0.93. This indicates that the employees judge
the approach of using EIM for innovation assessment as “good”. This fosters the
results from Figure 5.10. Both results show a medium positive correlation of 0.56612,
which means that the company is considered to assess innovations better with EIM.
Furthermore, the correlation is significant at the 5 % level. In general, participants
consider EIM as a good method for innovation assessment. In addition, the results
from the question shown in Figure 5.10 indicate, that employees are sure that the
EnBW is able to better assess innovations with EIM (cp. design objectives 2 a), 2
c)). The combination of the results presented in Figures 5.11, 5.4 and 5.5 indicates
that the EIM is accepted by employees and is therefore actively used. This indicates
that design objective 2 b) is met and is therefore a valuable indication for the
employment of EIM in organizations.
5.3.3 Decision Makers vs. Information Market
In order to give an indication about design objective 3, the results of the market
are compared to the results of an expert panel. The expert panel consisted of two
experts with consultative functions who are responsible for the implementation of
the innovations at EnBW. Before the market started, the experts came to their ex-
pectation based on their personal anticipation about the benefit of each innovation.
After the market, they revealed their expectations and these were compared to mar-
ket results. Table 5.7 shows the ranked results from experts and the Information
Market.
The results in Table 5.2 show that in the Information Market five stocks were
rated above the initial price of 8.33 currency units. In the expert panel, the inno-
12According to Weise (1975), 0.566 is medium correlated. Other values: (0-0.2] – weak correlation,
(0.2-0.5] – low correlation, (0.5-0.7] – medium correlation, (0.7-0.9] – high correlation.
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Table 5.7: Decision Makers vs. Enterprise Information Market
Rank Decision Makers Information Market Price
1 Web 2.0 Poster All in one 36.4
2 xing@enbw.com MEREGIO Platform 21.9
3 All in one Web 2.0 Poster 18.2
4 Intelligent Calendar Management xing@enbw.com 16.1
5 Twitterinfo Parallel Document Processing 11.1
6 Mobile Metering Hardware Inventory 6.0
7 Parallel Document Processing Mobile Metering 5.9
8 MEREGIO Platform Home Automation 2.3
9 Home Automation New Contact Networking 1.6
10 Digitizing Business Cards Intelligent Calendar Management 0.9
11 Hardware Inventory Digitizing Business Cards 0.8
12 New Contact Networking Twitterinfo 0.6
vations cannot be ranked via final prices because the ranking was not originated
with a market mechanism. The experts were asked to rank the innovations based
on their expectation about the profitability and feasibility. The experts’ results in
the top five innovations overlap three innovations of the Information Market which
indicates, that both methods delivered congruent results. In case of innovation al-
ternative ranked 1, 2 and 3 from decision markets and ranked 1, 3 and 4 of the
Information Market in Table 5.7, the results can be categorized as case (1) – or
case (4) – discussed in Table 5.6. This indicates, that both, market participants
and decision makers in the expert panel come to the very similar results which is
a strong indication for the implementation of innovations. For the interpretation
of the presented results, it is necessary to further investigate the evolution of stock
prices in order to interpret the market results. Thus, in the next section, a metric
will be developed to discuss the market results.
5.3.4 Confidence in Stock Prices
The results presented in Section 5.3.3 are mainly based on the last observable
trade prices and disregarded how the final price has formed. According to Fama
(1970), the last transaction price comprises all available information and is, thus,
the best estimation of the represented contract. But in reality, traders do not
follow the optimal theoretical concept. Information deficits and misinterpretations
can affect market prices and, therefore, last transaction prices are not necessarily
the best representation of the aggregated assessment of a contract. This applies
especially for events in which no defined end can be determined. For example, the
stock price in Figure 5.12 shows a peak in the transaction price at the end of the
market duration while the market price was stable until 11th of June.
This development can be explained twofold: On the one hand, new information
may have been available which was integrated in transaction prices by the traders.
On the other hand, traders may have played the market in order to manipulate the
outcome or followed other motives which are described in Section 3.1.2. In case of
Twitterinfo, the peak on the day before market close was caused by only a single
trader who pushed the price from a level of one currency unit up to 80 currency
units in the early morning. Later that day, other traders noticed the distortion and
adjusted the price back to the level before. If the market had been closed that day
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Figure 5.12: Time Serie: Twitterinfo
in the morning, the final price would have been distorted by only one trader, which
seems not very “confident” to decision makers. Therefore, the last transaction price
does not have to be the best representation of the stock’s value. Hence, further
information about how the price formed is desirable, especially for events that do
not have a defined outcome, e.g., in innovation contexts.
Thus, a confidence score is developed in the following in order to provide further
information about how trade prices evolve. Several aspects are considered useful as
input for the confidence score such as the number of unique traders, the volatility of
stock prices and the number of trades. In the next section, the development of the
confidence score is described, before it is evaluated based on the dataset introduced
in Chapter 4. It provides an appropriate basis for the evaluation since the final
outcomes of the events are known and, therefore, the quality of the confidence score
can be evaluated. After the evaluation, the confidence score is applied to the dataset
from the EnBW experiment.
5.3.4.1 Confidence Score Development
In order to obtain information about “how” the price of contracts has formed,
several market parameters can be considered. For example, the total number of
trades indicates if different traders “agree” with the actual price. For instance, if
the number of trades in a certain period of time is low, it can be assumed that
traders do not think that the price must be adapted to their estimation – or they
have other motives as stated in Section 3.1.2. If the number of trades is more
frequent, traders perceive the actual price differing to their estimations and start
trading. Therefore, besides low overall participation in markets, which can be also
a reason for low trading activity, a low number of trades may indicate that traders
perceive a consensus given sufficient liquidity.
Another parameter which is interesting to be considered and indicates how many
people represent the actual prices is the number of unique traders. Unique traders
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are single persons involved in the price formation process, no matter how many
trades they did. From a decision maker’s point of view, it is worth knowing how
many different traders were involved in the price discovery process. For example, one
single trader can cause a price which only represents his estimation. The aggregated
estimations of many traders which come to a consensus is a much more valuable
piece of information for decision makers in terms of how many people support this
price. Thus, the unique number of traders could be considered for the confidence
score.
Furthermore, the number of trades per trader is an indicator for the development
of the confidence score. This parameter is indirectly linked to the volume which
is traded. Traders can, on the one hand, submit one order with a high volume
to change the price. On the other hand, they can split up their order with the
same volume into several smaller orders with the same effect. The difference is the
information they reveal to other traders. If they see one order with a high volume,
they may assume that the submitting trader has valuable information and tries to
integrate it via only one order. In the other case, submitting several smaller orders to
the market does not support such an interpretation (Schwartz et al. 2006). Hence,
it cannot be determined why traders choose their number of trades or volume and,
thus, these measures are of limited usefulness for the creation of a confidence score.
The volatility of prices indicates the deviation of stock prices from the average. It
can be assumed if the volatility, which can be measured by the standard deviation,
is low, traders agree to some extent with the actual market price – given sufficient
liquidity. If the volatility is high, traders disagree and no consensus can be expected.
Thus, the volatility level is a very useful indicator for the overall level of consensus
among traders. Even if the fundamental value changes and the stock price con-
verges to a new level, the volatility measure then adapts this change and increases.
Once several changes of the fundamental value occurs, the volatility increases and
indicates a high level of uncertainty. Hence, a stock price’ time series with a high
volatility can be interpreted that traders did not come to a consensus and, thus, the
prediction of this stock is uncertain compared to a stock showing low volatility. For
the measurement of volatility of stock j, the standard deviation (sj) is used, which
is depicted in Equation (5.1), where Eij denotes the observed values in a time serie
j, Mj denotes the average value of it and nj denotes the number of observations.
sj =
¿ÁÁÁÁÀ n∑i=1(Eij −Mj)2
nj − 1 (5.1)
Several patterns of time series can be identified. Experiment data from Chapters 4
and 5 were analyzed and the following patterns could be identified.
● Up —
Stock prices rise over time.
● Down —
Stock prices fall over time. E.g., in Figure A.1(d).
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● V —
Stock prices fall down and then rise again – and vice versa, e.g., Figure A.4(a).
The V-characteristic can be broader or narrower. Figure A.4(a) is an example
for a narrow V pattern whereas Figure A.4(c) is an example for a broader V
pattern. This pattern also applies to time series where the price rises first and
then decreases.● ZigZag —
Stock prices alternate in periods of rising and falling. E.g., Figure A.3(a),
Figure A.3(d) or Figure B.10.● Plateau —
Stock prices remain at a plateau and do not rise or fall heavily. E.g., Figure B.7
or Figure B.10.
Several patterns may occur in combination with other patterns. In order to
classify these patterns to a time series, it can be determined if a sequence of trades
is observable. One way is to analyze the sequence of buy or sell transactions. If
a majority of consecutive buy or sell transactions moved the stock price into one
direction or if the sequence is of minor impact, the interpretation of it can be used
for the classification.
The classification of time series into the proposed patterns is the first step in
order to derive a level of confidence which can be provided to decision makers in
a single measure. Therefore, each pattern shows certain characteristics regarding
the number of trades as well as the volatility. The number of unique traders can
also be interpreted in this context. However, it does not change the course of the
stock price and is therefore disregarded. Hence, the confidence score considers the
number of traders as well as the volatility of time series. Table 5.8 shows the
expected characteristics of the proposed patterns.
Table 5.8: Characteristics of Patterns for Time Series
Pattern # of Trades Volatility
Up medium/high medium
Down medium/high medium
V high high
ZigZag high high
Plateau low/medium/high low
From a decision maker’s point of view, stock prices showing a low volatility and
a medium or high number of trades seem more confident as a representation than
stock prices showing high volatility and a low number of traders. Confident stock
prices can be expected for patterns like Plateau, Up and Down where the level
of uncertainty is moderate. In highly volatile time series, one cannot expect that
traders agree in a consensus and, therefore, decision makers have to interpret it
carefully. In extreme cases, trades can be conducted by only one trader. Therefore,
the total number of unique traders is also important to decision makers and indicates
how many traders are involved in the price discovery process. In both investigations
in Sections 5.3.4.2 and 5.3.4.3, the number of unique traders does not add further
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information since the number of unique traders is on average equal in each stock.
Table 5.9 illustrates the classification matrix.
Table 5.9: Classification Matrix
Volatility
low medium high
# of Trades
low c d e
medium b c d
high a b c
With this classification, contracts can be tagged based on their combination of
volatility and their number of trades. In the following, the number of trades and
the volatility is equally weighted. Depending of the dataset, input parameters can
be weighted based upon their importance. For example, if prices show balanced
volatility, the number of trades can be prioritized by a weighting factor. In addition,
the classification can be conducted for several periods of the market duration, for
instance, the last two trading days, the last trading week and so on to put more
influence on recent periods which cover more information as mentioned earlier. This
classification also maps both input parameters to a number, for instance 1-5, where
1 is represented by the green color and 5 is represented by the red color. One can
also use other or more (weighted) input parameters for the classification like traded
volume, but this depends on the type of data and is to be decided individually. In
this work, the two described input parameters are used. Equation 5.2 shows the
categorization function where the numbers are associated with the colors as follows:
a → dark green, b → light green, c → yellow, d → orange, e → red.
f(Volatilita¨t, Anzahl Transaktionen)→ (a (++), b (+), c (#), d (−), e (−−)) (5.2)
In order to assign a confidence score to stocks, the input data is characterized
separately. First, stocks are sorted by the number of trades in a descending order.
Second, one third of stocks with the highest number of trades is marked “high”, the
second third with a medium number of trades is marked“medium”and the third with
the lowest number of trades is marked with “low”. Then, the same characterization
is conducted with the second input parameter. As mentioned, low volatility is in this
investigation considered as more confident than high volatility. Thus, high volatility
is decreasing the confidence score. The result is the combination of rankings which is
described in Table 5.9. For instance, the stock with a high number of trades and low
volatility is sorted into the dark green cell on the lower left marked with character
“a” and so on. In the following section, the results from the experiment introduced
in Chapter 4 serve as the evaluation dataset in order to test the classification before
the dataset in this chapter is finally categorized and discussed.
Another approach to map the input parameters to the classification numbers
is the usage of Fuzzy Logic13. In some cases, the mapping of stocks cannot be
13For details about Fuzzy Logic refer to Klir and Yuan (1995) and http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/logic-fuzzy
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determined precisely following the mapping mentioned in Equation 5.2. Two stocks
can be very similar regarding their number of trades and volatility, but one of them
is characterized as a “b” and the other as “c”. The mentioned mapping presumes
that stocks can be characterized precisely. Since the characterization is based on
relative values of the whole dataset and does not refer to an absolute fixed point
for volatility and number of trades, stocks can range between two numbers. Thus,
Fuzzy Logic can be applied whenever a mathematical correlation between input
and output parameters cannot be exactly described. In contrast to “crisp logic”,
where parameters are classified exactly based on binary decisions, a fuzzy approach
classifies input parameters approximately rather than accurately. In this work, the
application of Fuzzy Logic is not described and is left as future work. In addition,
the characterization can also be conducted via Neuronal Networks14, which are also
promising to be investigated. In the following, the evaluation of the confidence score
is described.
5.3.4.2 Evaluation of the Confidence Score
As described in Section 5.3.4.1, the categorization of stocks based on volatility and
trading activity measures provides valuable additional information about how stock
prices evolved. The development of the categorization was necessary since the results
of the field experiment at EnBW cannot be paid out according to actual outcomes
of events, which do not occur in innovation contexts. Therefore, decision makers
need additional information of how “confident” a stock price is. In order to evaluate
the categorization presented in Section 5.3.4.1, the dataset from the experiment
introduced in Chapter 4 is used since the characterization can be compared to the
real outcomes.
In order to evaluate if the confidence score operates confidently, an analysis
of characteristic patterns derived from the observable patterns mentioned in Sec-
tion 5.3.4.1 will be described in the following. Table 5.10 illustrates the input data.
In the pattern column, the name of the pattern as well as a thumbnail of the price
evolution is shown.
Table 5.11 illustrates the application of the test patterns according to the confi-
dence score. In Section 5.3.4.3, the application of the confidence score is conducted
for the EnBW dataset.
As one can see, the confidence score classifies each pattern into a cell in the matrix.
The confidence score classifies all input data relative to the whole dataset, which
means that a red classified pattern is the “worst” in the classification, but does not
need to be absolute worse. Therefore, the confidence score identifies “confident”
stocks in a given dataset.
In order to apply the categorization to a real world dataset, the data of the group
phase from the experiment described in Chapter 4 was taken. Stock prices were used
14Neuronal networks provide a classification which is to be learned based on a training dataset.
Once a neuronal network is trained, it is capable of processing input parameters to a certain
output based on the logic covered in the training dataset. For example, time series with known
volatility and known number of trades can be combined to a training dataset to set up the
neuronal networks. Afterwards, new datasets can be processed via the neuronal network in
order to obtain a classification matrix according to Table 5.9.
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Table 5.10: Evaluation of the Confidence Score
No. Pattern Volatility # Trades
1 Plateau 1 2,24 65
2 Plateau 2 0,00 30
3 Plateau 3 2,24 100
4 ZigZag 1 4,00 110
5 ZigZag 2 3,00 70
6 ZigZag 3 2,00 40
7 V 1 3,74 60
8 V 2 4,58 80
9 V 3 5,48 50
10 Cont. 1 3,16 55
11 Cont. 2 3,54 75
12 Cont. 3 2,35 40
Table 5.11: Classification Matrix - Test Evaluation
Volatility
low medium high
# of Trades
low 2, 6 12 9
medium 1 5, 10 4, 7
high 3 11 8
from the beginning of the group phase till the outcome of the event was available.
Furthermore, the input data for the classification was clustered into four periods
which were the last trading prices, the average last trading day, the average last two
trading days as well as the last average trading week. The prices during the last
trading day are used in multiple clusters and, thus, get more weight in the overall
classification which calculates the average of all used periods. This is to ensure that
the development of earlier trading days is also considered and, thus, not only the last
trading activities are used. As already mentioned, considering only the last trading
day may lead to an inappropriate representation of the evolution of prices as it is
in case of Figure 5.12. The results of the categorization are shown in Table 5.12.
Table 5.12: Classification Matrix - Evaluation 1/2
Volatility
low medium high
# of Trades
low 2, 12 1, 3, 8
medium 14, 15 6 5, 7
high 10 4, 9 11, 13, 16
The categorization in Table 5.12 follows the same rules as described in Sec-
tion 5.3.4.1. Stocks with high/medium/low volatility as well as high/medium/low
trading activity are categorized in a matrix similar to Table 5.9. After the stocks
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were put into the matrix based on the classified input parameters, the ranking of all
stocks after the group phase is colored according to the matrix shown in Table 5.13.
Table 5.13: Classification Matrix - Evaluation 2/2
Stock Winner (Last Price) Final Round
12 95.52 4
3 90.00 4
15 80.00 4
9 64.41 4
16 61.24 4
5 58.68
11 54.00 4
1 52.12
6 43.20
7 29.94 4
13 29.56
14 25.95 4
8 25.08
2 21.00
10 08.02
4 00.04
As one can see, traders were right in their forecast of which team will reach the
final round in 6 out of 8 cases. The dark green color indicates that traders assessed
stocks with the lowest volatility and the highest number of trades and so on. The
red color indicates that the evolution of stock prices was based on extremely high
volatile trading activity and a very low number of trades, which was not the case
in this dataset. The two light green stocks in the third and fourth place indicate
that these stocks were traded with low or medium volatility and at least medium
number of trades which indicates that traders were confident that these teams will
reach the final round. In case of stock 10, traders were very confident that the
team will not reach the final round. In this case, Switzerland was the only team
which did not win one of the first two matches and therefore dropped out of the
tournament early. In case of stock 4, traders showed a strong consensus that this
team will drop. Stock 14 is also classified as confident whereas it was predicted
wrong. In this case, traders constantly misinterpreted the likelihood that Turkey
will make it although they won two of their three group phase matches. Stock 3 is
also characterized as less confident, although the stock price is extremely high and
therefore, traders were confident that this team will make it to the finals but were
not sure about the exact likelihood. All charts of the field experiment are depicted
in Appendix A, Figures A.1 - A.6.
As mentioned, the evolution of stock prices shows different patterns over time. For
example, Figure A.1(d) showed a consensus that Switzerland drops out of the group
phase and shows a downward slope of the stock price which matches the “Down”-
pattern as described in Table 5.8. In case of Spain, the patterns follow a downslope
at the beginning once Spain won the second game and an upslope afterwards which is
similar to the “V”-pattern described in Table 5.8. In order to add such information
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about the evolution of prices, the characteristic of stock prices during the group
phase have to be analyzed to add further information in addition to the colors. The
examples of Switzerland and Spain indicate that the characteristic of stock prices
reveals, if traders showed a consensus during the market period or if they thought
that the probability of reaching the final round changed heavily. Heavy changes
in the estimation of traders result in high volatility in trading activity. Thus, the
confidence score is capable of characterizing stocks according to their volatility and
the number of traded shares.
Stocks close to a price of 50 currency units indicate that this team is close to reach
the final round. Therefore, stocks ranging in the middle of the ranking are hard to
interpret. Thus, additional information can be added via the analysis of how this
price formed over time. Hence, one has to regard the evolution of stock prices in
terms of how many traders caused a change and how stock prices moved up or down
in a certain period of time. Altogether, traders may either predict correctly with a
high level of confidence or wrong with a high level of confidence whereas the second
case is fatal. On the other hand, stocks showing low confidence reveals that traders
do not agree about the likelihood of the events. Thus, low confidence should also
be treated carefully. In the following, the confidence score is applied to the dataset
from the EnBW experiment introduced in this chapter.
5.3.4.3 Application to the EnBW Dataset
For the classification, six periods were chosen to be used in order to put weight
on the periods close to the end of the market which comprise actual information as
stated in Section 3.1.1. The periods are defined as follows:
● 1 day before market close (t−1)● 7 days before market close (t−7)● 14 days before market close (t−14)● Period: 1 day to market close (t−1; t0)● Period: 7 days to market close (t−7; t0)● Period: 14 days to market close (t−14; t0)
The first three periods are based on daily average values for the number of trades
and standard deviation. For the second three periods, the volatility as well as the
number of trades where humans were involved have been calculated on an average
basis. As mentioned, several periods build the basis for the analysis to capture the
trading history and to put weight to the periods close to the end of the trading
period.
In order to combine values like standard deviations, the relevant transaction prices
were also tested for stationarity. A stationarity test indicates how the means and
variances of time series change over time. If time series are stationary, it can be
assumed that trading prices show a stable course over time and can therefore be
expected to be representative for a certain time. As seen in Figure 5.12, the trading
price changed rapidly on the last day. On the days before the market ended, the
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trading price was stable and did not change noticeably. The results of the station-
arity test show that all contracts are stationary based on their trading sequence.
Hence, the time series can be used for further analysis. The test was conducted
with a Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and a Phillips-Perron test (Dickey and Fuller
1979; Phillips and Perron 1988).
The results of the investigation for volatility and the number of trades are depicted
in Table 5.14. The four most volatile shares are colored red, the four medium volatile
shares are colored yellow and the four shares with the lowest volatility are colored
green. Regarding the number of trades, the four most traded shares are colored
green, the four medium traded shares are colored yellow and the four lowest traded
shares on average are colored red.
Table 5.14: Volatility and # of Trades: Shares can be categorized based on their
characteristics of volatility and the number of how often they were
traded. Often traded shares are colored green, medium traded shares
are colored yellow whereas lowest traded shares are colored red. In case
of volatility, shares with the highest volatility are colored red, medium
volatility is colored yellow and low volatility is colored green.
Stock Volatility # of Trades
1 20.71 52
2 4.54 97
3 3.30 42
4 4.17 21
5 17.00 25
6 7.77 58
7 0.98 28
8 3.90 74
9 0.45 7
10 8.24 57
11 5.90 11
12 2.59 48
Table 5.15: Classification Matrix
Volatility
low medium high
# of Trades
low 7,9 4,11 5
medium 3,12 1
high 2,8 6,10
The results of the classification are applied to the classification matrix and are
shown in Table 5.15. Shares with a high volatility marked in red color in Table 5.14
are categorized in the right column named“high”. If the volatility was low, indicated
by green color, the share is categorized in the left column named “low”. The same
applies to the number of trades in Table 5.14. For instance, a high number of traded
shares indicated by green color is categorized in the last row whereas a low number
5.3 Experiment Results 125
of traded shares marked with red color is categorized in the first row named “low” in
Table 5.15. The result of the confidence score are transferred to the market results
which are usually delivered to decision makers and are shown in Table 5.16.
Table 5.16: Decision Makers vs. Enterprise Information Market - enhanced
Rank Decision Makers Information Market
1 Web 2.0 Poster All in one
2 xing@enbw.com MEREGIO Platform
3 All in one Web 2.0 Poster
4 Intelligent Calendar Management xing@enbw.com
5 Twitterinfo Parallel Document Processing
6 Mobile Metering Hardware Inventory
7 Parallel Document Processing Mobile Metering
8 MEREGIO Platform Home Automation
9 Home Automation New Contact Networking
10 Digitizing Business Cards Intelligent Calendar Management
11 Hardware Inventory Digitizing Business Cards
12 New Contact Networking Twitterinfo
As one can see, shares with a high volatility and a low number of shares can
be easily identified. The ranking is based on last transaction prices and with the
colors, it provides additional information to executives and decision makers about
how “confident”prices are in relation to the remaining contracts. The ranking based
on last transaction prices was chosen since last transaction prices are assumed to
comprise the latest available information before the market was closed. The line
between the fifth and sixth rank indicated the initial price of contracts. Contracts
above this line increased their price and vice versa. It can be concluded, that traders
were confident that contracts ranked 7 and 8 are below the issued price and contracts
ranked 2 and 4 are above the issued price. Green colors indicate that the number of
trades was high and volatility was low in relation to other shares. In contrast, the
contract ranked 10 showed a low number of trades and a high volatility. Therefore,
traders were either not able to assess this innovation alternative or several traders
did not come to a consensus which lead to high volatility. This indicates that
decision makers have to assess results carefully which are “less confident” based in
employees’ assessment.
In summary, the results proposed in Table 5.7 can be enhanced and evaluated
with the introduced confidence score. The results shown in Table 5.16 reveal that
the ranking comprises two middle valued contracts (yellow) and two positive val-
ued contracts (green) within the first four ranks. Altogether, the confidence score
provides additional information to decision makers about the confidence of traders’
assessments. In future work, the refinement of the confidence score is promising in
order to include additional input data like traded volumes or detailed results from
a lead user analysis in Equation (5.2) and to provide even more sophisticated char-
acterization results, e.g., through the application of pattern recognition algorithms.
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5.4 Conclusion
The results of this section show that Information Markets motivated employees
in using them and, thus, they traded continuously (c. Section 5.3.1.1). Further-
more, market participants approved the method of Information Markets and used
it frequently (c. Section 5.3.2.2). The results of a survey among participants indi-
cate that most of the participants assess the method of Information Markets as a
good one (cp. Table 5.11). Table 5.17 summarizes the results based on the design
objectives stated in Section 5.2.
Table 5.17: Summary of Results
Design Objective Result
1 a) Trading activity equally spread over time  
1 b) Traders are active during market duration  
1 c) Employees are motivated in using the EIM G#
2 a) Employees assess the method of EIM positively  
2 b) The EIM is accepted and actively used  
2 c) EnBW can better assess innovations via EIM  
3 Results of the EIM do not differ to Experts   statisfied, G# partly satisfied, # not satisfied
Moreover, the results of Section 5.3.2.2 show that the results of the Information
Market and the expert panel overlap in three innovations, which indicates that
in this field experiment the results differ only slightly between the EIM and the
decision makers. The situation could have been different, if the market results
differed heavily from the results of the expert panel and hit case (2) or (3) described
in Table 5.6. Then, the decision makers have to take further actions like hiring
an external consultant or involve other people capable of providing an additional
independent ranking. Another action could be to invite the identified Lead Users
described in Section 5.3.1.2 to an expert round and discuss their motives.
After the market closed, the results were discussed with decision makers. Fi-
nally, two innovations were implemented at EnBW. The implementation of “Web
2.0 Poster” was finished within the second half of the year 2009. “xing@enbw.com”
won one out of three innovation vouchers worth 25.000e in an internal award pro-
cedure and is going to be implemented shortly. In total, ten innovation contenders
applied for the three vouchers. Therefore, the results of the market supported the
results of the decision makers strongly.
Figure 5.13 shows, which success factors are mostly relevant for change manage-
ment (Jørgensen et al. 2008). The three top categories can be addressed with an
EIM. Interestingly, the top aspect is the sponsorship of the top management. In
Section 5.3.1.2, executives were identified as lead users. If the top management
is involved in innovation processes as lead users, this can be interpreted as a very
strong sponsorship and shows the commitment of the top management.
The second success factor, named “Employee involvement” can also be addressed
with Enterprise Information Markets. Employees were invited to join the market,
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Monetary and non-monetary Incentives
Soft Factors
Hard Factors
Figure 5.13: Success Factors of Change Management
Adapted from Jørgensen et al. (2008)
if they were interested in providing their estimations to the market. As shown
in Section 5.3.1.1, they traded continuously and actively over the market duration.
Furthermore, honest and timely communication is another essential success factor in
change management. The market can be considered as communication method, as
described in Section 3.2.2, because employees can “communicate” their estimations
through their trading activity. Often, employees do not communicate their true
estimations because they may fear consequences from their managers, if they have
“negative” information. In Information Markets, participants are anonymous and
may fearlessly communicate even “negative” information.
Often, the success of change processes is directly connected with the culture of a
company, as described in Section 2. EnBW uses Information Markets in order to
involve employees actively, which indicates a very open company culture. Often,
employees cannot be involved in innovation processes due to complexity aspects in
managing thousands of employees via questionnaires or online surveys. Informa-
tion Markets are a very scalable method to involve a large number of employees
efficiently. The market mechanism aggregated new information continuously and
employees participated actively, which indicates a culture that motivates employees
to participate and involves them in innovation processes.
Altogether, the Information Market was a new way for the EnBW to involve
their employees in innovation processes and provide a sustainable method after the
innovation workshop. The experiment catches on so that the EnBW wants to have
another Information Market. The very valuable knowledge of employees is now a key
main pillar in their innovation process. Therefore, besides the positive feedback in
the survey, the next Information Market will be as successful as the one introduced
in this chapter and may confirm the results shown in this work.

Part III
Finale

6 Conclusion
I
n this thesis, Information Markets were introduced in innovation contexts as
a method for the assessment of innovation alternatives. The easy integration
of employees, customers and consultants as well as the continuous forecasting
and information aggregation capabilities of Information Markets are promising to
deliver valuable information to decision makers in companies. But Information
Markets may suffer from low trading activity and, thus, illiquid Information Markets
may lead to inappropriate results. Hence, the usage of automated market maker
mechanisms was investigated in order to foster useful results. Two main objectives
were investigated in this thesis. The main research questions stated in Section 1.1
can be briefly summarized as follows whereas R1 and R2 amalgamates whenever
small-sized Information Markets are threatened by illiquidity.
R1: Do Information Markets show more trading activity, increased ac-
curacy, less error and higher information efficiency utilizing automated
market makers?
The impact of automated market maker mechanisms in Information Markets was
evaluated in a field experiment predicting the outcomes of soccer matches. Two
identical markets were set up, whereas one market employed an automated market
maker mechanism while the other one did not. The results of both markets were
compared to the outcome of soccer matches during the European Soccer Champi-
onship in 2008. The result of the comparison indicated that the overall accuracy
of the automated market maker market was equally accurate as betting odds from
wetten.de and more accurate than forecasts derived from the FIFA world ranking.
Compared to the parallel market without market maker mechanisms, the trading
activity was higher and the market itself showed increased information efficiency.
Based on the results of R1, another field experiment was set up to investigate the
application of Information Markets for the assessment of innovations, which was
addressed by R2.
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R2: How to design and operate Information Markets for innovation as-
sessment in companies?
The usage of Information Markets in companies is a delicate field of applica-
tion. The employment of Information Markets influences the business culture and
therefore, it has to be investigated how Information Markets can be designed and
operated in order to be accepted by employees as well as decision makers. The re-
sults of the field experiment in an innovation context at EnBW Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
showed, that employees accepted the Information Market as a valuable tool for the
assessment of innovations. Furthermore, the market results aligned with the results
of the survey for decision makers. This indicated that the innovation alternatives
were assessed coherently. Altogether, the proposed market design as well as the
design of the automated market maker, as a result of R1, turned out to be useful
and enabled the success of the field experiment.
In the following, Section 6.1 summarizes the key findings during the course of this
work. Afterwards, Section 6.2 discusses the limitations of the approach. Section 6.3
gives an outlook on complementary research and future work.
6.1 Summary of the Key Findings
In this thesis, Information Markets were introduced as a method for the assess-
ment of innovations in an enterprise context. Up to now, only a little number of
research articles reported findings and experiences from this field of application.
While the challenges, the functioning as well as the implications for the application
of Information Markets in enterprise contexts are not completely understood, so
far this work provides further findings for two application scenarios of Information
Markets. First, the performance of Information Markets in low liquidity situations
was analyzed via a field experiment during the European Soccer Championship in
2008. With the findings of this experiment an additional field experiment was con-
ducted in an industry innovation context at EnBW Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in order
to investigate how Information Markets perform in the assessment of innovation
alternatives. The presented work provides the following contributions:
1. The results of the field experiment for small-sized markets provide evidence
that Information Markets lead to more accurate results via the employment
of an automated market maker mechanism compared to small-size markets
without an automated market maker functionality. It furthermore analyzed
the impact on trading activity and information efficiency and showed that the
trading activity as well as the forecast accuracy increased with the automated
provisioning of liquidity. Furthermore, market efficiency increased whereas
the forecast error decreased.
2. This thesis provides evidence that Information Markets can be used in indus-
trial innovation contexts. Employees accept Information Markets as a method
for the aggregation of individual expectations and beliefs about innovation al-
ternatives. Moreover, employees and decision makers’ expectations can be
combined in order to get an aggregated reflection of estimations. Information
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Markets motivate employees to reveal their information and, thus, employees
assess the method of Information Markets as appropriate to evaluate innova-
tions alternatives.
After the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 emphasized the usage of Infor-
mation Markets for innovation assessment objectives. The state-of-the-art in In-
novation Management was described and the benefit of group decisions via Infor-
mation Markets against individual decisions was shown. The application potential
of Information Markets to support the communication of stakeholders in a market
mechanism was illustrated. Furthermore, traditional methods for decision mak-
ing commonly used in innovation contexts were compared to Information Markets,
whereas advantages of them, e.g., the involvement of stakeholders and the integra-
tion of employees, as well as challenges regarding the business culture were high-
lighted. In addition, it was explained that Information Markets can be applied in
inter-organizational innovation contexts (Business Networks) where “open innova-
tion” enables their implementation and, thus, support (group) decision making even
across companies boundaries.
In order to provide a comprehensive introduction of market systems, Chapter 3
highlighted the fundamentals of markets, e.g., the efficient market hypothesis and
trader’s motives. Market engineering as a research direction was illustrated to sup-
port market designers to identify vital aspects to be considered while setting up
Information Markets. In addition, the functionality of Information Markets in con-
trast to financial markets was described. Relevant design parameters like the design
of contracts or the selection of traders were discussed and the utmost importance to
design contracts carefully was highlighted in order to keep them easy to understand
and intuitive to interpret. Incentive schemes need to be clearly defined to allow
traders the interpretation along the market objective and to motivate them. Fur-
thermore, to assess the outcome of Information Markets, useful measures to describe
market liquidity and information efficiency were introduced. Moreover, mechanisms
for automated market making were illustrated and compared against each other
considering their practicability, transparency and liquidity provision capability. In
essence, a CDA mechanism with an automated marker maker functionality was cho-
sen to be implemented in the field experiments in Chapters 4 and 5. In order to
show futurity application potential of Information Markets in inter-organizational
contexts, the usage of Information Markets as an essential part of innovation man-
agement in the TEXO research project was described as well.
In Chapter 4, the results of a field experiment to investigate low liquidity mar-
kets were described. Therefore, the experiment design was highlighted including
the decisions on market design and the used market maker mechanism. After the
introduction of descriptive statistics, hypotheses were stated in order to investigate
research question R1. The first research hypothesis analyzed the trading activity
of traders during the experiment. The results of the comparison of both markets
showed, that the trading activity in the market maker market was significantly
higher compared to the non-market maker market. Moreover, the forecasting accu-
racy was also higher whereas the forecasting error was lower, which was investigated
via according research hypotheses. The hypothesis concerning the information ef-
ficiency, which was measured via an arbitrage trading analysis, revealed that the
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market maker market showed a significant increase of information efficiency. After-
wards, a conclusion summarized the contributions of the chapter.
Based on the results of Chapter 4, the use of Information Markets in an industrial
context was studied in Chapter 5. During a field experiment at EnBW Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, an Information Market was implemented in order to assess innovation
alternatives by employees. At the beginning of the chapter, the experiment design
was described followed by design objectives for the investigation of research question
R2. R2 was supported by three design objectives which were the analysis of trader’s
activity, motivation as well as the results of the Information Market compared to
decision makers. It was shown that the trading activity was constantly observable.
The most active trader did more than 1.000 trades during the experiment, which was
not expected. Survey results as well as the trading activity showed that traders were
motivated to use Information Markets, whereas they also perceive a non negligible
effort. Since, the effort and the motivation of traders were negative correlated, this
result indicated that further improvements of Information Market’s usability would
lead to a higher motivation. In addition, the result of the third design objective
showed that the top three innovations from decision makers were also assessed within
the top four innovation alternatives in the Information Market which indicated that
employees as well as decision makers showed a coherent assessment. Moreover, a lead
user analysis revealed that even executives were actively trading amongst the most
active traders. Hence, executives showed their interest to use Information Markets
for innovation assessment. The conclusion then summarized the contributions of
Chapter 5.
6.2 Limitations of the Approach
In this work, field experiments were conducted in order to collect the results
presented. Results of a field experiment, in contrast to laboratory experiments or
simulations, are conducted in an uncontrollable environment where external effects
influence the experiment results. In a laboratory experiment, external effects can be
controlled. It may occur that the same market mechanisms in a repeated field ex-
periment would leads to other results than reported in this work. Nevertheless, this
work provides evidence that in both presented field experiments Information Mar-
kets produced appropriate results concerning the objectives of the market. Thus,
the general applicability needs to be further evaluated via experiments and investi-
gations.
In the field experiments presented, people participated and were supposed to re-
veal their true beliefs and expectations. In scientific literature, it is assumed that
traders behave rationally and follow rational behavior patterns. But in reality, they
sometimes do not, as reported in this work. In a field experiment as well as in
financial markets, traders have individual motives, risk aversion levels and individ-
ual incentives which cannot be anticipated and regarded in the experiment design.
Sometimes, these motives go beyond rationality and, therefore, several behavior pat-
terns, e.g., those from noise traders, cannot be explained completely because some
motives have not been covered by market models, yet (De Long et al. 1990). Effects
of noise trading are normally counteracted by arbitrageurs. Hence, the results pre-
sented in this work may be aﬄicted in some parts due to trading behavior of noise
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traders while arbitrageurs were not quick enough to counteract. For example, one
trader tried to raise the market price in the presented Information Market in Chap-
ter 4 way beyond to what is rational.1 Those effects were unfortunately reflected
in the results. Other traders brought the price back to a normal level within sev-
eral hours. In order to investigate behavior patterns or regard them in the results,
several pre-tests have to be conducted to learn, e.g., risk aversion levels or motives
of each individual trader, which is hardly feasible during a field experiment with
only a few traders. The risk of losing traders by bothering them with mandatory
questionnaires is to be balanced with the benefit of having them actively trading in
Information Markets without knowing their motives exactly.
In this work, the automated market maker mechanism was designed to provide
liquidity at any time in both field experiments. The intention was to show that even
a simple automated mechanism fosters accurate trading activity and accuracy as well
as information efficiency. The algorithms of the market maker employed reactive
strategies and traders tried to play them. Therefore, the possibility of a distortion
or manipulation of the markets cannot be fully eliminated. The focus of this work
was to evaluate the impact of automated market making on Information Markets
rather than to identify the optimal algorithm design. Hence, more sophisticated
algorithms are promising to deliver even more robust results than reported in this
work.
Furthermore, the payout of contracts in innovation contexts cannot be deter-
mined. Information Markets provide a snapshot of estimations and beliefs from
traders. If a company has to decide which innovation they should go for, it is
left unclear if the chosen one is most beneficial because not all innovations can be
evaluated due to economic constraints. Thus, the results of the conducted field
experiment were compared to survey results from decision makers in order to eval-
uate if the market results deviate from those of decision makers. In this context,
the market results were inline with those of decision makers. As an alternative, it
was intended to use an Information Market for experts in parallel to the market
for employees in order to use the market results as payout function for the other
market. Unfortunately, the market for experts could not be applied as a benchmark
due to extremely low trading activity.
6.3 Complementary Research & Future Work
As stated in this work, Information Markets are used in Innovation Management
frameworks, e.g., the TEXO research project. It is interesting to further inves-
tigate Information Markets in cross-organizational contexts. Nowadays, Business
Networks are in their infancy and therefore, once these networks are more ma-
ture, they seem to be a promising field of application for Information Markets.
Inter-organizational contexts offer a variety of opportunities for the application of
Information Markets since companies are working together for the creation of value.
Thus, Business Networks will become a promising field of application, not only for
innovation assessment.
1The trader submits an order to raise the market price up to 5.000 currency units, whereas the
maximum payout was 100 currency units.
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Moreover, the field experiment at EnBW Baden-Wu¨rttemberg will be continued
in late 2010. The usage of Information Markets in order to integrate employees
in innovation contexts at EnBW was considered as a very good approach and will
therefore be repeated. The experience of the first experiment will be used to set up
an improved Information Market. Hence, it is interesting to gain further evidence for
the successful application of Information Markets in an industry context. Improved
user interface techniques, adapted market maker mechanisms as well as revised
incentive mechanisms will be investigated in order to confirm the success of the first
experiment.
Furthermore, partly based on the insights of this thesis, Information Markets are
currently under investigation in order to forecast economic indicators like Inflation,
Exports, etc. (Teschner et al. 2011). It would be highly interesting to combine
market results with other methods of forecasting like Delphi Studies, Surveys or
historical data. Results from one method may serve as input for others and, thus,
provide further information to participants. The implementation of several methods
seems promising in order to compare results of different groups to assure consistent
results among methods. In academia, several reports state that the combination
of different forecasting methods improves the overall forecasting accuracy (Graefe
et al. 2009). Thus, further investigation on the combination of different methods
like Delphi Studies, Information Markets and historic social sentiments studies are
interesting as well. For instance, one can analyze the effect of providing results from
one method as input for another method and, thus, identify synergy potentials and
reciprocal effects.
In Section 5.3.4, the results of the investigation about the confidence of traders
(Confidence Score) in Information Markets is based on several input factors. It
provides valuable additional information to decision makers. In future steps, the
identification and interpretation of trading patterns can be improved, e.g., via pat-
tern matching techniques (Pavel 1993; Duda et al. 2001). Moreover, the confidence
score can be enhanced using additional input factors like trading volumes or results
derived from single trader analysis of lead users. In addition, using a fuzzy approach
for the categorization seems promising since in some cases one cannot exactly dis-
tinct if a stock is characterized more accurately in other cells of the confidence score
presented in Section 5.3.4. In addition, fuzzy logic or a neural network approach
may also provide appropriate characterization results of stocks in the confidence
score. These promising approaches are capable of categorizing input values which
cannot be characterized exactly and are, therefore, interesting to investigate in this
context.
Concerning the investigation in low liquidity markets in Chapter 4, further exper-
iments should be conducted in order to confirm the results presented in this work.
Other types of incentive schemes as well as different variations of automated market
maker mechanisms can be the focus of further research. In Section 3.3.4, several
mechanisms for automated market making were introduced which can be compared
to each other in order to analyze the benefits of each mechanism in detail.
This work investigated the usage of Information Markets in an innovation context
in Chapter 5. In scientific literature, Information Markets were already used in new
product development or sales forecasting contexts. It is interesting to identify other
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fields of application in enterprise contexts in order to support decision making. This
fosters the need to further research incentive schemes. Experts seem to be reluctant
to use additional methods besides their own established approaches. They notice
Information Markets as a threat and not as an additional way to come to better
decisions. Therefore, the further development of incentive schemes for industry
usage is a very interesting field of research. For example, monetary incentives may
have a different impact on managers compared to regular workers. Other incentives
like leave days or awards may have a substantial impact on regular employees and
managers.
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(a) Portugal (b) Turkey
(c) Czech Republic (d) Switzerland
Figure A.1: Group Phase A
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(a) Croatia (b) Germany
(c) Austria (d) Poland
Figure A.2: Group Phase B
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(a) Netherlands (b) Italy
(c) Romania (d) France
Figure A.3: Group Phase C
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(a) Spain (b) Russia
(c) Sweden (d) Greece
Figure A.4: Group Phase D
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(a) Spain (b) Germany
(c) Russia (d) Turkey
Figure A.5: Finals 1/2
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(a) Italy (b) Netherlands
(c) Croatia (d) Portugal
Figure A.6: Finals 2/2
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In Figure A.7, the start screen of the Information Market is shown. On the left
hand side, the navigation bar allows the quick access to further pages, for instance,
the trading screen, the ranking or the depot. The navigation bar is visible at all
times. In the center, the content of each page is displayed. In the following, figures
of essential parts of the market system are zoomed in order to see the details,
therefore, the figures themselves do not reflect the market system view completely.
The market system supported German language.
Figure A.7: EM-Stoxx - Start Screen
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Figure A.8 shows the ranking. Each trader is listed based upon his individual
trading performance. It shows the user name, the depot value as well as the winning
chance which is explained in Section 4.1.1.
Figure A.8: EM-Stoxx - Ranking
Figure A.9 shows the SBT (AGB). The SBT had to be accepted by traders dur-
ing the online registration process. The SBT state that any attempt to defraud,
misbehavior, usage of automatic trading software etc. will be punished with market
disqualification.
Figure A.9: EM-Stoxx - Standard Businees Terms (SBT)
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In Figure A.10, the FAQ are shown. In the FAQ, frequently asked questions were
stated. Every question was linked to a section with answers in order to support
traders to get familiar with the functionalities of the market system, quickly.
Figure A.10: EM-Stoxx - Frequently Asked Questions
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In Figure A.11, the tutorial page is shown. In the tutorial, the basic functionalities
are described following an example. Essential buttons and graphics were highlighted
so that the trader could easily identify relevant information.
Figure A.11: EM-Stoxx - Tutorial
In Figure A.12 the howto is shown. The howto provided an in depth description of
all market functionalities. The essential concept of the market system, the available
markets, the endowment, the payout function etc. were described to allow traders
to consult the howto once they needed information to proceed trading.
Figure A.12: EM-Stoxx - HowTo
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Table A.1: MAE Group Phase: The MAE for the MM and NMM market can be calculated without distortions and after results were available if teams reached the finals or not. The
calculation is based at the point in time once it was determined if a team dropped during the group phase. The error is measured as the difference to the final payout value of
100 or 0 and is reported in percent (%) for each day and for each team.
Market Maker Market (MM)
Group Team 07 June 08 June 09 June 10 June 11 June 12 June 13 June 14 June 15 June 16 June 17 June 18 June
A
Portugal 0,38 0,18 0,24 0,17 0,15 0,14 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Turkey 0,58 0,66 0,77 0,82 0,92 0,72 0,71 0,71 0,74 0,00 0,00 0,00
Czech Republic 0,56 0,60 0,51 0,66 0,58 0,48 0,42 0,42 0,34 0,00 0,00 0,00
Switzerland 0,44 0,36 0,25 0,20 0,21 0,21 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
B
Croatia 0,40 0,40 0,31 0,18 0,30 0,43 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Germany 0,10 0,10 0,04 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,06 0,10 0,10 0,00 0,00
Austria 0,50 0,23 0,16 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,50 0,00 0,00
Poland 0,46 0,39 0,26 0,22 0,24 0,28 0,26 0,22 0,12 0,08 0,00 0,00
C
Netherlands 0,96 0,87 0,61 0,19 0,23 0,40 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Italy 0,32 0,15 0,12 0,28 0,26 0,26 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,49 0,00
Romania 0,45 0,38 0,25 0,19 0,22 0,22 0,37 0,32 0,19 0,15 0,21 0,00
France 0,81 0,81 0,81 0,45 0,45 0,71 0,65 0,59 0,44 0,40 0,18 0,00
D
Spain 0,23 0,23 0,02 0,12 0,20 0,31 0,17 0,17 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Russia 0,55 0,59 0,69 0,66 0,72 0,80 0,81 0,74 0,72 0,65 0,82 0,82
Sweden 0,46 0,42 0,31 0,39 0,63 0,40 0,37 0,40 0,46 0,64 0,63 0,63
Greece 0,47 0,42 0,31 0,22 0,14 0,15 0,24 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Average Error (%) 0,48 0,42 0,35 0,31 0,33 0,35 0,31 0,28 0,24 0,16 0,15 0,09
Non-Market Maker Market (NMM)
A
Portugal 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Turkey 0,44 0,53 0,71 0,80 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,00
Czech Republic 0,57 0,57 0,60 0,60 0,55 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,88 0,00 0,00 0,00
Suisse 0,59 0,29 0,35 0,12 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
B
Croatia 0,25 0,38 0,55 0,20 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Germany 0,05 0,14 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Austria 0,42 0,51 0,46 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,05 0,00 0,00
Poland 0,52 0,39 0,47 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,00 0,00
C
Netherlands 0,40 0,40 0,25 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Italy 0,12 0,18 0,13 0,13 0,21 0,21 0,30 0,30 0,35 0,00
Romania 0,45 0,49 0,49 0,05 0,30 0,26 0,26 0,26 0,26 0,26 0,00
France 0,86 0,72 0,95 0,95 0,73 0,73 0,40 1,00 1,00 0,00
D
Spain 0,55 0,55 0,14 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Russia 0,43 0,45 0,38 0,34 0,90 0,90 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,25
Sweden 0,80 0,65 0,67 0,41 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,95
Greece 0,40 0,50 0,46 0,30 0,05 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Average Error (%) 0,43 0,45 0,42 0,40 0,27 0,38 0,33 0,33 0,26 0,22 0,22 0,08
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Figure B.1: Price Chart: Twitterinfo
Figure B.2: Price Chart: MEREGIO Platform
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Figure B.3: Price Chart: Home Automation
Figure B.4: Price Chart: Parallel Document Processing
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Figure B.5: Price Chart: Intelligent Calendar Management
Figure B.6: Price Chart: Web 2.0 Poster
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Figure B.7: Price Chart: Digitizing Business Cards
Figure B.8: Price Chart: XingEnBW
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Figure B.9: Price Chart: New Contact Networking
Figure B.10: Price Chart: All in One
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Figure B.11: Price Chart: Hardware Inventory
Figure B.12: Price Chart: Mobile Metering
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Figure B.13: EnBW - Start Screen
Figure B.13 shows the start screen of the market. On the left hand side, nav-
igation sidebar enables easy access to the basic functionalities. In the middle, a
text explaining the objectives of the market is shown. Traders, accessing the mar-
ket for the first time, are informed about the motivation of the EnBW, why they
run the Information Market and what they expect from traders. Furthermore, it
is stated that two traders with the best performance will be rewarded with prizes.
The benchmark, how the performance of traders is measured, will be explained in
Section 5.3.2.
159
Figure B.14: EnBW - Market Overview
Figure B.15: EnBW - Order Book
By clicking on the button“Trade Stocks”, the market overview displays the current
stock prices as well as the best bid and ask offers (cp. Figure B.141). In addition,
the depot positions split into “Holdings available” and “Holdings”. The difference is
that “Holdings” represent real ownership of stocks whereas “Holdings available” are
holdings minus the stocks bounded in open orders in the order book. By clicking a
stock in the product list in the stock overview in Figure B.14, the order book pops
up which is shown in Figure B.15. On the left hand side, the best buy orders are
displayed. On the right side, the best sell orders are displayed.
1Cp. Table 5.1 for the translated names of the innovation alternatives.
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Figure B.16: EnBW - Trading Screen
Orders can be submitted to the system via the trading screen shown in Fig-
ure B.162. Via the radio buttons, traders can select the stock they want to trade
and enter the number of shares and the limit price. The sell or buy action can be
selected via two radio buttons.
Figure B.17: EnBW - Charts
Via the menu button “Market Information” the price history can be reviewed.
In the graph, the historic evolution of stock prices are shown. If the trader wants
to see a single stock, he can filter the view via the buttons on the right side (cp.
Figure B.17).
2Cp. Table 5.1 for the translated names of the innovation alternatives.
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Figure B.18: EnBW - Transactions
After submitting an order, it can either lead to a direct transaction, if a matching
order is already in the order book or it stays in the order book until a matching
order comes in. In Figure B.183, all transactions can be reviewed whereas open
orders can be deleted.
Figure B.19: EnBW - Ranking
Stocks were paid out after the market close. Hence, traders get a monetary
payments depending of how many stocks they have in their portfolio. After the
payout of shares, the money they get affects their total portfolio value. As an
incentive and competitive element, all traders are listed in a ranking-based on their
portfolio value. An example ranking is shown in Figure B.19.
3Cp. Table 5.1 for the translated names of the innovation alternatives.
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Table B.1: Market Statistics - weekwise min/max: The minimum and maximum prices are shown for each contract and each week.
ID Name min1 min2 min3 min4 min5 min6 max1 max2 max3 max4 max5 max6
01 Twitterinfo 2,50 0,27 0,68 0,64 0,19 0,64 9,00 2,00 1,43 2,00 1,00 90,00
02 MEREGIO Platform 6,26 8,99 5,64 0,10 0,10 0,28 50,00 35,00 29,00 29,00 12,00 17,40
03 Home Automation 0,89 3,10 2,64 0,10 5,16 7,17 8,80 6,00 2,64 30,00 14,45 25,00
04 Parallel Document Processing 8,34 8,50 10,87 1,95 6,59 0,10 40,00 20,00 20,00 20,00 39,50 21,00
05 Intelligent Calendar Management 3,80 0,14 2,34 0,50 0,17 1,80 20,00 8,15 2,34 2,34 2,34 5,50
06 Web 2.0 Poster 4,00 0,24 10,01 14,21 4,16 0,10 10,00 5,15 30,00 43,32 40,00 27,95
07 Digitizing Business Cards 4,00 0,75 1,00 1,00 1,24 0,10 7,05 1,00 2,50 5,00 7,40 9,23
08 xing@enbw.com 2,95 16,64 12,83 12,90 4,13 3,86 19,99 100,00 33,00 33,00 33,00 24,00
09 New Contact Networking 5,00 0,27 1,28 0,50 1,30 1,94 8,34 2,50 2,50 6,88 5,90 4,50
10 All in one 9,00 7,00 23,33 1,02 21,63 0,10 50,00 77,00 72,00 10,00 72,00 45,00
11 Hardware Inventory 0,19 0,27 1,47 3,00 0,94 4,10 9,00 3,80 3,00 48,50 48,50 6,99
12 Mobile Metering 5,87 0,25 4,80 3,86 4,07 0,10 12,00 11,67 9,95 10,50 10,50 18,54
Table B.2: Market Statistics - weekwise median/average: The median as well as average prices are shown for each contract and each
week.
ID Name med1 med2 med3 med4 med5 med6 1 2 3 4 5 6
01 Twitterinfo 8,34 2,00 1,43 1,50 1,00 0,99 8,07 1,36 1,18 1,51 0,56 41,49
02 MEREGIO Platform 8,35 20,00 29,00 0,10 12,00 6,00 14,86 24,56 13,87 13,78 6,14 7,81
03 Home Automation 8,80 5,00 2,64 0,10 14,45 11,40 5,86 4,52 2,64 18,08 8,06 13,10
04 Parallel Document Processing 10,00 20,00 15,00 5,00 20,00 0,10 14,04 15,81 14,05 5,42 21,13 6,56
05 Intelligent Calendar Management 9,00 2,00 2,34 2,34 0,17 2,34 7,25 0,30 2,34 2,24 1,39 3,38
06 Web 2.0 Poster 8,34 2,10 30,00 24,00 40,00 6,86 7,53 2,09 17,86 27,33 19,93 5,49
07 Digitizing Business Cards 7,05 1,00 2,50 1,00 5,00 1,55 5,63 0,92 1,62 2,25 5,81 3,16
08 xing@enbw.com 9,50 19,99 33,00 33,00 14,06 24,00 9,91 37,43 18,98 26,30 7,13 10,19
09 New Contact Networking 8,34 2,50 2,50 0,50 5,90 3,30 6,66 1,53 1,62 2,94 2,74 2,96
10 All in one 9,00 9,00 72,00 10,00 72,00 45,00 12,95 22,40 53,34 3,10 50,85 3,05
11 Hardware Inventory 9,00 3,80 3,00 3,00 48,50 4,10 2,71 1,23 2,11 14,09 5,09 5,51
12 Mobile Metering 8,50 11,00 9,95 5,00 10,50 2,39 7,49 8,49 6,92 6,23 6,51 4,09
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Fragebogen – 
Innovationsbewertung 
 
 
 
1. Welche Tätigkeit/Aufgabe begleiten Sie in der EnBW? (Mehrfachnennung möglich) 
 Personalverantwortung 
 Geschäftsverantwortung/Ergebnisverantwortung (Leitung eines Geschäftsbereichs) 
 Mitarbeiter 
 Mitarbeiter, der mit 50% oder mehr seiner Tätigkeit mit innovationsrelevanten Themen beschäftigt ist 
 Sonstiges: 
 
2. Welche Vorschläge des heutigen Tages erachten Sie als besonders aussichtsreich, um 
in einer Projektidee verwirklicht zu werden? Wählen Sie bitte bis zu drei Ideen aus. 
Fire Eagle Pachube Google Latitude 
Barcoo: Mit Barcode-
Scan nutzergenerierte 
Daten abfragen 
Xsights 
     
 
Mobiler 
Ratschlagsservice 
 
Web 3.0 
Geographic 
Peformance 
Report 
Microblogging als 
Marketingool 
Soliocharger: 
Solarakku speichert 
Energie bis zu einem 
Jahr 
     
Tiki Tag Piezo Konverter 
Heim 
Automation 
Digsby: All-In-One 
Lösung für 
Echtzeitkommunikation 
im Internet 
Web 2.0 
Funktionalitäten im 
Projektmanagement 
     
Evernote: 
Gleichzeitige 
Veröffentlichung 
von Informationen 
Google 
Power 
Meter 
 
 
 
   
Figure B.20: EnBW - Questionnaire 1/6
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3. Wie beurteilen Sie den Ansatz, Informationsmärkte zur Bewertung von Innovationen zu 
nutzen? 
sehr gut gut neutral weniger gut        nicht gut 
     
 
4. Wie hoch schätzen Sie Ihren persönlichen Aufwand, diese Methode als Bewertungstool 
in der EnBW zu nutzen? 
sehr aufwändig aufwändig neutral weniger aufwändig        nicht aufwändig 
     
 
5. Wie hoch schätzen Sie Ihre Motivation, einen Informationsmarkt über einen längeren 
Zeitraum zu nutzen? 
sehr hoch hoch neutral niedrig        sehr niedrig 
     
 
6. Denken Sie, dass die EnBW mit Informationsmärkten Innnovationen besser bewerten 
kann/können wird? 
sehr gut gut neutral weniger gut        nicht gut 
     
 
7. Welche Probleme sehen Sie in der Verwendung von Informationsmärkten? 
(Mehrfachnennung möglich) 
 Ich habe keine Zeit, mich über einen längeren Zeitraum mit Informationsmärkten zu beschäftigen 
 Bedienung des Tools ist mir unklar/finde ich unintuitiv 
 Ich weiß nicht, nach welcher Strategie ich handeln soll 
 Ich habe Probleme, den Nutzen/Realisierungsaufwand der Idee einzuschätzen und kann daher keine Informationen im Tool abbilden 
 Sonstiges: 
 
Figure B.21: EnBW - Questionnaire 2/6
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8. a) Was schränkt Sie z.Zt. in ihrer „Innovationstätigkeit“ ein?  (Mehrfachnennung 
möglich) 
 Keinen persönlichen Anreiz, Ideen abzugeben und zu verfolgen 
 Kein Geld zur Ausarbeitung von Konzepten/Prototypen vorhanden 
 Keine Zeit, um mich mit Innovationen zu beschäftigen 
 Keine Austauschmöglichkeiten unter Kollegen/Vorgesetzen 
 Kein Vorschlagssystem vorhanden 
 Sonstiges: 
 
 
8. b) Was wünschen Sie sich zusätzlich, um dies zu verbessern und Sie in ihrer 
„Innovationstätigkeit“ zu unterstützen?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Gibt es einen formalisierten Innovationsprozess in Ihrem Unternehmen/Gesellschaft, 
der von der Ideenfindung bis zur Markteinführung durchlaufen wird? 
 Ja, es gibt einen formalisierten Innovationsprozess für Dienstleistungen, der schriftlich fixiert ist 
 Ja, es gibt einen formalisierten Innovationsprozess für Dienstleistungen, der aber nicht schriftlich fixiert ist 
 Nein, es gibt keinen Innovationsprozess für Dienstleistungen 
 Keine Angabe möglich 
 
10. Besitzen alle Mitarbeiter Ihres Unternehmens/Gesellschaft Freiräume während der 
Arbeitszeit, neue Innovationen zu entwickeln? 
 Ja, hierbei handelt es sich um eine offizielle Regelung des Unternehmens 
 Ja, es wird gerne gesehen, ist aber nicht formal dokumentiert 
 Nein, es wird nicht gerne gesehen 
 Nein, es kommt praktisch nicht vor 
 Keine Aussage möglich  
 
 
Figure B.22: EnBW - Questionnaire 3/6
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11. Angenommen, folgender Prozess würde in Ihrem Unternehmen/Gesellschaft „gelebt“ - 
Wie sehr wären Kunden (interne Kunden als auch Endkunden) in den einzelnen Phasen 
integriert? 
 
Phase gar 
nicht 
gering mittel stark keine 
Angabe 
möglich 
Ideenfindung und Ideensammlung      
Anforderungsanalyse und 
Ideenbewertung      
Dienstleistungskonzeption und 
Investitionsentscheidung      
Dienstleistungsimplementierung      
Testphase      
Markteinführung, Marketing und 
Erfolgskontrolle      
12. Welche der folgenden Tools verwenden Sie innerhalb des Innovationsprozesses von 
Dienstleistungen? 
Tool zur 
Ermittlung von 
Ideen 
Tool für die 
Ideenbewertung 
Tool für die 
Kollaboration 
Tool für die 
Projektsteuerung 
Tool für die 
Prozess-
modellierung 
     
Tools zur 
Kommunikation 
Es werden 
keine Tools 
verwendet 
Keine Angaben 
Möglich 
Sonstiges: 
 
 
   
13. Welche der folgenden Konzepte und Möglichkeiten werden in Ihrem Unternehmen 
genutzt, um Qualität und Potential von Dienstleistungen zu beurteilen? 
Kunden-
beobachtung 
Kunden-
befragung 
Beschwerden-
management 
Kundenforen/ User 
Foren Kundenworkshops 
     
 
Expertenpanels 
 
Lead User 
Konzept 
Keine dieser 
Konzepte und 
Möglichkeiten 
werden genutzt 
Keine Angabe 
möglich 
Sonstiges: 
    
Figure B.23: EnBW - Questionnaire 4/6
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14. Welche der folgenden Methoden verwenden Sie, um neue Dienstleistungsideen zu 
bewerten? 
Checklisten 
Pro- und Contra- 
Methode SWOT-Analyse Nutzwert-Analyse 
    
Kundennutzen-Matrix Investitionsrechnung Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse Keine dieser Methoden wird verwendet 
    
Portfolio-Methoden Keine Angabe möglich 
Sonstiges: 
 
    
 
 
 
 
15. Beurteilen Sie bitte den Grad der Eigeninitiative der Mitarbeiter Ihres 
Unternehmens/Gesellschaft, an der Dienstleistungsinnovation mitzuwirken. 
Stufe 1: Mitarbeiter werden nicht aktiv bis ihr Vorgesetzter dies einfordert 
Stufe 2: Mitarbeiter fragen ihren Vorgesetzen aktiv nach Möglichkeiten, sich zu beteiligen 
Stufe 3: Mitarbeiter empfehlen von sich aus dem Vorgesetzen sinnvolle Aktivitäten und 
führen diese nach Vereinbarung selbstständig durch  
Stufe 4: Mitarbeiter unternimmt eigenverantwortlich Aktivitäten und führen diese nach 
Vereinbarung selbstständig durch 
Stufe 5: Mitarbeiter unternimmt selbstständig Aktivitäten und berichten darüber in längeren 
Abständen regelmäßig 
 Stufe 1 Stufe 2 Stufe 3 Stufe 4 Stufe 5 
 
Wie hoch ist der Grad an 
Eigeninitiative der Mitarbeiter 
ihres Unternehmens? 
 
     
 
Welcher Grad wird von ihrem 
Unternehmen gefördert? 
 
 
     
 
 
Wie wäre Ihrer Meinung nach der 
Idealzustand? 
 
     
Figure B.24: EnBW - Questionnaire 5/6
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16. Für wie geeignet halten Sie folgende Formen der Mitarbeitermotivation? 
 nicht 
geeignet 
weniger 
geeignet 
mäßig 
geeignet 
gut 
geeignet 
sehr gut 
geeignet 
keine Ein-
schätzung 
möglich 
Anerkennung in Form von 
Auszeichnungen durch die 
Geschäfts- oder 
Bereichsleitung 
      
Belohnung in Form von 
Prämien       
Erfolgsbeteiligung an der 
jeweiligen 
Dienstleistungsinnovation 
      
Dienstleistungsinnovation als 
Teil der Zielvereinbarung       
Teilnahme an externen 
Veranstaltungen oder 
Konferenzen 
      
Sonstiges: 
      
 
 
 
Vielen Dank! 
 
Kontakt: 
 
Figure B.25: EnBW - Questionnaire 6/6
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